Trader Leverage Use and Social Interaction: The Performance Implications of Overconfidence and Social Network Participation on Retail Traders by Forman III, John Hall
1 
 
 
 
 
 
Trader Leverage Use and Social Interaction:  
The Performance Implications of Overconfidence and Social Network 
Participation on Retail Traders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted by John Hall Forman III to the University of Exeter  
as a thesis for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy in Finance 
In October 2015 
 
 
 
This thesis is available for Library use on the understanding that it is copyright 
material and that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper 
acknowledgement. 
 
 
 
I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been 
identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the 
award of a degree by this or any other University. 
 
 
 
Signature: ………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
 
  
2 
 
Abstract 
 
Overconfidence and its relationship to investor market participation is 
well established in the finance literature. The research into investors and social 
networks is only in its infancy, however. This thesis extends the literature by 
expanding on both subjects individually, then bringing them together. 
Empirical work on individual investors in the existing literature links 
overconfidence and excess trading, resulting in impaired returns. The preferred 
activity metric, monthly account turnover, encapsulates two separate elements, 
though. One is trade frequency. The other is leverage use. Chapter 4 of this 
thesis theorizes based on the existing literature that in fact trade frequency is 
not a good measure of overconfidence. It then demonstrates through empirical 
analysis of a group of individual non-professional foreign exchange traders that 
leverage is much more suitable to that role.  
Chapter 5 turns the focus to social networks, particularly with respect to 
information transfer. The literature in finance anticipates that network members 
benefit from their membership. Further, network position (social capital) 
enhances that benefit. This thesis challenges that expectation with respect to 
non-professional investors. Findings based on analysis of members of an online 
retail foreign exchange trader social network indicate that while there may be an 
educational benefit accruing to unsophisticated members, for more 
sophisticated ones membership appears to have a negative effect on returns. 
One potential explanation for the negative impact of network membership 
is explored in Chapter 6 in the form of impression management. It is 
hypothesized that sophisticated investors are influenced in their behaviour by 
the realization they are being observed, and also the size of their audience. 
Analysis of foreign exchange traders indicates an increase in leverage use 
among sophisticated investors as their audience size increases, coinciding with 
a decline in trade excess returns, making the case for an observation-based 
rise in overconfidence. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Motivation and Contributions 
The motivation of this thesis is to examine the activity and performance 
of active traders and the factors which motivate their behaviour and influence 
their actions and outcomes. In general terms, this text will contribute to the 
individual investor behavioural literature summarized by Barber and Odean 
(2013) in several ways. First, it will further the work being done to examine the 
behaviour of non-professionals operating in a relatively high frequency trading 
environment (as opposed to the more traditional longer-term investor) and by 
extension how they can influence prices. Second, it will expand the research 
into trading in the foreign exchange market, specifically at the retail (individual 
investor) level, which has thus far only received limited attention because of that 
market’s relatively short period of existence. Third, it will contribute also to the 
very early-stage finance literature which explores the relationship between 
social network participation and investor behaviour and returns, particularly with 
respect to online social networks. All this is achieved by examining three 
specific areas: leverage and overconfidence, network participation influence on 
trader performance, and the influence of observability on trader activity. 
1.1.1. Leverage and overconfidence 
The act of making a trade in the financial markets involves two primary 
decisions at the time of execution. One is whether to trade long or short based 
on the outcome of some analytical process by which expectations for future 
price movement are derived. The other is how large a position to take, which is 
a function of both the amount of capital available as a constraining factor and 
the perceived riskiness of the trade. The position size decision can be 
expressed in terms of leverage, where leverage is simply the ratio of the value 
of the trade relative to the trader’s capital.1 Since the leverage decision is based 
on the trader’s perception of risk and/or opportunity, it is inherently subject to 
the influence of overconfidence. While prior research, most notably Barber and 
Odean (2000), has reflected the relationship between leverage use and 
                                            
1
 This ratio is generally expressed in market usage as N:1, where N would equal 1 when trade 
value equals capital. For equity market investors, N is generally less than 1, while for 
participants in the futures and forex markets N is quite often double digits, or even higher, 
indicating the taking on of positions many times the value of the underlying capital. 
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overconfidence-driven investing performance, it has done so in an 
undifferentiated way. That is to say, leverage thus far has been a factor in the 
extant literature as part of aggregate measures of trading activity such as 
turnover, but has mainly not been segregated for analysis in its own right. 
The relationship specifically between leverage and overconfidence is 
explicitly evaluated in Chapter 4. Using retail forex trader data in this regard 
provides considerable opportunity to do so thanks to the ample leverage 
allowed in that market, as well as the relatively high trade frequency. While a 
starting point is to confirm a negative relationship between returns and the level 
of leverage employed by a trader, which is accomplished employing quintiling 
methods similar to those of Barber and Odean (2000), this is far from sufficient 
given the context of a negative-sum market such as retail forex (as documented 
in Chapter 2). Trading larger positions, just as trading more frequently, all else 
being equal, will inherently result in more negative returns in a negative 
expectancy environment. As a result, to properly assess the link between 
proposed indicators of overconfidence such as leverage use and trade 
frequency (as the two contributors to turnover) it is necessary to control for the 
nature of the market in question. Benchmarking techniques have been 
employed in the prior literature to accomplish this, but they are not available in 
retail forex. The result is the requirement to analyse performance on a more 
granular basis at the per trade level. This is accomplished using regression 
modelling. The results not only support the hypothesis that increased leverage 
use is indicative of increased overconfidence, even when factoring for 
overconfidence influencing factors such as experience and investor 
sophistication, but also that leverage is a better indication of overconfidence 
than is transactional frequency. 
The findings of Chapter 4 extend the research into overconfidence and 
trading activity, therefore, in a number of ways. First, it expands it into a market 
which has not, thus far played much of a part in the research because of its 
relative newness and limitations on data availability. Second, it brings leverage 
to the fore as an important indicator of overconfident trading behaviour. Third, it 
shows how overconfident trading does not simply impair performance because 
of the impact of added trading costs, but in fact results in worse trades being 
executed. All of this is accomplished while controlling for elements such as 
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trader experience and sophistication which should impact on an individual’s 
tendency toward overconfident trading. 
1.1.2. Network participation influence on trader performance 
Do traders actually benefit from being connected with other traders and 
exchanging information with them? The literature developed thus far presents a 
mixed picture. There is evidence in support of the idea that being part of a 
network, and in particularly being a well-positioned member of said network, 
can be highly beneficial (Ozsoylev et al., 2011, Horton et al., 2012). Those 
results tend to presuppose the existence of private fundamental information in 
the network, however. In the context of a network comprised almost entirely of 
retail traders or investors, it is highly questionable whether such information is 
present. This is particularly true in the case of a market where a small number 
of instruments are traded and fundamental (valuation-determining) information 
is both readily available and slow-changing.  
That said, non-fundamental private information may be found in a 
network which could provide a benefit to its members – for example, education 
or sentiment. Analysis of a network of traders participating in the kind of market 
which features highly public, infrequently changing fundamentals and a limited 
number of tradable instruments would offer the opportunity to make an 
evaluation exclusionary of the influence of private fundamental information. This 
is the motivating factor behind Chapter 5, which explores the information 
transmission idea from the perspective of retail foreign exchange traders. 
One cannot evaluate information transmission without also considering 
the influence of the context in which that transmission takes place and the 
impact that may have on those involved. The literature has thus far only begun 
trying to answer related questions. For example, the likes of Hong et al. (2004) 
suggest that being social plays a part in determining how active a given trader 
or investor is as a market participant. To the extent that excess trading could be 
linked to overconfidence (Odean, 1999), the implication is that aspects of being 
a part of a social network could have an impact on returns. Finally, the literature 
suggests that being part of a network could tend to alter one’s views and/or 
behaviours, which certainly has the potential to play a meaningful role in trader 
performance. 
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The way information receipt drives potential behaviour changes amongst 
those participating in a social network is addressed in Chapter 5. It is 
accomplished by examining key metrics of trading activity to see the degree to 
which they change based on network membership and one’s position in the 
network. This then provides a basis for at least starting to understand the 
driving factors behind the changes in returns seen after traders join the network. 
The findings presented point to a strong positive influence from the network for 
those in a position to gain educational benefits, but at the same time a strong 
negative (presumably social) influence on performance for those individuals for 
whom education is not a major consideration. Interestingly, in the latter case the 
potentially explanatory factors of socially driven increased trade frequency, 
information driven overconfidence, and/or network motivated changes in risk 
aversion prove not to be explanatory. 
Chapter 5 thus extends the literature in multiple ways. First, it expands 
the fledgling use of actual (as opposed to hypothetical) social network data in 
finance, in particular as it relates to the online space, and continues to explore 
the idea of social capital. Second, it extends the literature related to the 
transmission of information between and amongst investors, particularly where 
it relates to high frequency market participants. Third, it expands the research in 
the area of the linkage between social interaction and investor behaviour. 
Fourth, it expands the consideration of heterogeneity with respect to the 
performance and behaviour of traders and investors. Fifth, it further develops 
the research into potential herding behaviour and peer effects. 
1.1.3. The influence of observability on trader activity 
Are investors influenced by having others watch them participate in the 
markets? The psychology research would suggest that is probably the case. 
The finance literature has explored this subject to a limited degree, mainly 
looking at it from the perspective of what one shares with others on a filtered, 
voluntary basis. What if the information is not filtered, though? What if an 
investor had an audience watching every trade they make? The psychology 
literature makes a good case for some sort of behavioural impact as the 
investor looks to influence the way they appear to others. 
Chapter 6 explores the idea of observer effects on investors by 
examining members of a retail foreign exchange social network. The particular 
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network in question offers a somewhat unique structure whereby members are 
able to see each other’s trading activity in virtual real time with no filtering. That 
provides the opportunity to ascertain whether having others watch them alters 
an investor’s decision-making. The areas of risk aversion, trade disposition, 
overconfidence, and market timing alternation are all examined in this context. 
The findings point to negative audience size effects with regards to 
overconfidence and market timing, with potentially broader effects in the areas 
of disposition and risk aversion. 
The findings presented in Chapter 6 extend the literature by developing 
the concepts of observer effects and impression management with respect to 
finance. It also furthers the research into financial social networks and their 
influence on members and member performance. Additionally, it extends the 
behavioural finance literature with respect to the topics of overconfidence and 
trade disposition. 
1.1.4. The study group and data source 
Central to the analysis described above is the dataset employed 
throughout this thesis. It comes from a retail (individual) foreign exchange trader 
online social network. While equity market investor studies are quite common in 
the finance literature, the same cannot be said for participants in the forex 
market. Studying retail forex traders in particular allows for both extending prior 
studies of equity market investors in a new direction and the examining a group 
of market participants who are fairly homogeneous as mainly speculators and 
who tend to operate in a high frequency manner. As documented in Chapter 2, 
the retail forex market has a somewhat unique position within the overall market 
structure. This offers some interesting research opportunities, both in terms of 
high frequency actors and looking at activities which have a limited impact on 
market prices. 
The fact that the data under consideration comes from a social network 
makes it novel with respect to the finance literature. Social network analysis is 
beginning to make inroads in the research. This dataset directly links network 
participation with transactional activity and returns, as documented in Chapter 
3, allowing for the merging of some of the key areas of research in behavioural 
finance with social considerations within a network context. 
18 
 
1.2. Thesis Structure 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 provides a description 
of the retail foreign exchange market – its structure, mechanics, and 
participants. Retail foreign exchange – as differentiated from inter-bank or 
futures market foreign exchange trading - is the primary focus of the empirical 
work presented in subsequent chapters. Chapter 3 follows with a definition and 
description of the dataset used in the research herein, a relatively novel dataset 
which comes from a retail forex trader social network. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are 
the primary research chapters. Chapter 7 concludes, notes some important 
caveats, and presents considerations for future work. 
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Chapter 2: The Retail Spot Forex Market 
Structure and Participants 
2.1. Introduction  
The structure of the institutional foreign exchange (forex) market is well 
documented, with King et al. (2012) providing a recent summation of its current 
state. It is a market dominated by an over-the-counter (OTC) inter-bank system 
whereby exchange rates are determined in a decentralized multiple-dealer 
structure, with the spot market as the driving force, though not necessarily 
representing the largest volume sector (Lyons, 2001).  
What is less well documented is the retail (individual investor) spot forex 
market. This is unsurprising since until only relatively recently it was virtually 
non-existent. Retail forex trading has only been active in earnest since around 
the year 2000 (King et al., 2012), facilitated by the development of online 
trading platforms made available by retail aggregators,2 which allow for smaller 
minimum transaction sizes than commonly traded in the inter-bank and futures 
markets.3 Previously, the retail segment was considered too small to be 
economically interesting by banks (BIS, 2013). 
Through the aggregators, the retail market also has a decentralized 
multiple-dealer structure in a fashion similar to the inter-bank market, with an 
array of institutions providing pricing and transactional capacity. The difference, 
however, is that the aggregators are largely price takers. Those using a dealer 
model may simply pass along inter-bank spot prices received from liquidity 
providers (generally inter-bank dealers), perhaps with a spread mark-up (King 
and Rime, 2010). Those using a pure broker model merely provide access to an 
electronic communication network (ECN) where orders are matched in an 
exchange-like system. The ECN model is the less frequently applied of the two. 
That said, however, it must be noted that aggregators do not necessarily 
operate in a single-model fashion. For a number of reasons (redundancy of 
                                            
2
 Retail aggregators are commonly referred to in the market as brokers, though there is actually 
a mixture of dealer and broker models employed. 
3
 The online platforms also no doubt contributed to more active trading, as per the findings of 
Barber and Odean (2001). 
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systems, risk management, etc.) any given aggregator may operate multiple 
models side-by-side.4 
On the surface, therefore, the retail spot forex market looks rather like 
the institutional spot market in that it features a number of price-making entities 
servicing a larger group of price-taking ones, with Figure 2.1 providing a basic 
indication of the relationship between the different parties. This belies the fact, 
however, that much of the exchange rate pricing in the retail market is simply 
passed down from the inter-bank arena. The retail forex structure is thus 
effectively a step removed from the inter-bank market. As a result, it is not a 
meaningful price discovery mechanism. 
 
Figure 2.1 – The primary parties in the retail forex market 
Those who hold, or may hold, net positions appear in rounded boxes, while non-
position-holding entities are in rectangles. Solid arrows indicate the direction of order 
flow. Single direction dotted arrows indicate the direction of price dissemination, 
indicating price-maker/taker relationships. Double-direction arrows indicate two-way 
price flow. 
 
It must be noted, however, that in the retail spot forex market there is no 
actual exchange of currencies. This will be explained in Section 2.3, but some 
of the implications are important to address here as this structure has led to 
accusations of the aggregators acting like so-called “bucket shops”. If applying 
the Raines and Leathers (1994) description of bucket shops as being places 
where no buying or selling takes place, but rather both sides merely pretend to 
do so with an obligation to pay based on price changes (making them a form of 
derivatives market), then there is justification for such characterizations. This 
                                            
4
 The workings of one particular retail forex aggregator are described in Nolte & Nolte (2011) 
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assessment is made by the numerous accusations of fraudulent practices – 
both anecdotal and regulator-initiated – aimed at aggregators over the years.5 
With this in mind, the retail aggregators are now much more regulated 
than the inter-bank players in that countries have begun developing and 
enforcing rules and guidelines6 as a consumer protection mechanism, with the 
US and Japan leading the way (King and Rime, 2010, King et al., 2012). This 
serves to blunt the bucket shop accusations, at least in terms of the more 
dubious aggregator activities. Though in some parts of the world the regulation 
of retail forex remains limited or non-existent, in recent years the overall 
impression is one of a more controlled and transparent environment – much 
less “Wild West”. 
Despite the concerns about aggregators acting like bucket shops, retail 
participation in forex nevertheless is an example of rapid growth since its 
inception. Galati et al. (2007) note that Japanese investors alone were indicated 
by one source to have grown from under 2,000 accounts at the start of 2003 to 
nearly 120,000 in 2007,7 and a survey of five of the largest global retail 
aggregators indicated that daily traded volumes rose over 300% from 2007 to 
2010 (King and Rime, 2010). The latter suggests long trading hours, liquidity, 
low transaction costs, and the availability of high levels of leverage as being the 
main drivers of increased retail participation in the forex market. The ability to 
trade readily from both the long and short side and low initial capital 
requirements were both additionally noted in survey results (CitiFX, 2010a). 
Investor discontent with the equity market, which during the observed 
period was going through many upheavals (bear markets, corporate scandals, 
etc.), is likely to be an undocumented contributing factor as well. This is not to 
suggest, however, that retail spot forex trading can be viewed as a substitute for 
long-term stock market investing (particularly that related to personal retirement 
accounts and similar structures). As will be shown, retail forex is primarily a 
short-term speculator market. That suggests any transition to it from stocks 
predominantly comprises equity investors operating in similar time frames, with 
similar objectives. 
                                            
5
 The Forex Peace Army website is a place where many of the former can be found – 
http://www.forexpeacearmy.com/public/forex_broker_reviews. 
6
 Margin requirements, standard accounting methods, minimum aggregator capital levels, price 
slippage fairness, etc. 
7
 According to Rime and Schrimpf (2013), Japan has a 36% share of retail spot forex volume, 
more than the next two markets (US and UK) combined. 
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Forex Magnates estimates that in 2011 daily volume among retail 
investors was $217bln per day (Magnates, 2011), which compares to an 
estimate from 2010 of $125bln-$150bln from King and Rime (2010) based on 
that year’s Bank for International Settlements triennial survey (BIS, 2010). 
Indicative of how elusive good volume figures are in this decentralized market, 
however, Segal (2012b) estimates daily volume in April 2012 as $172bln, with 
limited (if any) real growth in activity since 2010 when volumes were suggested 
to have seen their highest monthly reading. Forex Magnates supports the 
flattening volume trend during that period, with steadily declining volume in 
Japan over the previous two years contributory to the levelling pattern 
(Magnates, 2012). This corresponds with the number of active trading accounts 
among the US retail aggregators reporting to the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) holding fairly steady between Q2 2010 and Q2 2012, as 
reported in Greenberg (2010) and Greenberg (2012a) respectively.  
There was concern that increased regulation, changing market 
dynamics, and/or simple maturation of the markets may have led to a 
stabilization in retail forex volumes, but they expanded once more in 2013. The 
2013 BIS volume survey (BIS, 2014) indicates a continuation in the general 
uptrend in overall foreign exchange volumes, seeing the average daily turnover 
crossing the $5trln level. Segal (2013) reports that estimates of the June 2013 
retail volume averaged $329bln daily, indicated as an all-time record which was 
subsequently extended to $360bln in October 2014 (LeapRate, 2015). This 
figure actually matches, or even exceeds, the total daily trading volume of the 
global equity markets noted by Rime and Schrimpf (2013). Additionally, there is 
a modest uptick in the number of active US trading accounts in 2013 over 2012 
based on the quarterly aggregator reporting referenced above (Greenberg, 
2012a, Greenberg, 2012b, Greenberg, 2012c, Finberg, 2013a, Finberg, 2013b, 
Greenberg, 2013, Siddiqui, 2013, Finberg, 2014). 
2.2. Linking Retail Forex to the Inter-Bank Market 
The involvement of liquidity providers in offering pricing and transactional 
capacity to the retail aggregators links the retail spot forex market with the 
broader currency market, as those providers are mainly inter-bank dealers. 
Without them, retail forex would effectively be a self-contained construct – a 
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kind of virtual market (as per the bucket shop discussion above). In many ways 
that remains largely the case in as much as individual investor positions are 
matched against either each other or against dealer aggregators. 
There are investor position imbalances, however, where retail traders are 
collectively either net long or short a given currency pair. Historical net position 
figures published by OANDA (2012), shown in Figure 2.2, provide a sampling 
from one of the largest global aggregators (Magnates, 2012), which likely 
means it can be assumed to be fairly representative of the patterns in the 
market as a whole. FXCM, the largest global retail aggregator, publishes similar 
positioning figures via its DailyFX unit,8 which also documents such imbalances. 
It is, in fact, rare that customer positions actually balance out, and at times the 
imbalances can be quite substantial. This implies the existence in the retail 
forex system of one or more institutions holding a net position which offsets the 
aggregate individual investor imbalance. To a certain degree, that is handled by 
those aggregators acting in market-making dealer roles, at least within the 
constraints of their risk management policies. 
 
Figure 2.2 – Net Positions in EUR/USD Over a 12-month Period 
One year of net investor positions in EUR/USD with an overlay of the EUR/USD 
exchange rate (black line). The histogram values are determined by subtracting short 
positions from long positions. For example, if there were 60% longs and 40% shorts, 
the reading would be 20. Source - OANDA 
 
 
The liquidity providers are the institutions at the end of the retail 
imbalance chain. Through the orders passed directly to them by the 
                                            
8
 http://www.dailyfx.com/technical_analysis/sentiment 
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dealer/broker aggregators, they have immediate exposure to the imbalances 
which develop. This is furthered by any hedging capacity they provide to the 
market-making aggregators. To the extent that these imbalances are not 
handled through internalization, which is something noted as broadly increasing 
by King et al. (2012) and suggested by Rime and Schrimpf (2013) as potentially 
being as high as 75%-85%, it is then expected that they offset them externally. 9 
This liquidity provider internalization motivates questions as to how much 
of an impact the noted retail imbalances have on the inter-bank market. The 
OANDA net position figures show a nearly 50% short imbalance for EUR/USD 
on December 15, 2012 (see Figure 2.2). That translates to 25% long positions 
set against 75% shorts. There are no published figures regarding total retail 
spot forex open position volume like the Commitment of Traders report 
published weekly by the CFTC,10 so it is hard to know what a 50% imbalance 
means in those terms. One can get some basic idea of potential exchange rate 
market impact by looking at the retail forex volume, though. 
The latest BIS (2014) survey figures indicate average daily inter-bank 
spot market turnover of approximately $2.0trln. If the $329bln per day Segal 
June 2013 estimate is used, then a 50% overall order imbalance coming out of 
the retail market in net supply/demand on a given day would represent about 
8% of total daily inter-bank market turnover. Of course the 50% imbalance is on 
the extreme end of readings and comes from only a single currency pair, so one 
would expect to see smaller imbalances for the retail market taken as a whole. 
Rime and Schrimpf (2013) suggest that retail trading accounts for only 3.8% of 
spot market turnover in terms of the flows which actually reach the bank dealer 
level. The rest are internalized by liquidity providers, as well as lower down the 
channel in the retail platforms.11 This implies a limited impact on exchange rates 
at the inter-bank level, counter to the conclusions drawn by Barber et al. 
(2009b) and Barber et al. (2009c) that retail order imbalances create a noise 
trader effect of pushing prices too far.12 Further, liquidity providers largely view 
retail investors as uninformed, so are generally more willing to hold their net 
                                            
9
 While the liquidity providers cannot create exact contract offsets outside the retail market 
because of the non-deliverable nature of retail forex contracts, they can reasonably hedge 
externally any exchange rate exposure which develops. 
10
 http://www.cftc.gov/marketreports/commitmentsoftraders/index.htm 
11
 Rime and Schrimpf (2013) indicate that internalization rates vary considerably by currency 
pair, but are unlikely to exceed 50% (GBP/USD indicated as 15%-20% as an example). 
12
 Which is not to say noise trading among institutional level market participants cannot do 
exactly that. 
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positions in inventory (King et al., 2012) than perhaps would be the case with 
institutional counterparties, assuming they are not internalized against inter-
bank customer flows.  
That said, large imbalances in some of the less liquid currency pairs and 
imbalances hitting at times when general market liquidity is low could see retail 
flows exert a short-term influence on exchange rates. This is particularly true in 
the case of a “hot potato” effect among inter-bank dealers (Lyons, 1997).13 
Further, to the extent that liquidity providers are able to ascertain which group(s) 
of retail investors are informed - providing them with a kind of private 
information, as suggested by Lyons (2001) - they will be less inclined to hold 
their inventory and more likely to attempt to quickly offset their exposure to such 
players externally. Thus, even as uninformed or noise traders (Black, 1986), 
retail forex investors may have some impact on exchange rates as suggested 
by Long et al. (1990) and Kogan et al. (2006).  
2.3. Retail Spot Forex Trading Mechanics 
While nominally called a spot market, retail forex operates differently 
than the inter-bank spot version. The latter involves transactions in which the 
exchange of one currency for another is set to occur on a settlement date in the 
near future (1-2 business days) at a specific exchange rate. It is functionally 
very like a short-dated forward contract. Unless a later agreement offsets this 
transaction, the two parties will do the agreed upon exchange, at the designated 
rate, when the appointed day and time arrives. 
No exchange of currency ever takes place in the retail forex market. This 
is not to say, however, that retail spot forex is a cash-settled futures or non-
deliverable forward (NDF) market, though it can be viewed very similarly to both 
in certain ways, as will be shown below. 
A retail spot forex transaction starts in a manner similar to one in the 
inter-bank market with an agreement to do a future exchange. There is never 
any settlement, however. Instead, at the end of each trading day - assuming no 
offsetting intervening transaction - the agreement is automatically rolled forward 
                                            
13
 Rime and Schrimpf (2013) suggest that structural changes in the global foreign exchange 
market mean dealers are no longer necessarily at the centre of “hot potato” trading, but that 
such trading through non-dealer market makers continue to influence exchange rates. 
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to the next available settlement date.14 The result is that these quasi-forward 
contracts are perpetual, with no expiration or delivery date. 
Since there is no exchange of currency, retail spot forex trading is 
completely focused on the movement of exchange rates. These are quoted in 
the same standard XXX/YYY fashion as seen in the inter-bank market whereby 
XXX is 3-letter ISO 4217 (a.k.a.  SWIFT) code for the base currency, and YYY 
is similarly the code for the quote currency. The reading of these exchange 
rates is that one unit of the base currency is worth N units of the quote currency. 
For example, EUR/USD is the exchange rate between the euro and the US 
dollar, where the former is the base and the latter the quote. Thus, a reading of 
1.2000 for EUR/USD would indicate €1 as being worth $1.20. 
When entering into a retail spot forex position, as in the case of futures 
and NDFs, the investor posts margin equivalent to some fraction of the value of 
the transaction. For example, US aggregators registered with the National 
Futures Association (NFA) and/or CFTC must require the posting of at least 2% 
in initial margin, depending on which currencies are involved (more in the case 
of lower-liquidity pairs). This is not a down payment on a loan for the purchase 
of an asset, unlike margin deposits in the stock market. Rather it is a deposit to 
reduce the aggregator’s credit risk in the case of customer losses from adverse 
exchange rate movements, as in the futures market. 
Also similar to the case of the futures market, positions in retail spot forex 
are subject to mark-to-market accounting. This is done in real time on a 
continuous basis, which allows for a wrinkle in the margin call mechanism. 
When an investor’s account equity (cash minus open position losses) falls 
below the required maintenance margin level, rather than issuing a request for 
additional funds, as is the traditional case in the futures and equity markets, the 
aggregator in most cases simply closes out the investor’s position(s) with 
immediate effect. This takes place no matter when during the trading day it 
happens. These automatic forced closures further reduce the aggregator’s 
credit risk, and actually serve to prevent the investor from going into a negative 
equity situation in all but the most extreme situations.15 The result is the ability 
                                            
14
 Global aggregators commonly use 16:00 or 17:00 New York time as the end of the trading 
day, but some more regional ones operate on a schedule appropriate to their primary time zone. 
15
 The January 2015 move by the Swiss National Bank to no longer support the EUR/CHF 
exchange rate was one such extreme event. The resulting volatility not only resulted in trader 
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of the aggregator to provide greater leverage to the investor than would 
otherwise have been prudent.16 
2.4. Retail Forex as a Zero-sum game 
Because retail forex is based on obligations rather than asset transfers – 
agreements to do a future exchange of currency, albeit ones which never 
actually happen – it means there must be opposing long and short sides to all 
open positions. Where a retail aggregator acts in a dealer fashion it is nominally 
the counter-party to all customer positions, with the aggregator hedging 
positional imbalances externally as per its risk management policies. Where the 
aggregator operates in a broker fashion, while legally it may still be official 
counter-party, the effective counter-party will be external - a liquidity provider, 
another aggregator, the customer of another aggregator matched via an ECN, 
or some combination thereof. 
Regardless of the aggregator model, for each customer long there must 
either be a customer or an institution short on the other side somewhere in the 
market, and vice versa. That means every change in exchange rates is at once 
financially benefitting one party and harming another by the same amount. This 
is reflected in the following profitability functions for the two counterparties to the 
transaction: 
  𝐿 = 𝑃𝑇 − 𝑃0  (2.1) 
  𝑆 = 𝑃0 − 𝑃𝑇  (2.2) 
where 
L is the gain/loss for the long 
S is the gain/loss for the short 
𝑃0 is the spot exchange rate at time t=0 (trade entry point) 
𝑃𝑇 is the spot exchange rate at time T (trade close or other profit 
measurement point) 
                                                                                                                                
losses, but also significant broker ones. See http://www.wsj.com/articles/switzerland-scraps-
currency-cap-1421320531.  
16
 Before the initiation of a cap of 50:1 leverage in the US, 100:1 leverage and higher was 
commonly available. That remains the case today in much of the world. Japan and South Korea 
are exceptions as leverage regulations there have become even stricter than in the US (Segal, 
2012a). 
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The above functions work equally for either point-based or currency-
denominated profit/loss calculations. In the latter case, one would simply 
multiply through by the number of base currency units to get a change in value 
in quote currency terms.  
Since the 𝑃0 and 𝑃𝑇 terms above offset, there is a simple zero-sum 
structure to each position: 
  𝐿 + 𝑆 = 0  (2.3) 
 
By way of example, say Investor A expects EUR/USD to appreciate from 
its current rate of 1.20 and wants to go long 100,000 euros against the dollar. 
To do so, someone (Investor B) must be found who is willing to go long 120,000 
dollars against the euro (100,000 x $1.20). The transaction being done, Investor 
A will benefit from a rise in EUR/USD to the detriment of Investor B, and vice 
versa in the case of a fall. If EUR/USD rises to 1.30, the 100,000 euros is worth 
$130,000 - a $10,000 gain for Investor A and a $10,000 loss for Investor B. The 
gains and losses net out.  No wealth is ever gained or lost, just transferred 
between investors. 
2.5. Retail Forex as a Negative-sum game 
Like all traded markets, retail spot forex features bid-ask pricing. All 
transactions done whereby the aggregator is acting as dealer puts the customer 
in a price-taker position (buy at the offer, sell at the bid), as do all those where 
the aggregator is merely passing through prices from a liquidity provider. In the 
case where the aggregator passes customer orders through to an ECN for 
order matching there is the prospect for the customer to be a price-maker 
through the use of limit orders, but all market orders will put the customer in a 
price-taker position. As a result, the majority of transactions see the customer 
on the wrong side of the bid-ask spread. An adjustment therefore needs to be 
made to Equations 2.1 and 2.2 to reflect bid-offer pricing: 
  𝐿 = 𝑃𝑏,𝑇 − 𝑃𝑜,0  (2.4) 
  𝑆 = 𝑃𝑏,0 − 𝑃𝑜,𝑇  (2.5) 
where 
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𝑃𝑏,0 and 𝑃𝑜,0 are respectively the bid and offer spot exchange rates at 
time t=0 
𝑃𝑏,𝑇 and 𝑃𝑜,𝑇 are respectively the bid and offer spot exchange rates at 
time T 
It is worth noting that now the situation is such that both the long and 
short could lose. This would occur if the market failed to move sufficiently for 
one side to overcome the bid-offer spread. That can be demonstrated by 
imagining the case where a position is opened and immediately closed before 
the market could move. The long would have entered at the offer price and 
exited at the bid price, while the short would have entered at the bid and exited 
at the offer. In this case both would lose the bid-offer spread, so L + S = 2(𝑃𝑏0-
𝑃𝑜0). 
The change to account for bid-offer pricing means the Equation 2.3 
equivalency no longer holds. It must be adjusted as follows, with the addition of 
the term C to account for any commissions paid: 
  𝐿 + 𝑆 = (𝑃𝑏,𝑇 − 𝑃𝑜,0) + (𝑃𝑏,0 − 𝑃𝑜,𝑇) − 𝐶  (2.6) 
 
The result of accounting for the bid-offer spread and any commissions or 
other fees levied by aggregators is a negative-sum market for the aggregate of 
investors. The market as a whole remains zero-sum, so there must be a 
positive side offsetting the negative investor side. This is the liquidity providers 
and market-making aggregators who are on the right side of the spread (and 
collecting any commissions).  
To get some idea of just how much money is shifted out of retail investor 
accounts and into the hands of those institutions through the bid-ask spread, an 
estimate can be derived.  The most actively traded currency pair is EUR/USD 
(BIS, 2010). As a result it has a very tight spread that is often just about 1 pip 
(King et al., 2012), which equates to 1/10,000 of a US dollar. At an exchange 
rate of 1.3000 for EUR/USD the spread is worth about 0.008% of the value of a 
transaction. Using the $329bln June 2013 average daily volume estimate noted 
above, and multiplying that spread value through, the result is a bid-ask cost 
estimate of about $26.3 million per day. This, of course, is actually an 
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unrealistically low estimate as the spread for other currency pairs is not as 
narrow as the one for EUR/USD. 
There’s an additional element which needs to be included for a full 
understanding of how much of a negative-sum game retail forex trading is in 
aggregate for investors (and, conversely, positive for the liquidity providers and 
aggregators). From the perspective of profitability and risk exposure, a retail 
spot forex transaction functions as if one borrows a given currency, exchanges 
it for another, and invests the proceeds, then reverses the process when the 
trade is closed.17  More specifically, it is as if the long side has borrowed the 
quote currency and invested an equivalent amount of the base currency (based 
on the exchange rate at position entry), and vice versa for the short. Thus, an 
investor’s profitability is the gain/loss on the exchange rate change, less any 
commission paid, plus the net cumulative difference between the interest 
earned and the interest paid. The latter is the so-called interest carry. It is paid 
or received (depending on which side of the spread one falls) at the end of each 
day when the spot position is rolled forward to the next settlement date. 18 
Thus, the investor profitability functions for each side look like this: 
  
𝐿 = (𝑃𝑇 − 𝑃0) − 𝐶 + ∑(𝑖𝑏,𝑑𝑃𝑑 − 𝑖𝑞,𝑑)
𝑛
𝑑=0
 
 (2.7) 
  
𝑆 = (𝑃0 − 𝑃𝑇) − 𝐶 + ∑(𝑖𝑞,𝑑 − 𝑖𝑏,𝑑𝑃𝑑)
𝑛
𝑑=0
 
 (2.8) 
where 
𝑃𝑑 is the spot exchange rate at the rollover of day d (n being the number 
of days held) 
𝑖𝑏,𝑑 is the 1-day overnight interest rate of the base currency at rollover of 
day d 
𝑖𝑞,𝑑 is the 1-day overnight interest rate of the quote currency at rollover of 
day d 
                                            
17
 This doesn’t actually happen, but the accounting for gains, losses, and interest rate 
differentials accruing to the holder of a position operates as if it does. 
18
 The manner by which aggregators deal with interest carry varies. There is even at least one 
broker who employs continuous carry such that it is not just positions held beyond the end of the 
trading day which earn/pay the interest differential. 
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Notice that 𝑃𝑑 is used to convert the interest on the base currency to 
quote currency terms. This normalizes the total carry interest into quote 
currency terms to match the rest of the equation. 
For example, someone going long EUR/USD has a return function equal 
to one where they borrow dollars overnight, convert them into euros at the 
current spot rate, then invest the euros overnight. Such an investor is then 
subject to both exchange rate movement and the spread in the overnight 
interest rates between the euro and the dollar.  
The result of this structure is that interest carry accrued while holding a 
retail spot forex position will approximate the premium/discount priced into a 
forward contract of equivalent time to delivery (assuming covered interest 
parity). The difference is that the interest rate differential will be debited to, or 
credited from, the investor’s account daily when holding a spot position, 
whereas in the forward that income/loss will come as a narrowing in the basis 
as the contract approaches delivery. 
 This can be expressed for a long position (in terms of the base currency 
in a pair) as: 
  
𝐹0 − 𝑃0 ≅ ∑(𝑖𝑏,𝑑𝑃𝑑 − 𝑖𝑞,𝑑)
𝑛
𝑑=0
  
 (2.9) 
where 
𝐹0 is the forward exchange rate at time t=0 
Substituting the forward price equation for 𝐹0 produces: 
  
𝑃0
(1 + 𝑟𝑏,0)
(1 + 𝑟𝑞,0)
− 𝑃0 ≅ ∑(𝑖𝑏,𝑑𝑃𝑑 − 𝑖𝑞,𝑑)
𝑛
𝑑=0
  
 (2.10) 
 
Or in the case of a short position: 
  
𝑃0 − 𝑃0
(1 + 𝑟𝑏)
(1 + 𝑟𝑞)
≅ ∑(𝑖𝑞,𝑑 − 𝑖𝑏,𝑑𝑃𝑑)
𝑛
𝑑=0
  
 (2.11) 
where  
𝑟𝑏,0 is the n-period interest rate of the base currency at time t=0 
𝑟𝑞,0 is the n-period interest rate of the quote currency at time t=0 
Because the left side of the equation features a ratio for the interest 
differential whereas the right side features a summation, the two sides of the 
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equation do not quite equate, even when the i and r rates are equivalent. For 
example, if spot EUR/USD is currently 1.2000 with the 1-yr EUR and USD rates 
are 2% and 1% respectively, it would mean a 1-yr forward rate of 1.2119 (1.2  x  
1.02/1.01 = 1.2119), resulting in an interest differential (basis) return of 0.0119 if 
one were to go short the forward against a non-interest bearing long cash EUR 
position. By comparison, if EUR/USD held constant at 1.2000 through the full 
year, one would see a 0.0140 cumulative interest carry return (0.02 x 1.2 – 
0.01) on a long retail spot position. What creates the potential for a greater or 
smaller disequilibrium is the fact that the r rates in Equations 2.10 and 2.11 are 
fixed while the i rates are variable (as is 𝑃𝑑). 
Bringing the long and short sides of the retail spot forex position together, 
the total net interest carry (N) can be expressed in this fashion: 
  
𝑁 = ∑(𝑖𝑏,𝑜,𝑑𝑃𝑑 − 𝑖𝑞,𝑏,𝑑)
𝑛
𝑑=0
+ ∑(𝑖𝑞,𝑜,𝑑 − 𝑖𝑏,𝑏,𝑑𝑃𝑑)
𝑛
𝑑=0
  
 (2.12) 
where 
𝑖𝑏,𝑏,𝑑 and 𝑖𝑏,𝑜,𝑑 are the bid and offer overnight rates respectively for the 
base currency at rollover on day d 
𝑖𝑞,𝑏,𝑑 and 𝑖𝑞,𝑜,𝑑 are the bid and offer overnight rates respectively for the 
quote currency at rollover on day d 
The bid-ask granularity on the overnight interest rates in Equation 2.12 is 
required because aside from expressing the reality of the markets, it also 
facilitates understanding of how carry interest is not zero-sum, as perhaps 
would be expected. Since 𝑖𝑏,𝑜,𝑑 < 𝑖𝑏,𝑏,𝑑 and 𝑖𝑞,𝑜,𝑑  < 𝑖𝑞,𝑏,𝑑 (bid interest rates being 
higher than offered rates), the amount earned on the long currency of each side 
is less than that paid on each short side. Thus, N will always be negative. 
Moreover, it is possible for both the long and short to experience 
negative interest carry. This would come about if the interest rates of the two 
currencies are sufficiently close together or the bid-offer spreads sufficiently 
wide to create a situation where the offer rate on the long currency is lower than 
the bid rate on the short currency, or vice versa. 
Adding in the carry interest, the full expression of the net cumulative 
return of a retail forex position becomes: 
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𝐿 + 𝑆 = (𝑃𝑏,𝑇 − 𝑃𝑜,0) + (𝑃𝑏,0 − 𝑃𝑜,𝑇) − 𝐶 + ∑(𝑖𝑏,𝑜,𝑑𝑃𝑑 − 𝑖𝑞,𝑏,𝑑)
𝑛
𝑑=0
+ ∑(𝑖𝑞,𝑜,𝑑 − 𝑖𝑏,𝑏,𝑑𝑃𝑑)
𝑛
𝑑=0
  
(2.13) 
 
The bottom line is that the retail spot forex market is negative sum for 
investors after factoring in exchange rate spreads, overnight interest rate 
spreads, and the commissions charged by some aggregators. This necessarily 
has implications for participation in the market since on average investors are 
expected to have negative returns. 
2.6. Participants in the Retail Spot Forex Market 
The survey done by CitiFX (CitiFX, 2010a, CitiFX, 2010b) mentioned 
above provides some information as to the make-up and motivation of the 
population of participants in the retail spot forex market. The CitiFX survey may 
not strictly be confined to retail spot forex market participants, especially since 
about 6% of respondents indicate having at least 10 years of experience 
(meaning longer than retail spot forex had been readily tradable), but the 
respondents are likely to be mainly from that sector, so the results can be taken 
to be fairly indicative (nearly 80% indicated five or fewer years of forex 
experience). 
Just under 91% of respondents describe themselves as individual non-
professionals, and just shy of 83% listed speculation as their main reason for 
trading currencies. About 9% say hedging is their primary focus.19 That hedging 
figure may be a bit misrepresented, however, as the term has taken on a 
somewhat different meaning in retail forex. This requires some explanation. 
In normal parlance, hedging is generally meant to indicate putting on a 
position in a related security to offset all or part of some aspect of risk inherent 
in a primary position. For example, a long-only equity sector fund portfolio 
manager could short index futures as a hedge against systematic risk. This at 
least significantly reduces the exposure of said portfolio to a market decline, 
                                            
19
 The remainder selected “other” but details as to what that entails are not included in the 
survey results. 
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while leaving the portfolio exposed to the residual idiosyncratic risks of the 
sector and individual stocks held. 
In retail forex trading, hedging has a more extreme connotation. It has 
come to mean putting on opposing positions in the same currency pair. For 
example, if one were long 100,000 EUR/USD, a hedge in this usage of the term 
would entail going short 100,000 EUR/USD (or one could do a partial hedge by 
going short something less than 100,000 units). By any normal definition this 
would be considered an offsetting transaction which closes one’s position (no 
residual risk of any kind). Some aggregators do not force net accounting, 
however, so investors are able to have such opposing positions show as 
simultaneously open in their accounts.20 
In 2009, the National Futures Association (NFA) introduced a new ruling 
which prohibits US member aggregators from employing this so-called hedge 
accounting, requiring both net and first-in, first-out (FIFO) accounting (NFA, 
2009). The NFA regulation only applies to registered aggregators operating in 
the US. Those operating outside the US remain free to offer hedge accounting. 
The CitiFX survey indicates 25.9% of respondents usually trade using 
hedging in this definition of the term. Anecdotal evidence indicates some of 
these investors actually consider this offset version of hedging to be a strategy 
rather than just an accounting variation as it should be properly viewed. This 
may mean the aforementioned 9% who describe themselves as being hedgers 
is an overstatement due to confusion as to the definition of the term.  Such a 
conclusion tends to be supported by the fact that only 8.7% of respondents 
indicate position holding periods longer than a few days (43.3% indicate 
generally holding for a few hours or less), which is the time horizon in which one 
would expect to see traditional hedgers operate. As a result, it is probably safe 
to say more than 83% of individual investors can be classified as speculators. 
In any case, hedgers are not likely to be as active as speculators (in 
terms of frequency of transactions) given their generally longer time horizons 
and less frequent transactional requirements. As a result, one would expect the 
ratio of speculative activity to hedging activity in terms of at least number of 
trades, and probably dollar-equivalent volume as well, to be higher than the 
ratio of speculative investors to hedgers reported by the survey. 
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 Even in cases where aggregators use net accounting (as currently required in the US), 
traders can circumvent it by using multiple accounts, or sub-accounts. 
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Supporting that case, King et al. (2012) includes a table of survey results 
which incorporates information from five of the largest global retail aggregators. 
They are indicated has having a mean of nearly 1.2 million transactions per day, 
each averaging about $61,000 in notional value. The five taken together 
account for about half the King and Rime (2010) estimated daily volume, which 
suggests the total number of daily transactions in the retail spot forex market 
could approach 2.5 million. By comparison, the survey shows average trade 
notional value of just over $2mln for the ten institutional trading platforms 
surveyed. Applying that to the $1.5trln BIS spot volume figure for that period 
(BIS, 2010) results in an estimate of roughly 750,000 transactions per day done 
at the institutional spot level. This means individual investors trade, on average, 
3-4 times as often as institutions lending strong support to the notion that retail 
investors are primarily speculators. 
On the question of returns, only 26.8% of respondents indicate a 
negative return in the prior 12 months. The numbers reported to the CFTC by 
US aggregators do not corroborate this figure as they indicate only about 30% 
of active investor accounts (meaning accounts where at least one transaction 
was made) in any given quarter show a profit (Greenberg, 2010, Greenberg, 
2013). It is a major stretch to suggest US investors underperform those from the 
rest of the world so badly as to close that gap, especially when over 20% of the 
survey participants report being from the US.21 
Nearly 40% of respondents indicate they consider themselves full-time 
traders, yet only 29.7% of them indicate trading more than 15 hours per week. 
Most said they only trade forex, but about 37% note being active in multiple 
markets, with over 70% of the latter group listing equities as one of their 
secondary choices, and 47% listing commodities. 
In terms of their approach to trading exchange rates, a total of 89.2% of 
respondents indicate they use strategies employing technical analysis, with 
36.1% saying they do so exclusively. Only 8.1% say they employ strictly 
fundamental analysis. This bias fits with the strong leaning toward short-term 
trading, as slower changing fundamentals favour longer-term strategies. The 
prevalence of technical analysis based strategies and the short time frames in 
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 The figures reported quarterly to the CFTC actually are not far off the profitability percentages 
reported in Jordon and Diltz (2003). 
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which they operate makes a good case for classifying retail forex market 
investors as largely being noise traders per the Black (1986) definition. 
Furthering the strategy discussion, the evidence seems to point toward 
the application of mean-reversion (counter-trend) oriented approaches. This can 
be seen in Figure 2.2, taken from the previously referenced OANDA historical 
position ratios. Notice in the figure how investors were consistently positioned 
against the prevailing direction of the exchange rate. They tended to be net 
short when EUR/USD was rising and net long when it was falling. This is 
something which lends support to the earlier-noted view that individual investors 
as a collective are uninformed noise traders, matching the findings of Bloomfield 
et al. (2009a), though without the potential price impact the authors identify. 
2.7. An Adversarial Game 
Treynor (1999) uses the term adversarial to describe the relationship 
between the two parties in a securities transaction when two criteria are met. 
The first is a zero-sum financial relationship in that one party to the transaction 
will end up better off than the other because either one of the exchanged assets 
(cash or stock in the case of the equity market) will outperform the other, or both 
will move comparably. The second is that both sides are playing to win, 
meaning they are seeking to profit rather than just managing cash positions. 
The argument is that the cash management operations will largely offset, 
leaving the dominant institutional trading to be adversarial. 
Looking at retail forex from Treynor’s perspective, one can see an even 
more acute adversarial relationship between players. At least in an asset 
market it is possible for both of the exchanged assets to rise in value, increasing 
wealth for both parties (even as one may outperform). In a negative-sum market 
like retail forex it is impossible for both parties to come out ahead financially 
(though, as noted in Section 2.5, it is theoretically possible for them to both lose 
money).  
To assess the second of Treynor’s criteria the prospective counterparties 
for an investor position – another investor, an aggregator, or a liquidity provider 
(or multiples and combinations thereof) – must be reviewed.  As discussed 
earlier in Section 2.2, investor positions will net out to a degree, making them 
effective counterparties for each other, and that group largely comprises profit-
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seeking speculators, as the above survey results indicate. To the extent that 
investor positions don’t fully offset, institutions will be on the other side of the 
imbalance. Because liquidity providers (and likely market-making dealer model 
aggregators as well) view the aggregate of retail investors as uninformed, as 
previously discussed, they view positions taken in opposition to said investors 
as having a positive expected return. Thus, institutional counterparties are 
profit-seeking as well. 
By Treynor’s definition then, retail forex must be viewed as being highly 
adversarial. It is zero-sum in nature and the vast majority of counterparties are 
profit-seeking. If this is accepted, then the conclusion must be that above 
average skill is required to earn any kind of positive return. A merely average 
investor would have a negative expected return after factoring in the previously 
outlined exchange rate and carry interest bid-offer spreads and any commission 
costs. The more informed investors will tend to take money away from the less 
informed ones over time. It is very much like poker where there is a random 
element to any singular outcome, but in the long run money will flow out of the 
pockets of the less-skilled players into the pockets of the more-skilled ones 
(with the house taking a small cut). This contrasts with a market like equities 
where one can earn positive returns with a passive (index, etc.) strategy, which 
requires little skill and likely will result in outperformance over many active 
managers. 
2.8. What Makes Them Think They Can Win? 
The question which one cannot help asking at this point is why investors 
take part in retail spot forex trading at all given that taken collectively they will 
lose money, as highlighted above. Since that negative-sum nature is akin to 
casino games, there is the automatic inclination to ascribe a gambling mentality 
to forex participation. There are certainly grounds for doing so. 
Kumar (2009b) demonstrates that individual gambling preferences are 
reflected in equity investment decisions, resulting in a disproportionate focus on 
stocks with lottery characteristics. The high levels of leverage allowed retail 
forex investors22 may facilitate similar behaviour among retail forex investors 
since it provides considerable opportunity for entering positions with asymmetric 
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 The CitiFX survey results show nearly half admit to employing 50:1 or greater leverage. 
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return profiles. Further, Kumar indicates an increase in gambling type 
investment behaviour during troubled economic times, which could be an 
uncited factor in the growth of retail forex in the 2000s when there were 
considerable economic and socio-political upheavals. 
Gambling investors cannot be the only market participants, however. If 
all investor positions offset such that there is no need for a dealer to hold an 
imbalanced book, then perhaps a case could be made for an all-gambler 
market, but it can be observed in the OANDA positioning data referenced above 
this isn’t the case. And because all longs require matching shorts, there must be 
someone on the other side of those imbalances. If gambling investors are 
viewed collectively as underperformers in terms of having negative expected 
returns, then there must be informed investors with positive expected returns on 
the other side of the gambler net position. As noted, the liquidity providers and 
market-making aggregators willing to hold unbalanced books can be viewed as 
being informed investors. The question is to what extent there are other 
informed investors outside of those institutional ranks. 
There are no extant figures to offer a clear answer to that question. The 
best available is the previously noted profitability figures reported by US 
aggregators to the CFTC. While those reports indicate that about 30% of active 
accounts are profitable in any given quarter, they do not indicate returns, nor is 
there information on how many of the same accounts are profitable across 
quarters. The latter would provide an indication of persistence in performance, 
potentially indicative of the presence of informed investors. The only conclusion 
which can be drawn is that most retail forex investors lose money. 
That brings the discussion to the third group of retail forex market 
participants – non-gambler investors who enter the market believing they have 
the skill required to profit, or that they can acquire it through education and 
experience. To put it another way, they believe they are informed, or can 
become informed.23  At any given time, then, there is a group of market 
participants either working toward becoming informed investors or working 
toward the realization that they are not informed investors and/or will not 
become informed investors. Mahani and Bernhardt (2007) and Linnainmaa 
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 Of course those with a gambling mentality may also think of themselves in this way, and 
those who no longer have gambling as a primary motivation but continue to trade the market 
would end up in this third category. 
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(2011) address investors in this category of “learning” investor, as is discussed 
in Chapter 4 with regards to its impact on how actively they trade. This then 
motivates the question as to how reliable are investor assessments of their level 
of informational advantage and/or their ability to develop such an advantage, 
which speaks to the degree of overconfidence which exists among retail forex 
traders.  
The first element of being or becoming an informed investor is actually 
understanding the structure and mechanisms of the market. This includes the 
realization that the market is adversarial and thus requires one to not just be 
informed, but to be more informed than average to be profitable. Only after that 
comes being informed in the nature of exchange rate forecasting, etc. 
The indications are that even the most basic of functional understanding 
among investors is lacking. Highlighting this is the example of the NFA 
legislation against so-called hedge accounting mentioned previously. The 
regulator specifically cites a lack of knowledge among investors in a letter to the 
CFTC (Sexton, 2008) as one of the justifications for requiring that aggregators 
employ net and FIFO accounting. To quote: 
 
“The other trading practice NFA believes must be addressed 
involves a strategy that FDMs refer to as ‘hedging’, where customers 
take long and short positions in the same currency pair in the same 
account. NFA is concerned that customers employing this strategy do 
not understand either the lack of economic benefit or the financial costs 
involved.” 24 
 
Supporting the NFA concern about the lack of understanding among 
investors is the sometimes vehement reaction expressed when the new 
regulation was announced. The lengthy comment section of Forman (2009) 
offers examples of both the anger (evidenced by some fairly explicit language) 
and the clear lack of knowledge among investors (especially when more than 
25% of them report holding these sorts of offsetting positions per the CitiFX 
survey). Some even indicated their belief that their success in generating 
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 FDM=Forex Dealer Member. 
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positive returns is due to this “hedging” (the NFA using the term “strategy” in the 
quote above supports this case), which obviously is a case of misattribution. 
In other words, before even getting to the point of investors 
overestimating their ability to consistently profit from anticipating/forecasting 
exchange rate movements there is evidence of overconfidence in terms of 
fundamental market understanding.  Ironically, the 30% profitability figure noted 
above may only exacerbate the problem by creating a misunderstanding among 
investors as to the percentage of profitable investors there are in the retail forex 
market. The CFTC initiated reporting of this data in 2010 to increase 
transparency. In doing so, however, to the extent investors fail to realize there 
may not be a high degree of persistence in accounts profiting from quarter to 
quarter, they may have made matters worse rather than better. 
2.9. Trade Replication Programmes 
In recent years there has been a move toward what is referred to as 
copy, auto, or social trading, with that trend seen continuing Magnates (2012). 
These systems are ones whereby the trades done by one investor are 
automatically replicated in one or more other investor accounts. In this way 
investors are provided the opportunity to have all or part of their account 
effectively traded by someone else (presumably an informed trader). Some are 
specifically managed – and even regulated in some cases. Others are much 
more open-access in nature. 
This is not the same as one investor managing multiple accounts, 
however, which is something which has been around in the markets for many 
years. In this case the initiating investor has no actual control over the linked 
accounts. Instead, there is an intermediate automated system which observes 
when trades are initiated, then duplicates those trades (the specific processes 
and compensation structures at work among the competing systems vary). 
For example, Investor A goes long EUR/USD. The copy-trading platform 
sees this action. It then initiates new long positions in the accounts of Investors 
B, C, and D such that now all four accounts are holding the same position as 
outlined in Figure 2.3 (though likely with variations in relative size of position 
based on a number of considerations). When Investor A closes the long trade, 
the platform will close all the other trades as well. The intention is that Investors 
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B, C, and D have accounts (or portions of them) which replicate the 
performance of Investor A. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 – Structure of a Copy-Trading Platform 
Trades done by Investor A duplicated in the accounts of Investors B, C, and D. 
 
On the face of it, the potential growth of such systems suggests the 
increased influence of informed traders in the retail forex market – assuming 
those whose trades are being duplicated are in fact mostly informed. This 
implies the market could become more competitive at the individual investor 
level. It could also mean liquidity providers are less inclined to take the other 
side of retail investor position imbalances, which creates the potential for 
greater influence of retail on the inter-bank spot market prices. For these sorts 
of things to happen in a meaningful fashion, though, copy-trading will likely have 
to grow faster than the overall rate of growth of the retail market to allow for its 
influence to expand as a ratio of trading activity.  
Even if copy-trading does grow its market share, there are some factors 
which could limit its influence on competitiveness and exchange rates. One 
comes from the fact that investors retain control over their account though the 
copy-trading process when another investor’s trades are being replicated. As 
such, they can close trades (all or part) prior to them being closed by the 
initiator, no doubt with influence from the disposition effect (Shefrin and 
Statman, 1985). To the extent they do so, they reduce the impact of the 
presumably informed investors they are following, while also reducing their own 
returns.  
The other factor potentially working against copy-trading having a large 
influence is that in most cases an investor can opt into and out of copy-trade 
relationships whenever they like, rather like moving in and out of mutual fund 
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investments. As a result, effects on investor performance from poor selection 
decisions and “timing” which are akin to those seen in equity mutual fund 
research, such as that of Friesen and Sapp (2007) may result.25 
2.10. Research Potential 
The retail spot forex market, because of its structure and composition, 
offers a unique research opportunity. Unlike other markets, which comprise of 
participants with a variety of different purposes for taking part (issuance, 
hedging, cash management, fiscal/monetary policy, etc.), retail forex is almost 
exclusively a realm of speculative activity. As such, it offers a window into 
speculative behaviour across all markets otherwise not available because of the 
heterogeneity of transactional intent in other places. Through it researchers may 
be able to extend ideas developed in the considerable literature regarding 
equity investor behaviour. The retail spot market may not (at least currently) 
have much impact on exchange rates in the inter-bank market because of its 
fairly insular nature, but the analysis of its participants’ behaviour could very 
well have a significant impact on what is known about the impact of speculative 
activity on financial markets more broadly.  
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 The authors find that market timing by investors reduces average returns. 
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Chapter 3: The Data 
3.1. Introduction 
The primary data set used for the analysis in this thesis is an expanded 
version of the one used by Simon and Heimer (2014), Heimer (2013), and 
Simon (2013). It comprises transactional, positional, performance, and limited 
demographic information from a retail foreign exchange trader social network. 
This network followed the definition of Boyd and Ellison (2007) in that it allowed 
for the creation of a member profile (using screen names rather than real 
names), the connection with other members, and the ability to view their 
connections. The network in question was formed in early 2009 (earliest 
completed registration was February 2, 2009) as the first of its kind for individual 
retail forex traders, although it was in limited testing until October of that year 
when it was opened to the public. It should be noted that although the initial 
period was private, there was no defined selection process involved in recruiting 
members. To quote one of the co-founders in a comment to me, “We invited 
anyone with a pulse that trust us enough to give us his credentials while we 
were still unknown.” 
Participation in the social network required members to link the platform 
to their live brokerage account.26 This granted the platform the ability to collect 
data from those linked accounts - to include transactions executed, orders 
entered, and positions held – both by capturing all activity moving forward from 
registration and by collecting historical transaction information available in the 
account.27 It was strictly a read-only configuration. The platform could not 
execute trades or enter orders, unless a given member took part in an available 
trade duplication program addressed in Section 3.2 below, which is a separate 
research consideration. Members had no control over which actions and/or 
transactions done in their broker account were exposed to the platform.28  
From the perspective of representing the transactional record of a large 
group of traders, the data in question is comparable in general terms to the 
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 Only real-money trading accounts were permitted. No demo, practice, or paper trading 
accounts were allowed. 
27
 There was historical data collection only for some of the membership either due to technical 
limitations or the simple lack of any data to collect (new trader and/or new account). 
28
 It should be noted that the social network in question was closed down in 2014 after being 
acquired by one of the large global retail aggregators. 
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types of equity market datasets used previously in the research (Odean, 1999, 
Barber and Odean, 2000, Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001, Garvey and Murphy, 
2005, Dorn et al., 2008, Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2009, Linnainmaa, 2011, 
Grinblatt et al., 2012, Kelley and Tetlock, 2012, Barber et al., 2013), though 
obviously has a global breadth of coverage rather than single-market one as in 
most cases. From the perspective of retail forex, it is similar to the data used by 
Nolte and Voev (2011). Their dataset, however, only includes data from a single 
broker covering a single month worth of trading, albeit with more traders 
involved. The dataset used for this thesis includes data from a broad number of 
brokers, as addressed below in Section 3.4. With pre-registration historical 
transactional activity included, it covers the period from July 2008 to early May 
2013 for a total 58 full months, and one partial.  
Because the dataset includes traders from all across the globe, as 
highlighted in section 3.3, and because some brokers allow customers to open 
accounts in something other than their native currency,29 the accounts included 
are denominated in a number of different currencies. In order to standardize for 
analysis, all non-USD values for trade volumes and nominal gains/losses (part 
of the transactions record described in Section 3.5), along with account 
balances (part of the data described in Section 3.6) have been converted to 
USD using the requisite closing exchange rate of the day in question.30  
3.2. Trade Duplication Service 
A feature of the social network in question was the ability of members to 
follow the trades of selected other members. As documented in Chapter 2 
(Section 2.9), this was done via a mechanism which replicated the trades done 
by a given “leader” in the accounts of one or more “followers” for the purposes 
of trying to match the performance, all of which was handled by the network as 
intermediary.31 The leaders were compensated on a performance basis, earning 
a percentage of the profits they generated for their followers in a system which 
was similar to that used by hedge funds. Leaders were initially recruited from 
amongst the social network population, with the network managers scanning 
through performance records for potential candidates. Over time, however, the 
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 For example, a UK trader having a USD-denominated account rather than one based in GBP. 
30
 Daily closing exchange rates were collected from Thomson Reuters for this purpose. 
31
 This required a separate set of legal permissioning by the member to allow the network to 
execute trades in their account. 
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inclusion of new leaders in the program took on a more professional aspect, 
with some leaders actually not being individuals, but rather trading shops. 
This functionality and participation of members in the social trading 
mechanism means there are a number of duplicated (follow) trades in the 
transactional records. The inclusion of these follow trades means the dataset 
features both trades which were initiated by the member themselves (self-
directed) and those initiated by a second party. Heimer and Simon (Heimer, 
2013, Heimer, 2014b, Simon, 2013, Simon and Heimer, 2014) avoid dealing 
with this particular issue by working only with data from before the trade 
duplication system was implemented. Since the follow trades introduced into a 
member’s transactional record actions and performance which cannot be 
specifically attributed to them, as well as essentially duplicate trades into the 
aggregate, only self-directed trades are included in this study. Conceptually, this 
brings the data in line with the motivation of Barber and Odean (2000) in terms 
of looking to avoid direct external influence on trading performance. 
The exclusion of these follow trades creates a split dynamic to the two 
primary parts of the data set. On the one hand, excluding positions indicated as 
initiated as part of the duplication service from the transactional record outlined 
in Section 3.5 below is fairly straightforward. They are tagged in the record, so 
easily filtered out. Unfortunately, the daily performance record, which is the 
second primary part of the dataset (described in Section 3.6), is not so easily 
handled. It is required that any period in which follow trades took place be 
excluded to avoid having returns which are not fully based on self-directed 
trading activity. 
While analysis of the leaders would be a very worthwhile pursuit in its 
own right, unfortunately the dataset lacks indications of when a leader started 
and stopped in that status. As a result, analysis of behavioural changes, which 
are the subject of Chapters 5 and 6 with respect to the network members, 
cannot be performed based on leadership status change. 
3.3. The Traders 
Between February 2009, when the social network started accepting 
members, and May 2013 over 49,000 registrations were made to join. Of those, 
11,931 actually went on to link their brokerage account to the network. Of that 
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group 7,180 had trading activity recorded which was self-directed (not 
exclusively followed trades). Figure 3.1 shows the growth in registered active 
members for the network from inception through the end of the dataset, with 
Figure 3.2 indicating the number of members with at least one trade in any 
given month. A rapid expansion period during 2010 can be observed during 
which time the network was aggressively marketed to new members. Those 
efforts were curtailed thereafter, shifting to a focus on the trade duplication 
service. The network continued to grow steadily thereafter, but the combination 
of the shift in direction and general attrition saw a steady downside progression 
in the number of members actively trading in their own right each month. 
The dataset includes a limited amount of demographic data provided 
primarily through the user completing a profile during the registration process. 
Not surprisingly, given the social network is a primarily English-language 
platform (and the company behind it was based in the United States), the vast 
majority of members have English as their primary language. This can be 
observed in Figure 3.3. As can be seen in Figure 3.4, though, the members 
come from all over the globe, with Europe actually representing the largest 
fraction at just over a third. 
Technical analysis dominates the trading styles indicated by members as 
their preferred. Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of styles, with technicals 
representing nearly two thirds and fundamental analysis coming in at only 4%. 
This fits well with the indicated trading frequency of the members. As can be 
seen in Figure 3.6, about 57% of them claim to trade 6 or more times per week. 
Those engaged in primarily fundamentally driven trading would not be expected 
to be nearly so active.32 
Members of the network are relatively inexperienced, as indicated in 
Table 3.7. Those in the 1-3 year range of indicated history in the markets 
represent the largest fraction. Add in those indicating 1 year or less of 
experience, and it covers about two thirds of the community. If one makes the 
reasonable assumption that these experience values are not changed later in 
most cases, then they provide an indication of experience at the time traders 
joined the network. The suggestion, therefore, is that the network mainly 
attracted newer traders, which has implications for its value to the membership. 
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 It must be noted that these trade frequencies are member-indicated values, not actual ones 
based on their transactional record. 
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This distribution is in line with the distribution seen in the CitiFX survey results 
discussed in the last chapter. 
As well as capturing member trading activity and performance, the 
network also presented that information on its platform via each user’s viewable 
profile page. Members were given a choice of privacy setting for sharing this 
information. At the most relaxed level, members could opt to either make their 
data fully viewable within the network and even beyond to the public. 
Alternatively, they could opt to only allow their “friends” to view their activity, or 
to not allow it to be seen at all. Figure 3.8 shows the distribution of choices. 
Only a small fraction actually chose one of the more restrictive privacy options. 
The final demographic element is age. As can be seen in Figure 3.9, 
membership in the network is biased toward the younger end of the adult age 
spectrum. At the time individuals joined the network they averaged about 37 
years old. The 25%-75% range is 28 to 43, so this is not a playground for 
retirees. Given the relative youth of the retail forex market, the inexperience of 
the membership, and the bias toward highly active styles of trading noted 
above, the relative youthfulness of the traders in question probably should come 
as no surprise. It must be noted that the age data is very messy, however. 
Values are missing in a large percentage of cases and even when present there 
are numerous clearly erroneous values. The reliability is so questionable that 
age values are not included in the analysis which follows in Chapters 4 through 
6 where demographic information is included. They are presented here for 
rough indicative purposes only. 
An additional aspect of the data worth mentioning comes from the 
biography part of the available profile information. A quick scan of these entries 
written by members offers at least some information on the motivation of traders 
to join the network. The indicated drivers toward membership are diverse. They 
included clear commercial interests such as members promoting their trading-
based websites. Given the involvement of certain members as leaders in the 
trade duplication service noted in Section 3.2 above, this is to be expected. 
Some members were clearly motivated on educational grounds, while still 
others express a desire to connect with fellow traders. Unfortunately, a detailed 
analysis of these biographical offerings is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
though it would certainly seem to present a research opportunity. 
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3.4. The Brokers 
Approximately 70 different retail foreign exchange brokers (aggregators) 
have members included in the social network data set. Table 3.1 provides a 
listing of the top 20 by number of accounts included. Some of the brokers, such 
as OANDA and FXCM, are global operators, while others are regionally 
focused. The permissions and technical linkages required to allow the network 
to access customer accounts were developed at different points, resulting in a 
progressive expansion of the number of brokers included over time. The 
reporting and data extraction methodologies employed by the brokers, and 
between them and the social network, have some variation. This variation 
contributed to inconsistencies, and in some cases errors, in the resulting 
dataset, which had to be addressed in preparing it for use. These are 
addressed in sections 3.5 and 3.6 below. 
The total number of brokerage accounts linked to the social network is 
indicated at over 19,000. This is considerably more than the number of 
members who completed their registration, as noted above in section 3.3, which 
is a result of the network allowing members to link in multiple accounts, either 
from the same broker or from different ones. Approximately 76% of members 
have only 1 account. Another 13% have two accounts linked to the network. 
About 3.5% of members have more than 5 linked accounts. The largest 
indicated number of accounts for one member is 95. 
It should be noted that sub-accounts with a given broker are considered 
different accounts, at least in some cases.33 Sub-accounts can be used by 
traders to operate in multiple account base currencies in some cases (for 
example, having a GBP sub-account when the main account is denominated in 
USD). They can also be used to segregate by trading methodology or some 
other differentiating factor. 
The implication of varied account currencies is discussed in Section 3.9. 
3.5. The Transactions 
Half of the core of the dataset is a transactional record containing all 
pertinent details regarding each round-turn trade executed. Trades still showing 
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 I am aware that OANDA sub-accounts function in this fashion, but do not know if this is the 
case with other brokers as well. 
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as being open, which is an extremely small fraction, are excluded to both 
ensure the exclusion of potentially erroneous entries and to provide actualized 
returns for analysis. Trade records showing errors in entry such as lack of 
volume, open date/time listed as falling after the closing date/time, missing 
prices, etc. are also excluded. When filtering out the follow trades described in 
Section 3.2 above, the total transaction count is just over 4 million, representing 
$194.6 billion in transactional volume. This works out to an average trade 
volume of about $48,600, which is 20% less than the average trade size noted 
in Chapter 2 (Section 2.6). Long trades represent 49% of the number of 
transactions and 48% of the total volume. 
Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics for trade volumes, holding 
period, and returns. The volume and holding periods are both quite 
heterogeneous, with considerable skewness reflective of the diversity of the 
size and style of the traders included in the dataset. The fact that most trades 
are quite small (less than $10,000 in notional value) provides a good indication 
of the general bias toward smaller traders in the social network. With 75% of 
trades being held for about 9 hours or fewer, the influence of high frequency 
(day) traders is clear, though that does not necessarily provide an indication of 
the distribution of trading time frames among the members. 
The average trade has a return of -0.02% in terms of the exchange rate 
move captured. Given the overall negative sum nature of retail forex trading, as 
documented in Chapter 2, one would expect to see just such a small average 
trade loss reflective of the bid/ask spread. The very small frequency of gains or 
losses in excess of 1% is reflective of both the scale of the moves in exchange 
rates and the bias toward high frequency trading. 
Table 3.3 documents the distribution of currencies traded by the social 
network members. The top two currencies are predictably USD and EUR. 
Volume in USD for the dataset, at just over 40%, is quite close to the proportion 
of overall spot market volume indicated in the BIS (2014) survey results. The 
proportion of volume in EUR is significantly higher for the network members, 
however, at 34% vs. 18%. The representation of the other currencies is then 
relatively lower in the dataset.  The only difference in ranking among the major 
currencies is GBP coming in third and JPY fourth in among member trades, 
while that is reversed in the BIS figures.  
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Table 3.4 shows the top 20 most traded exchange rate pairs. The 
relatively high amount of trades done in EUR noted above is reflected in the 
dominance of EUR/USD as a trading vehicle for members of the network. The 
ranking of pairs by trading activity is fairly close to the “favourite” ranking from 
CitiFX (2010a). Just over half of surveyed traders consider EUR/USD their top 
choice pair. The social network activity is either side of that, depending on 
whether one looks at things in terms of number of trades or volume. The fact 
that it is 60% of volume, but only 40% of trades suggests a bias toward 
EUR/USD by larger traders, likely because of the high global liquidity and the 
resulting very narrow bid/ask spread. 
3.6. The Daily Returns 
The other main part of the dataset is a daily account summary table, 
which includes the return on the day, account balance, and related information. 
Unlike the transactions log, the data in this table is largely calculated by the 
social network at the end of each day. As a result, there is more opportunity for 
errors. For example, a number of negative account balances were discovered 
which looked to be a function of a faulty pre-membership historical data retrieval 
process in certain cases.34 Such entries are excluded, along with other obvious 
error cases (such as NULL entries for daily net ROI). Truncation is further 
applied to entries where the daily net ROI reading is in the most extreme 0.5% 
readings in both tails so as to drop highly suspect values. When further filtering 
out days during which follow trades were held, the total number of observations 
came in at just over 4.3 million. 
Table 3.5 provides descriptive statistics for both account balance and 
daily return values. The account balance figures from Panel A very much 
support the idea that members of the social network are biased toward being 
small traders, with less than 5% of observations at $43,000 or higher. Again, 
considerable skewness is observed. The extremely low values for part of the 
dataset likely is at least partly a function of accounts denominated in other 
currencies, such as JPY, being converted in to USD, as mentioned in Section 
3.1 above. 
                                            
34
 This was discussed with administrators of the network, and corrected on their end moving 
forward, but nothing could be done about the existing data. 
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Panel B from Table 3.5 provides an indication of the range of daily 
returns for the traders in the network.35 In this case, days with a zero return 
were excluded as most were a function of non-market related account changes 
such as interest income earned on the account balance and other factors 
unrelated to having an active position. Average daily returns come in at -0.53%, 
though it must be noted that this is based on active traded days, not on total 
available trading days.36 A comparison of these return values to those from 
Table 3.2 helps in the appreciation of the influence of leverage on trading 
performance among retail forex traders, as noted in Chapter 2. 
3.7. The Social Network 
Connecting with other members is, of course, the point of a social 
network. Across all members, over 41,000 two-way “friend” links are shown as 
of early May 2013, with 5,901 members having at least one friend at that point. 
Unfortunately, the records do not indicate when such links were made, or which 
member was the initiating party. A second set of friend links from April 2012 is 
also part of the dataset (5,608 members with at least 1 connection at that date, 
5,546 members with at least one connection at both the April 2012 and May 
2013 measurement points), so there are potentially two fixed points of 
observation for any given individual, depending on their membership tenure. As 
such, there does not exist a time series of friend linkages as members connect 
with each other, just two discreet measurement points. 
Once two members became friends they could see each other’s trading 
activity, within the privacy setting constraints noted in Section 3.3. Figure 3.10 
shows two of the aspects of the social network’s platform which allowed 
members to observe what their friends were doing in real time. They could see 
the orders entered, as well as the positions entered and exited. By clicking 
through to a friend’s profile page, they could then also see overall performance 
for that individual. It should be noted, however, that friends could not observe 
each other’s position size or capital balance. 
                                            
35
 It should be noted that these daily return values are inclusive of any interest carry 
income/expense, though given the short time frames of most trades that is likely a negligible 
factor. 
36
 In other words, a trader may only actually trade 10 days in a month. In such a case, the 
average daily return would be based on those 10 days, not on the full average 22 monthly 
trading days (exclusive of weekends). 
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Table 3.6 provides descriptive statistics for the distribution of the number 
of friends had by connected members based on the May 2013 data. The 
median value is 6, with 25% of members having 2 or fewer.  Two members 
have in excess of 1,000 connections, with the upper 1% coming at 128 and 
above. This helped push the mean number of friends up to 14. Once more the 
outcome is a high skewed heterogeneous set of data. 
While private messaging between friends was a feature of the social 
network platform, one need not be friends with another member to interact with 
them. There was a forum area where members could have open discussions. 
Plus, at a macro level the platform included an indication of the current balance 
of open positions for the aggregate of members – a sort of real-time version of 
the Commitment of Traders report from the futures market which can be used to 
gauge trader sentiment. Figure 3.11 provides a sample. 
3.8. Overall Performance 
In Chapter 2 the negative sum nature of retail forex is documented. The 
traders in the social network certainly do not break that pattern. In aggregate 
their trades come out as a loss of $2.22 per round-turn, inclusive of transaction 
costs (spread). This is a number which actually sounds pretty reasonable when 
compared to trading in other markets where commissions can be considerably 
higher. In fact, the comparison of this figure to spread costs is positive. Based 
on the average $48,600 in trades size noted in section 3.5, a very low end 
estimate of spreads would be about $3.75.37 On this cumulative basis then, the 
members of the social network are beating the spread, which puts them ahead 
of the trading curve. 
A second measure of performance also provides evidence that members 
of the social network were, on average, stronger performers than the general 
population of traders. The quarterly profitability rate the CFTC requires US 
brokers to post provide a basis for comparison. The performance of network 
members is compared to the broker figures in Table 3.7. On average across the 
14 quarters for which the broker-reported figures are available, just under 31% 
of accounts were profitable. The compares with almost 39% of the social 
network accounts, and there are no quarters in which the network membership 
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 This is based on commonly seen 1 pip EUR/USD spread assuming an exchange rate of 1.30, 
so 0.0001/1.30 = 0.008%. 
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did worse than the broker figures. Even when only including members indicating 
the United States as their location, the average for the network is over 35% 
profitable accounts per quarter and only in Q1 of 2011 is the network profitability 
rate lower than that reported in the aggregated broker data. 
Although the traders in the network collectively show better than average 
performance, they are not without their predictable flaws. For example, there is 
support for the influence of the disposition effect on the network membership. 
The average holding period for winning trades is 1.08 days, with a mean return 
of 0.19%. In contrast, the average holding period for losing trades is 1.98 days, 
with a mean return of -0.39%. Clearly, members struggle to hold on to winning 
trades and exit losing ones quickly. 
Additionally, a deeper examination of the figures suggests that the 
aggregate profitability numbers are biased by the presence of larger traders 
who likely are better. This can be seen by removing trade size from the 
equation. When simply looking at the change in exchange rate captured, the 
average result is a loss of 0.021%. To get an approximation of trade costs, a 
sample of exchange bid/ask rate spreads was taken, which can be seen in 
Figures 3.12 and 3.13.38 The average of those spread costs is 0.015%, which 
means the average trade does not actually beat the spread. In fact, it is 0.006% 
worse, which works out to about $2.92 per trade based on the $48,600 average 
volume. 
The bottom line is that the social network members collectively lost 
nearly $9 million over about a five year period.  There are 49,803 trader-month 
observations in the dataset, where a trader-month is a single month of activity 
for one member.  Members of the network are therefore losing about $180 per 
active month of trading. 
3.9. Calculating Member Returns 
As indicated in Section 3.6, the dataset includes daily return values. In 
keeping with the main part of the related literature, monthly time frames are the 
primary focus of the research in the next three chapters when considering 
period returns. Calculating monthly returns from the daily data is a simple 
function of sequentially multiplying the net ROI values for each active trading 
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 The OANDA spreads, as more specifically representative of those likely to be experienced by 
retail traders, were given priority, with the Thomson Reuters spreads used to fill in any gaps. 
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day during the period in question to achieve a compounded return for the month 
as a whole. As is noted in Section 3.4, some members of the network have 
multiple trading accounts linked to the network. For the purposes of the 
research which follows, it is felt that the best indication of individual 
performance is to combine the returns of the separate accounts of members 
with more than one into a single monthly value. This is accomplished by 
weighting the returns of each active account by the USD-equivalent balance 
and taking an average on that basis.  
In theory, only including active accounts in the weighting could result in 
an understatement of trading capital exposure and a resulting inflation of returns 
(positive or negative) if traders are actually trading in one account (or a sub-set 
of their accounts) on the basis of the capital they have across all accounts. The 
working assumption, however, is that traders will have made trading decisions 
based on the capital in the account(s) they are trading, not on others they might 
have. Further, if the inclusion of non-active accounts is deemed desirable then 
the logical question is to ask why not include all of the individual’s assets as the 
capital basis. Since the focus here is on speculative activity, it makes sense to 
focus on the capital a trader would view as immediately at risk. 
A weighted averaging of returns across multiple accounts of course 
requires a common currency basis for the account balances. As noted in 
Section 3.1, a conversion of all account balances in the data is accomplished 
using prevailing exchange rates. This could only be managed where there is an 
indication in the account information regarding the currency denomination. Not 
all accounts have such an indication. An assumption that the accounts are in 
USD could be made, but some of the notional balance values are so high as to 
make that an unlikely prospect. Since having USD-equivalent account balances 
is also critical in the development of the turnover and leverage values used 
throughout the research which follows, those accounts are excluded. When that 
is done and the returns are combined with activity derived from the transaction 
log, the total number of usable members is 5502. This is the group that is the 
basis for the research to come. 
To summarize: 
Total member registrations: >49,000 
Members who linked their live trading account: 11,931 
Members with recorded trading activity: 7,180 
Members with usable aggregated returns data: 5,502 
55 
 
3.10. Conclusion 
The outline of the dataset provided herein is meant to only offer a 
general indication of the common backdrop for the research presented in this 
thesis. That said, there are a couple broad aspects to the data worth discussing. 
Firstly, it should be noted that while the transactions collected by the 
social network were executed in live money accounts, and they represent an 
unfiltered listing of each member’s trades for accounts linked to the network, 
they cannot necessarily be seen as completely unbiased. While it is true that 
members could not pick and choose which trades were reported, they could 
have maintained unlinked accounts which would not be included in the data set. 
For example, a member may have an unused account linked to the network to 
gain access, but actually do their primary trading via an unlinked account. There 
is no way of knowing for sure from the data the degree to which this sort of 
activity takes place or by which members, though the members with linked 
account in which no trading activity was ever captured at least offer in 
indication. 
Secondly, survivorship must be viewed as a factor for consideration with 
this dataset. The downward trend in active monthly members in Figure 3.2, and 
the quarterly one from Table 3.7, especially in the face of rising overall 
membership, makes it clear that traders are falling out, either because they 
have stopped trading or because they have shifted to accounts not tied into the 
network. Aggregate figures have been presented here to provide a general 
picture of the dataset, but making major conclusions from them become 
problematic because of the survivorship issue. 
That said, the description of the data provided in this chapter is meant 
primarily to provide a picture of the dataset given its relative novelty to the 
literature - not to provide a basis for analysis at this point. In the chapters 
following, the data is segmented in ways relevant to the research questions 
being explored, the specifics of which are detailed therein. 
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Table 3.1 
Top 20 Retail Forex Brokers with Accounts Linked in to the Foreign 
Exchange Trader Social Network 
Distribution of member accounts by primary retail foreign exchange broker 
(aggregator). Where brokers were listed under multiple codes, reflecting different 
versions of their platform, numbers were combined in to one value. Members of the 
social network are permitted to link multiple accounts to the network. 
 
Broker Accounts 
OANDA 4,149 
FXCM 3,800 
FXDD 1,604 
Alpari 1,290 
IBFX 885 
AvaFX 741 
Gain 734 
FXOpen 686 
FxPro 338 
ILQ 324 
MBTrading 296 
Markets.com 262 
AdmiralMarkets 244 
LiteForex 161 
Instaforex 93 
GoMarkets 84 
Forexyard 82 
Tadawul 80 
CitiFX 74 
Pepperstone 67 
All Others 3,405 
Total:  19,399  
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Table 3.2 
Distribution of Trade Volumes, Holding Periods, and Returns 
Distribution of transaction volumes, trading holding periods, and trade returns of more 
than 4 million trades done by member accounts by primary retail foreign exchange 
broker (aggregator).  Panel A volumes are in USD. Panel B periods are days and 
fractions thereof. The Panel C returns are based on the exchange rate move captured, 
not the actual realized return which would factor in leverage. 
 
Panel A: Trade Volumes 
Observations:          4,001,339  
  25%                  1,288  
Median                  4,000  
75%                15,085  
  Mean:                48,640  
Standard Deviation:          1,717,037  
Skewness: 205.62 
 
 
Panel B: Trade Holding Periods 
Observations:          4,001,339  
  25% 0.011 
Median 0.062 
75% 0.381 
  Mean: 1.533 
Standard Deviation: 12.015 
Skewness: 25.059 
 
 
Panel C: Trade Returns 
Observations:          4,001,339  
  25% -0.00074 
Median 0.00029 
75% 0.00121 
  Mean: -0.00021 
Standard Deviation: 0.00735 
Skewness: -6.51410 
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Table 3.3 
Currencies Traded by Members of the Social Network 
Distribution of trade frequency and volume totals for individual currencies. Because of 
the pairs nature of trading, values represent double counting. 
 
Currency Trades % Volume ($) % 
AUD 514,210 6.43% 10,910,000,000  2.80% 
BCO 1,340 0.02% 1,616,439  <0.01% 
BGN 2 <0.01% 2,535  <0.01% 
CAD 241,179 3.01% 4,996,100,000  1.28% 
CHF 283,950 3.55% 9,111,300,000  2.34% 
CLP 130 <0.01% 5,730,000  <0.01% 
CNY 111 <0.01% 60,493  <0.01% 
CZK 5,191 0.06% 514,025  <0.01% 
DKK 992 0.01% 4,857,204  <0.01% 
EUR 2,024,001 25.29% 131,400,000,000  33.76% 
GBP 859,731 10.74% 37,800,000,000  9.71% 
HKD 549 0.01% 7,278,893  <0.01% 
HRK 2 <0.01% 20,000  <0.01% 
HUF 458 0.01% 2,150,681  <0.01% 
ILS 9 <0.01% 46,116  <0.01% 
INR 240 <0.01% 389,671  <0.01% 
JPY 696,725 8.71% 18,090,000,000  4.65% 
KRW 9 <0.01% 36,000  <0.01% 
LTL 1 <0.01% 10,000  <0.01% 
MXN 1,799 0.02% 26,087,258  0.01% 
NOK 5,233 0.07% 90,371,599  0.02% 
NZD 194,499 2.43% 3,341,100,000  0.86% 
PLN 730 0.01% 8,592,013  <0.01% 
RON 5 <0.01% 6,246  <0.01% 
RUB 90 <0.01% 515,250  <0.01% 
SAR 39 <0.01% 5,360  <0.01% 
SEK 4,015 0.05% 27,509,395  0.01% 
SGD 3,648 0.05% 24,484,115  0.01% 
SPX 128 <0.01% 2,142,500  <0.01% 
THB 70 <0.01% 23,274  <0.01% 
TRY 1,781 0.02% 38,299,257  0.01% 
TWD 52 <0.01% 17,858  <0.01% 
USD 3,066,467 38.32% 170,500,000,000  43.80% 
WTI 183 <0.01% 3,188,826  <0.01% 
XAG 25,752 0.32% 475,270,000  0.12% 
XAU 67,352 0.84% 2,372,500,000  0.61% 
XPT 4 <0.01% 38,508  <0.01% 
ZAR 2,001 0.03% 20,810,326  0.01% 
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Table 3.4 
Top 20 Traded Exchange Rates 
Distribution of trade frequency and volume totals for exchange rate and currency pairs. 
 
Currency Trades % Volume ($) % 
EUR/USD 1,604,496 40.1% 118,300,000,000 60.8% 
GBP/USD 538,585 13.5% 28,630,000,000 14.7% 
AUD/USD 282,583 7.1% 6,859,500,000 3.5% 
EUR/JPY 198,754 5.0% 5,749,800,000 3.0% 
USD/JPY 188,823 4.7% 5,720,200,000 2.9% 
GBP/JPY 138,866 3.5% 4,351,800,000 2.2% 
USD/CHF 136,550 3.4% 3,701,100,000 1.9% 
EUR/CHF 64,052 1.6% 3,660,700,000 1.9% 
USD/CAD 138,704 3.5% 3,329,400,000 1.7% 
XAU/USD 65,861 1.6% 2,341,300,000 1.2% 
EUR/GBP 76,042 1.9% 2,305,900,000 1.2% 
AUD/NZD 46,643 1.2% 1,357,600,000 0.7% 
AUD/JPY 89,108 2.2% 1,262,400,000 0.6% 
GBP/CHF 34,703 0.9% 1,157,800,000 0.6% 
NZD/USD 68,565 1.7% 952,820,000 0.5% 
EUR/CAD 26,625 0.7% 696,760,000 0.4% 
GBP/NZD 30,318 0.8% 602,500,000 0.3% 
EUR/AUD 33,106 0.8% 509,180,000 0.3% 
XAG/USD 24,133 0.6% 465,940,000 0.2% 
GBP/AUD 27,315 0.7% 462,230,000 0.2% 
Others 187,507 4.5% 2,204,268,312 1.1% 
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Table 3.5 
Distribution of Account Balances and Daily Returns 
Distribution of daily performance and account balance information for social network 
members. Panel A account balance is in USD terms. Panel B returns exclude days with 
no market return. 
 
Panel A: Account Balance 
Observations:           4,302,702  
  25%  50  
Median  574  
75% 4,414  
  Mean: 78,293  
Standard Deviation: 3,993,003  
Skewness: 111.27 
 
 
Panel B: Daily Returns 
Observations:           4,302,702  
  25% -0.0087824 
Median 0.0000022 
75% 0.0069774 
  Mean: -0.0053146 
Standard Deviation: 0.0798223 
Skewness: -1.4391290 
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Table 3.6 
Distribution of Member “Friend” Connections 
Distribution of the number of “friend” connections made by 5,901 members of a retail 
foreign exchange social network. 
 
Observations:                   5,901  
  25% 2 
Median 6 
75% 13 
  Mean: 14.14 
Standard Deviation: 43.98 
Skewness: 17.61 
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Table 3.7 
Comparison of Social Network Member Quarterly Profitability Percentages 
to Broad Averages 
Distribution of quarterly member account profitability rates compared to those reported 
by US brokers as mandated by the CFTC  (Quarterly broker data aggregated by Forex 
Magnates - Greenberg, 2010, Greenberg, 2011c, Greenberg, 2011b, Greenberg, 
2011a, Greenberg, 2011d, Greenberg, 2012d, Greenberg, 2012c, Greenberg, 2012a, 
Greenberg, 2012b, Finberg, 2013a, Finberg, 2013b, Greenberg, 2013, Siddiqui, 2013, 
Finberg, 2014). Profitability rates are based on accounts with at least one transaction in 
a given quarter. 
Panel A: All Network Members 
    
 
Broker Reported   Social Network   
 Quarter Accts Profitable % Accts Profitable % Diff. 
Q4 2009 92,024 25,943 28.2% 226 75 33.2% 5.0% 
Q1 2010 81,289 21,854 26.9% 1,592 565 35.5% 8.6% 
Q2 2010 106,650 28,176 26.4% 2,592 868 33.5% 7.1% 
Q3 2010 100,320 29,026 28.9% 2,835 889 31.4% 2.4% 
Q4 2010 108,361 31,242 28.8% 2,636 915 34.7% 5.9% 
Q1 2011 108,513 34,620 31.9% 2,561 867 33.9% 1.9% 
Q2 2011 106,945 28,765 26.9% 2,320 877 37.8% 10.9% 
Q3 2011 108,490 32,512 30.0% 2,302 950 41.3% 11.3% 
Q4 2011 97,206 33,953 34.9% 2,106 970 46.1% 11.1% 
Q1 2012 97,281 32,370 33.3% 2,170 896 41.3% 8.0% 
Q2 2012 93,687 29,884 31.9% 2,062 901 43.7% 11.8% 
Q3 2012 101,020 32,731 32.4% 1,872 788 42.1% 9.7% 
Q4 2012 89,567 32,131 35.9% 1,752 786 44.9% 9.0% 
Q1 2013 99,207 34,918 35.2% 1,785 799 44.8% 9.6% 
  
Average: 30.8% 
 
Average: 38.9% 8.0% 
        
Panel B: Only US-based Network Members 
   
 
Broker Reported 
 
Social Network 
  Quarter Accts Profitable % Accts Profitable % Diff. 
Q4 2009 92,024 25,943 28.2% 75 25 33.3% 5.1% 
Q1 2010 81,289 21,854 26.9% 592 198 33.4% 6.6% 
Q2 2010 106,650 28,176 26.4% 932 297 31.9% 5.4% 
Q3 2010 100,320 29,026 28.9% 1,014 309 30.5% 1.5% 
Q4 2010 108,361 31,242 28.8% 870 278 32.0% 3.1% 
Q1 2011 108,513 34,620 31.9% 814 232 28.5% -3.4% 
Q2 2011 106,945 28,765 26.9% 743 261 35.1% 8.2% 
Q3 2011 108,490 32,512 30.0% 683 229 33.5% 3.6% 
Q4 2011 97,206 33,953 34.9% 577 242 41.9% 7.0% 
Q1 2012 97,281 32,370 33.3% 551 210 38.1% 4.8% 
Q2 2012 93,687 29,884 31.9% 504 192 38.1% 6.2% 
Q3 2012 101,020 32,731 32.4% 411 144 35.0% 2.6% 
Q4 2012 89,567 32,131 35.9% 377 165 43.8% 7.9% 
Q1 2013 99,207 34,918 35.2% 378 152 40.2% 5.0% 
  
Average: 30.8% 
 
Average: 35.4% 4.6% 
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Figure 3.1 – Growth in Membership of a Trading Social Network 
The social network began adding members in February 2009, though was initially only 
in a private (beta) period. It opened to the public later that year and began a phase of 
very rapid growth through aggressive marketing which lasted about 12 months.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 – Active Members of a Trading Social Network 
The social network began adding members in February 2009, corresponding to Month 
8 (prior months represent back-filled activity). The chart indicates the number of 
members who executed at least one trade during a given month.  
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Figure 3.3 – Primary Language of Social Network Members 
Distribution of the indicated preferred language of 7,180 confirmed retail foreign 
exchange traders in the social network. Despite the very strong bias toward English, 
the network is global with traders from all over the world. The English bias (86%) is to 
be expected for an English-language platform. 
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Figure 3.4 – Geographic Region of Social Network Members 
Distribution of the indicated geographic region of 7,180 confirmed retail foreign 
exchange traders in the social network. Europe accounts for 35%, with the United 
States at 27%, and Asia/Pacific 17%. The “No Entry” category cannot be assumed to 
indicate an alternate region such as Africa or South America as it merely represents 
missing values. 
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Figure 3.5 – Primary Trading Style of Social Network Members 
Distribution of the indicated preferred trading style of 7,180 confirmed retail foreign 
exchange traders in the social network. Technical Analysis accounts for 54%, with 
momentum (4%), fundamental analysis (4%), news (2%) well behind. About 10% of 
members indicated no specific preference, with missing entries account for 
approximately 25%. 
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Figure 3.6 – Average Trades Per Week of Social Network Members 
Distribution of the indicated average trades per week for 7,180 confirmed retail foreign 
exchange traders in the social network. The 10+ trades category is 39%, with 1-5 
trades at 26%, while 6-10 trades is 18%. About 18% of members have no entry. Note, 
these are ranges indicated by the members in their profile, not the values actually seen 
in the transactional data. 
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Figure 3.7 – Years of Trading Experience of Social Network Members 
Distribution of the indicated years of trading experience for 7,180 confirmed retail 
foreign exchange traders in the social network. Note that these values are taken from 
entries in the trader member profile. Assuming they have mainly not been updated 
since an individual joined the network, they indicate experience at the time of becoming 
a member. 
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Figure 3.8 – Performance Privacy Choices of Social Network Members 
Distribution of the privacy option of 7,180 confirmed retail foreign exchange traders in 
the social network. This setting defines who is able to view a member’s trading activity 
and performance. The possible settings are Public for any visitor to the website, 
Community for only logged-in members of the network, Virtual Trading Team (VTT) for 
those with whom a member has linked as “friends”, or Owner for only themselves.  
 
 
  
70 
 
Figure 3.9 – Ages at Registration for Members of a Trading Social Network 
Distribution of the ages of 7,180 retail foreign exchange traders (exclusive of missing 
values) in the social network as of their date of registration. Youngest is 16.2 years, 
oldest 94.5 years. Mean age is 36.8 years. Median is 34.6 years. The 25% to 75% 
range is 28.3 - 43.2 years. 
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Figure 3.10 – Social Network Information 
Sample indication of “friend” trading positions and activity displayed to members of the social network. 
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Figure 3.11 – Position Balances amongst Members 
Balance of social network trader positions in various currency pairs. Snapshot taken 
April 4, 2014 during US morning trading hours from Thomson Reuters. 
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Figure 3.12 – Sample Exchange Rate Spreads 
Snapshot of bid and ask exchange rates taken April 4, 2014 during US morning trading 
hours from Thomson Reuters. 
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Figure 3.13 – Sample Exchange Rate Spreads 
Snapshot of bid and ask exchange rates taken April 4, 2014 during US morning trading hours from OANDA FXTrade platform. 
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Chapter 4: Leverage and Overconfidence 
4.1. Introduction 
In the financial markets, individuals are often told not to over-trade as a 
key factor in avoiding major performance issues. This advice addresses two 
considerations. One is trading too often. The other is trading too large relative to 
one’s capital. In other words, do not use too much leverage – leverage in this 
case simply being a multiple applied to account balance (e.g. leverage of 3:1 
would mean trading a $3,000 position on a $1,000 account). 
While perhaps not couched in such terms, the major admonishment in 
this sort of advice is to avoid overconfident trading. Given the research 
indicating negative effects from being active in the markets as an individual, 
such as Barber and Odean (2000), it could be suggested that simply trading on 
an individual basis at all is an indication of overconfidence, especially when 
taking part in a zero/negative-sum game type market structure or environment. 
Of course, things are not so simple. The fact is that some investors are 
successful in the markets. It may only be a small fraction, as Barber et al. 
(2013) document, but it exists and one cannot determine whether they have the 
requisite skill to be among that group without actually trading. This introduces 
questions as to the value of looking at certain trading activity metrics commonly 
used the literature (monthly account turnover primarily, trade frequency 
secondarily) in attempting to identify overconfidence, and whether others such 
as leverage would be better. 
The subject of leverage in trading and investing has thus far received 
little in the way of research attention, with only the very recent Heimer (2013) 
work taking a specific interest with a link to overconfidence, and Linnainmaa 
(2003) relating leverage and returns, but without a strong view toward 
causality.39 The primary focus of the published work to-date is on more macro 
level price and market impacts of leverage use and constraints thereof (Mayhew 
et al., 1995, Kupiec and Sharpe, 1991, Hardouvelis and Theodossiou, 2002, 
Foucault et al., 2011, Hsieh and Merton, 1990, Hardouvelis and Kim, 1995, 
Moore, 1966, Wang, 2013). Leverage, however, is commonly used by high 
                                            
39
 What causality is suggested is in the direction of the disposition effect rather than 
overconfidence. 
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frequency market participants such as day traders. For this reason, the study of 
its implementation by practitioners is important in understanding market activity 
and price movement in short-term time frames since it relates directly to the 
volumes transacted.  
This chapter serves two main purposes. First, it extends prior 
overconfidence research into the forex market, which offers the opportunity for 
examining behaviour in a more high-frequency arena. Second, it focuses on the 
use of leverage as an indication of overconfident trading behaviour. From the 
latter perspective, to the extent that the recognition of increased leverage points 
to increasingly questionable decision-making by traders, which is suggested by 
Burks et al. (2013), the opportunity exists for corrective action to be employed to 
improve performance. Further, to the extent that increased leverage use is 
observed in aggregate, it can potentially be employed as an indication of 
irrational market behaviour and as such it would facilitate improved risk 
management strategies. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 
reviews the prior literature and develops the primary hypotheses of the chapter. 
Section 4.3 provides documentation of the data and methodologies being 
employed in the research, with Section 4.4 containing the analysis. Section 4.5 
concludes and presents considerations for future research. 
4.2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
4.2.1. Foundations 
In the Barberis and Thaler (2003) review, the classical paradigm of 
financial theory is described as seeking to understand the financial markets by 
employing assumptions of participant rationality. For rationality to hold, actors 
must properly update their beliefs upon receipt of new information, as defined 
by Bayes’ law, and with those updated beliefs make choices which are 
normatively acceptable on the basis of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU). While 
elegant, however, models based on this rationality have consistently come up 
short in attempting to define and predict real life. Consequently, the field of 
behavioural finance research has developed as an alternative approach to try to 
understand the actions of individuals, and by extension markets. It does so 
through the relaxation of rationality assumptions. In other words, behavioural 
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theorists derive models based on the idea that agents fail to properly update 
their beliefs and/or act on the basis of decisions which are not necessarily SEU 
compatible.  
While accepting that such less-than-fully-rational agents exist, the 
classical finance arguments against these behavioural models centre on the 
influence of said agents in markets where there also exists fully rational actors. 
These fully rational actors are able to counter any influence on prices created 
by their less-than-fully rational counterparts. The area of research known as 
“limits to arbitrage” provides a counterpoint by suggesting that rational actors 
are constrained in their ability to offset the influence of irrationality. These 
constraints include issues such as limited capital, imperfect substitution, 
implementation costs, and noise trader risk (de Long et al., 1990, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). This then allows behavioural researchers to make the case that 
less-than-fully-rational agents can and do have a persistent influence on prices 
(Shleifer and Summers, 1990, Kyle and Wang, 1997, Kogan et al., 2006). 
Alongside the research into the limits to arbitrage, a second primary path 
of behavioural study is in the area of psychology, specifically related to systemic 
cognitive biases in beliefs and preferences. In other words, while the limits to 
arbitrage research focuses on how markets and agents act in the face of less-
than-fully-rational actors, this second area of study focuses on the sources and 
drivers of irrationality. 
One of the major themes on this psychological side of the behavioural 
research is violations of expected utility. At the forefront of this study is prospect 
theory, which is defined in Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Prospect theory, 
based on the findings of experimental research, focuses on decision-making 
under uncertainty and shows how individuals violate expected utility by 
weighting gains and losses differently (while not focusing on final wealth, as 
would be expected). Extension of these observations led to the development of 
the disposition effect in Shefrin and Statman (1985) which theorizes that 
financial market participants are biased toward quickly realizing gains to avoid 
seeing them slip away while being slow to take losses in hopes the market will 
turn around, an example of the failure of rationality in choices on the basis of 
SEU.40 
                                            
40
 The disposition effect is tested empirically in Odean (1998a). 
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The other major theme of the behavioural research from the 
psychological perspective is in the area of overconfidence. The psychology 
literature provides ample evidence that individuals are overconfident and that 
overconfidence comes in two primary forms. One is that people fail in their 
estimates of probabilities, particularly in the case of perceived certain or 
impossible events. The other is that they are too narrow in defining confidence 
intervals. Thus, individuals fail to properly update their beliefs per Bayes’ rule. 
From the perspective of financial market agents, as observed by Kahneman 
and Riepe (1998), the implication of overconfidence is that individuals 
overestimate their ability to make investments or trades with positive expected 
returns, or which outperform the market on a net basis. As Burks et al. (2013) 
assert, to the extent that overconfidence is a judgement bias it raises “…the 
possibility that individuals systematically make suboptimal decisions because 
they choose based on biased beliefs.” 
Daniel et al. (1998) also bring the overconfidence discussion into the 
financial markets realm by showing how prices overreact to private information 
which overconfident investors overweight, while prices underreact to public 
information which gets underweighted. This produces a negative autocorrelation 
in stock returns, along with unconditional excess volatility. Daniel et al. (2001) 
then extend this argument by theorizing a link between the cross section of 
expected security returns and a combination of risk and the misuse of 
information by investors in decision-making. 
4.2.2. Overconfidence implications on trading activity 
In Odean (1998b) it is theorized that overconfidence among investors 
leads to increased trading volume and by extension decreased utility as 
individuals fail to overcome the costs associated with the additional 
transactions. This is supported empirically by Barber and Odean (2000) in an 
evaluation of investor portfolio turnover. Statman et al. (2006) similarly find that 
overconfidence on the basis of the misattribution of market returns to individual 
skill drives increased stock market turnover. Barber et al. (2009a) draw a similar 
conclusion from analysis of trading in the Taiwan stock market that 
overconfidence factors into trading volume, with sensation-seeking also 
indicated as a potential motivator, resulting in a significant annual loss to 
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financial speculation.41 Narrowing the focus, Gervais and Odean (2001) provide 
a model whereby early-career investors are overconfident, resulting in more 
aggressive trading, which leads to higher expected trading volume. Statman et 
al. (2006) take a market-centric view rather than an investor-centric one and 
similarly find evidence for overconfidence (and disposition effect) trading on the 
basis of prior returns in the turnover pattern of individual stocks.  
Support for the Odean (1998b) assertion is also presented in the analysis 
of gender with respect to overconfidence in Barber and Odean (2001a), and 
then extended by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) wherein analysis of 
psychological assessments and speeding ticket records for participants in the 
Finnish stock market is made. Positive correlations between both those 
measures and trading activity (viewed in terms of both turnover and trade 
frequency) strengthen the case for overconfidence and sensation-seeking 
tendencies impacting investor behaviour. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) also 
examine returns as they may relate to overconfidence, but beyond observing 
that all relative returns are worse across all defined levels of overconfidence 
and sensation-seeking they hesitate to draw any real conclusions.  
The idea that increased trading activity drives reduced performance,  and 
thus should be viewed as indicative of overconfidence or some other 
behavioural issue, is partially challenged by Garvey and Murphy (2005), 
however. The metric for trading activity in this instance is trade frequency rather 
than volume or turnover. No link is found between the number of trades 
executed and trader performance. Unfortunately, the dataset used includes a 
meaningful number of professional traders rather than being strongly biased 
toward non-professionals. If it is assumed that professionals are more likely to 
be rational actors who will only trade when they have a statistical advantage, 
then it would follow that they would not experience lessened performance when 
trading more actively. Quite the opposite, in fact. 
Still, the Garvey and Murphy (2005) findings bring the question of the 
value of looking at trading frequency up for review. Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2009) do use it as a metric, suggesting that sensation-seeking investors are 
likely to trade more frequently. There are other potential drivers of trade 
frequency as well, however, which may tend to challenge it as a useful measure 
                                            
41
 French (2008) makes a similar case regarding the cost to society of active investing 
strategies. 
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of either overconfidence or sensation-seeking. In particular, research looking at 
investors from a learning perspective makes the case that individuals still trying 
to assess their trading talent may trade more than rational expectations would 
suggest. 
An example of this theorization is a learning model of speculation 
proposed in Mahani and Bernhardt (2007) which features small-scale trading by 
inexperienced traders as they seek to discover their skill level. The suggestion 
here is that while inexperienced traders may trade more actively in frequency 
terms during the learning process, they may not actually trade at very high 
relative turnover levels. Linnainmaa (2011) supports this idea, at least in part, 
by reporting that some traders use very small positions to learn about their 
ability. Thus, there theoretically exists a group of market participants who may 
be trading more frequently than rational expectations would suggest, but doing 
so on a relatively small scale. This is very similar to the trading pattern 
proposed by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) in terms of sensation-seeking 
individuals. Therefore, it may be a struggle to differentiate learning from 
behavioural bias on the basis of trade frequency. 
Additionally problematic in looking at the activity of traders is the 
implication for performance of the idea that lower levels of activity are linked to 
better relative returns. Research supports the case for the role of trading 
maturity in returns, with Nicolosi et al. (2009) and Seru et al. (2010) both finding 
a positive link between investor experience and performance, presumably at 
least part of which includes developing the ability to overcome behavioural 
biases [which features in the Gervais and Odean (2001) model]. There is 
additionally the question of investor sophistication. It factors positively into the 
equation, as outlined by Feng and Seasholes (2005), and further links higher 
levels of experience with lower behavioural bias influence (the disposition effect 
in particular). Thus, if the Odean (1998b) expectation of returns being negatively 
correlated to trading activity holds, one would expect to see more experienced 
and sophisticated traders operating at the lowest activity levels. Even if 
rationally increased trading activity on the basis of positive expectancy is left to 
the side, however, there is the finding of Graham et al. (2009) linking 
experience with increased activity. 
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4.2.3. Increased focus on speculative activity 
The focus of much of the early empirical research into market participant 
behaviour on relatively inactive individuals (investors rather than traders) has 
two major short-comings. One is that inactive investors offer relatively few 
decisions against which to measure the potential impact of overconfidence and 
other biases, or their learning to overcome them. The second is that inactive 
investors are not significant contributors to the short-term movement of prices, 
thus limiting the potential to analyse higher frequency price movements.  
The lack of research into the more high frequency trader population is 
starting to be addressed in the literature as new data sources become available. 
Jordan and Diltz (2003) provide one of the early empirical studies of active 
speculator behaviour. Looking at approximately nine months of order data from 
a US brokerage focused on day trading, they conclude that only about one 
trader in three is profitable and just 20% are more than marginally so, with 
trader performance broadly linked to market performance. As noted above, 
Garvey and Murphy (2005) evaluate stock market day traders, suggesting that 
under-skilled traders underwrite their more skilled counterparts. Thus, there are 
indications of the influence of skill in returns. 
Extending on the skill theme, Barber et al. (2013) provide what they 
describe as the first large-scale analysis of speculative activity in their research 
based on 15 years of activity for day traders in Taiwan. Here the focus is on 
cross-sectional analysis of speculator skill. The authors find that only a small 
fraction of traders are persistently profitable after accounting for transaction 
costs. This lack of a consistent ability to profit in the markets fits in well with the 
Odean (1998) theorization based on the expectations of the existence of 
overconfidence among traders accounting for at least some of the excessive 
volume in the markets (relative to economic requirements). Those who have 
learned to overcome their overconfidence (and/or other biases such as the 
disposition effect) will tend to benefit at the expense of those who have not, 
particularly in the case of zero/negative-sum markets where participants are in 
direct competition for returns. 
4.2.4. Retail foreign exchange 
The clear majority of the research into trader/investor activity and 
performance done thus far is concentrated on the equity markets. This is a 
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function of that market’s long history, relatively high levels of retail (individual) 
participation, and considerable volume of fundamental information, among other 
factors. Markets which are heavily professional – such as the heavily dealer- 
driven ones for government debt and foreign exchange – present significant 
hurdles both in terms of acquiring useful data from a decentralized market and 
the inclination toward privacy of those involved. Foreign exchange prices have 
received considerable research attention over the years in terms of valuation 
considerations (Mussa, 1979, Bacchetta and Wincoop, 2004, Froot and 
Ramadorai, 2005, Bacchetta and Wincoop, 2006, Berger et al., 2008, Berger et 
al., 2009), the forward discount puzzle (Baillie et al., 1983, Cumby, 1988, 
Cavaglia et al., 1994, Chaboud and Wright, 2005, Bacchetta and Wincoop, 
2007, Burnside et al., 2009, Bacchetta and Wincoop, 2010, Baillie and Chang, 
2011, Burnside et al., 2011b), the carry trade (Galati et al., 2007, Baillie and 
Chang, 2011, Burnside et al., 2011a, Menkhoff et al., 2012), and other pricing 
anomalies (Mussa, 1979, Goodhart, 1988, Froot and Thaler, 1990, Gourinchas 
and Tornell, 2004, Baillie and Chang, 2011). Similarly, a literature focusing on 
the microstructure of exchange rates and their trading has been developing for 
a number of years (Baillie and Bollerslev, 1991, Lyons, 1997, Lyons, 2001, 
Bacchetta and Wincoop, 2006, Sager and Taylor, 2006, Akram et al., 2008, 
Berger et al., 2008, Berger et al., 2009, Burnside et al., 2009, Osler et al., 2011, 
Mancini et al., 2012, Neely and Weller, 2013). The limited availability of usable 
transaction data, however, has largely confined work in the specific area of 
trader behaviour to theoretical and/or narrow scope efforts (Frankel and Froot, 
1987, Frankel and Froot, 1990, Taylor and Allen, 1992, Ito et al., 1998, Osler, 
1998, Payne, 2003, Menkhoff and Taylor, 2007, Bloomfield et al., 2009b, Neely 
et al., 2009, Kaltwasser, 2010, Neely and Weller, 2013). 
Recently, however, the study of speculative activity has begun to expand 
into the retail foreign exchange market, which is a highly concentrated source of 
active market participation where data is starting to become available. As the 
use of the term “retail” suggests, this is a sector which is mainly the domain of 
individual traders. The study of individual market participants is nothing new in 
and of itself, as the stock market studies of behavioural effects mentioned 
earlier are also concentrated on individuals. The difference lies in the motivation 
of the participants. The activity of retail forex traders is almost exclusively short-
83 
 
term profit motivated, as noted in the broker CitiFX’s trader survey findings 
(CitiFX, 2010a, CitiFX, 2010b) and discussed in Chapter 2. 
The forex market at the individual level is also much more active in 
nature than is true of the equity markets (with perhaps the exception of day 
traders). As such, it allows for highly concentrated research on very active 
speculators – high frequency traders. What’s more, retail forex is a 
zero/negative- sum market, which provides opportunities to directly observe 
relative speculator skill levels. Additionally, since exchange rates are notoriously 
hard to value,42 forex fits the Kumar (2009a) model of a market where 
individuals are likely to exhibit strong behavioural biases, providing fertile 
ground for research into their decision-making.43 
Retail foreign exchange trading has been available for a relatively short 
period of time, so data has only recently begun to be obtainable by researchers 
in a meaningful way. In some of the earliest research, Nolte and Voev (2011) 
use a month of data from one of the larger retail forex trading platforms to 
evaluate disposition effects among traders, while Simon and Heimer (2014) use 
data from retail foreign exchange traders to evaluate social network influences 
on performance, and (Heimer, 2013) evaluates the impact of leverage 
constraints on trader returns. 
4.2.5. Overconfidence and increased trading activity 
Odean (1998b) links overconfidence among investors to increased 
trading volume, and from there to reduced performance on the basis of 
investors failing to overcome the additional transaction costs incurred. The 
second part of that is explicitly tested in Barber and Odean (2000) based on the 
hypothesis that diminished performance in the form of lower relative returns at 
higher levels of trading activity indicates the presence of overconfident 
investors. This is accomplished using a large dataset of discount stock broker 
investor accounts. The authors find that while increased trading activity, 
measured in terms of account turnover, has little gross impact on investor 
returns, it does have an observable negative influence on net performance. 
                                            
42
 See Meese and Rogoff (1983) for an oft-cited survey of exchange rate forecasting models. 
43
 Chapter 2 of this thesis provides an overview of the retail foreign exchange market structure, 
its mechanics, and how it links to the sizeable global spot forex market. It also demonstrates the 
negative-sum nature of retail forex. Both the structure and the nature are important 
considerations when addressing research in this area. Additionally, Chapter 2 provides some 
insight into market participation – what motivates the traders and how they operate. 
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Thus, the conclusion is made that overconfidence drives excessive trading in 
the markets. 
A shortcoming of the Barber and Odean (2000) analysis, however, is that 
despite having a large number of households in the study, the sample is heavily 
focused on relatively inactive investors.44 The introduction of a dataset of retail 
foreign exchange traders, as will be employed herein, offers the opportunity to 
extend the research into a market where participants are much more active on 
average, providing considerably more opportunity to observe over-confidence 
driven decision-making.45 The first test in this chapter is therefore to seek 
confirmation of the Barber and Odean (2000) findings whereby turnover is 
evaluated in relation to retail foreign exchange trader returns. The advantage of 
the dataset in use, as outlined in Chapter 3, is that it features a set of market 
participants who trade frequently, allowing for an extension of the link between 
overconfidence and trading activity not just in to the retail foreign exchange 
market, but to the active trader arena in general. The results for this initial 
analysis are presented in section 4.4.1. 
4.2.6. Focusing on leverage 
As noted in the previous section, turnover is the metric of investor activity 
favoured by Barber and Odean (2000). Turnover, however, is a composite 
measure comprising of two contributory elements in the form of transaction 
count and leverage use. This is something which can be demonstrated 
formulaically. To the extent that monthly turnover is simply the total amount of 
volume traded in a given month divided by the average account balance of the 
month in question, it can be expressed as: 
 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡 = ∑ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡,𝑖
𝑛𝑡
𝑖=1
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡⁄  (4.1) 
where 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡 is turnover for month t 
𝑛𝑡 is the number of trades for month t 
                                            
44
 On average the households in question made only 4-5 trades per year. Even this figure likely 
distorts reality as it would take only a relatively few very active households (day traders) doing 
hundreds, if not thousands, of trade per year to inflate the sample mean. 
45
 As indicated in Chapter 3, the traders in the employed dataset averaged holding positions 
about 1.5 days, with a median of 0.06 days. 
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𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡is the volume for each trade i in month t 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 is the average account balance for month t 
 
Formula 4.1 can then be simplified:  
 
 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡 = (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡 × 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡 ) 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡⁄  (4.2) 
where 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡 is the total number of trades executed in month t (𝑛𝑡  above) 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡 is the mean volume of the trades made in month t 
 
In Formula 4.2 trading activity is now expressed as a function of how 
many trades get executed and how large those trades are on average. The 
average trade size figure, however, also has two elements to it. One is the size 
of the account, which is a limiting factor constraining how large a position one 
can take. The other is the amount of leverage the trader employs in their trades. 
Leverage is simply a multiplier applied to one’s account balance to get to a 
volume figure.46 That means the turnover equation can be adjusted further: 
 
 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡 =
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡 × (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡 × 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 )
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡
 (4.3) 
where 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡  is the mean leverage ratio for trades executed in 
month t 
 
This updated formula reflects the two decisions made by traders. One is 
how frequently they trade. The other is how much leverage they employ in the 
trades. If, as suggested in Section 4.2.2, there are contradictory explanations to 
the question of trade frequency, then it is reasonable to expect to see the 
number of trades executed by a trader in a given period be the less informative 
aspect of turnover by way of measuring overconfidence and/or sensation-
seeking behaviour. 
The corollary to trade frequency being the less informative contributor to 
turnover is that leverage employed must be the more meaningful of the two 
                                            
46
 This makes leverage equivalent to turnover in terms of comparability across traders and 
period observations. 
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measures which combine into the determination of turnover. It makes intuitive 
sense from the perspective that overconfident traders will tend to trade larger 
positions in order to maximise their expected returns, while those simply 
learning may trade relatively small positions to minimize risk at a time when 
expected returns are lower, as suggested by Mahani and Bernhardt (2007) and 
Linnainmaa (2011). 
This leads to the two initial hypotheses of this chapter.  
Hypothesis 1: Higher levels of employed leverage are indicative of 
higher overconfidence and therefore correspond to lower returns 
Hypothesis 2: Leverage is a better indicator of overconfidence than is 
trade frequency 
These hypotheses are addressed in Section 4.4.2 and again in Sections 
4.4.5 and 4.4.6. 
4.2.7. The influence of trader experience and sophistication 
Gervais and Odean (2001) suggest early-career investors are subject to 
overconfidence issues. It makes sense that as one spends more time in the 
markets – assuming they are not forced out – they will learn to overcome these 
issues and thereby produce better results. This is something which finds 
support in Nicolosi et al. (2009) and Seru et al. (2010), as both also link 
experience positively to performance. Feng and Seasholes (2005) specifically 
point to more experienced market participants suffering from less in the way of 
behavioural bias and also bring the idea of sophistication into the equation. To 
the extent that larger accounts are indicative of greater sophistication,47 there 
too the expectation is to see a reduced impact from behavioural biases among 
those with higher capital levels. That is the finding of Nolte and Voev (2011) in 
looking at the disposition effect among retail forex traders. 
This is where Barber and Odean (2000) run into a theoretical problem 
when attempting to judge overconfidence on the basis of performance linked 
back through activity level. If more experienced and/or more sophisticated 
traders do indeed show better returns then it suggests they are less active in 
the markets. Graham et al. (2009), however, find that more experienced 
                                            
47
 Regulators have often used investor capital levels as at least theoretical indications of 
sophistication in the investment arena to determine things like disclosure requirements and 
participation suitability. 
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investors trade more frequently.48 If the latter is true, then based on the Barber 
and Odean (2000) view, leverage use among this group of traders must be 
reduced to more than offset the higher number of trades to the point where 
turnover declines. Even if a disconnect between overall turnover and returns is 
allowed, leverage use will still be expected to drop on the basis of less influence 
from overconfidence. 
That leads to the next two of the hypotheses tested in this chapter. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relationship between trader 
experience and leverage use (though positive with returns), but not necessarily 
with trade frequency. 
Hypothesis 4: There is a negative relationship between trader 
sophistication and leverage use (positive with returns), but again not necessarily 
with trade frequency. 
 The results of testing these hypotheses are presented in Sections 4.4.3 
and 4.4.4 respectively. 
4.2.8. Changes in leverage use are uniformly significant 
To the extent that experience and/or sophistication influence the amount 
of leverage employed by a trader, it must be accounted for when evaluating the 
implications for a given amount of leverage with regards to its implications for 
overconfidence. Stated simply, a certain level of average trade leverage will 
have different implications for an experienced trader and an inexperienced one, 
or for a more sophisticated trader and a less sophisticated one. The change in 
leverage, however, should remain significant in all cases. This leads to the final 
hypothesis of this chapter. 
Hypothesis 5: Even when factoring in trader experience and 
sophistication, and other control factors, higher employed leverage signals more 
overconfidence, leading to lower returns. 
The results of this testing is in Sections 4.4.5 and 4.4.6. 
                                            
48
 This is theorized as being on the basis of a better-than-average type of overconfidence, as 
opposed to the miscalibration focus of Odean (1998b) 
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4.3. Data & Methodology 
4.3.1. The data 
The retail foreign exchange trader transaction and performance dataset 
described in Chapter 3 forms the basis for the empirical testing which follows. 
The 5502 active members with live trading accounts linked to the network with 
recorded trading activity and usable aggregated returns data provide just over 
35,000 monthly observations as a starting point. To ensure data integrity, some 
adjustments need to be made which result in a fractional reduction of included 
members and data points. Since the primary focus of this chapter’s analysis is 
at the monthly aggregate level, the first of these filters involves removing 
observations from May 2013 since only a handful of days are included from that 
month. The data thus starts with July 2008 and runs through April 2013. 
The second screening is on the basis of leverage. The measure 
employed in this research is the average trade leverage used in Formula 4.3. 
This is calculated as the total USD-equivalent volume traded in a month divided 
by the USD-equivalent average daily account balance for that month. Thus, the 
leverage values are expressed as a per trade multiple of the trader’s account 
balance, with a value <1 indicative of trades smaller than the average daily 
account balance for that month. Average trade leverage of more than 200 for 
any given month is quite rare.49 The existence of any such data points in the set 
is more likely to indicate erroneous values than actual use of those levels of 
leverage (some are so high as to clearly be faulty, putting them all in question). 
In the case of members where half or more of their monthly observations 
feature these suspect leverage values (91 cases), the individual has been 
completely excluded. Where the number of suspect leverage values is less than 
half of a member’s observations, those observations are excluded, but the 
remainder retained.  
Because these excessively high leverage levels are judged to very likely 
be the result of calculations employing erroneous account balance readings (in 
this case, overly small), excluding them serves to avoid issues in the analysis of 
leverage and turnover, both which have account balance as the divisor in their 
                                            
49
 I have heard of brokers allowing leverage of upwards of 500:1, but these were in the distinct 
minority and in areas of questionable regulatory oversight. Before the U.S. and other countries 
implemented leverage restrictions, 100:1 and 200:1 were the most seen levels of leverage 
permitted by brokers and remain such in domains where regulators have not instituted 
constraints. 
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calculations. Further, as account balance itself is a control variable in the 
models developed in Sections 4.4.5 and 4.4.6, excluding these observations 
also avoids potential outlier issues in that regard.  
The above filtering brings the number of members in the study down to 
5,357, and cuts the total number of observations to 34,002. Table 4.1 provides 
top level descriptive statistics for account balance and the trading activity 
metrics of note. Considerable skewness is apparent across the board, reflecting 
the heterogeneous nature of the members and their patterns of trading activity. 
Generally speaking, however, the sample comprises small traders. While the 
mean account balance is over $18,000 in USD-equivalent terms, the median is 
only $1,544. The prior research does not offer an indication of what to expect in 
terms of mean account balance, but King et al. (2012) do list a mean trade size 
of $68,000. On that basis, the network members would appear to be smaller 
than average accounts in that their mean trade size is only about $33,700. 
Lending support to this idea is that fact that more than half of the observations 
in the dataset come from those listing less than 3 years of experience. 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 bring some of the demographic values into 
consideration. The former includes descriptive statistics for trades, turnover, 
and return based on the different regional indications provided by members of 
the social network, while the latter does the same based on indicated 
experience. Noteworthy in Panel C of Table 4.2 is the considerably worse mean 
return for those members from the United States. The difference is highly 
statistically significant (t-value of 8.83). This aligns with a higher median 
monthly turnover value, but no real difference in trades/month. Similarly, Panel 
C of Table 4.3 shows a marked difference in mean returns between those with 
0-3 years of experience and those with 3 or more. Here it can be observed that 
median turnover is higher for the less experienced group, but trade frequency is 
actually higher for the more experienced traders.50 
The returns mentioned above are the combined member monthly returns 
described in Section 3.9 of Chapter 3 in which returns across all active accounts 
are merged on an account-balance weighted basis to derive a single value for 
                                            
50
 In the aforementioned tables, and in the analysis in Section 4.4, the total number of trades 
registered for a given month is based on when a trade is entered. That then carries over to the 
average volume, monthly turnover, average duration, and average trade leverage values. Since 
more than 90% of trades are closed within a week, is unlikely there is any meaningful 
disconnect between return values, which are based on daily changes, and the activity 
measures. 
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those members with multiple active accounts. A second set of returns indicating 
relative performance is derived from this base set by determining a monthly 
aggregate unweighted mean return for all traders active in a given month and 
subtracting that from the return achieved by each individual. Table 4.4 presents 
the monthly average returns used to calculate the relative returns. Although the 
values are almost uniformly negative, there is considerable variation. 
A third set of returns is calculated strictly on the basis of exchange rate 
changes, removing trade size (leverage) from the equation. In this series all 
trades are assumed to have a leverage of 1:1, meaning each trade’s return is 
determined as if it had a value equal to the capital in the account at the time of 
entry. These trade returns are then summed (not compounded) for each month 
to provide a deleveraged cumulative monthly return. Because of the small 
returns of these trades,51 the lack of compounding is unlikely to create any 
meaningful return distortion relative to any potential compounding effect there is 
in the actual returns. Likewise, since the vast majority of trades are short 
holding periods (more than 50% held less than 12 hours), not including the 
influence of interest carry is also unlikely to be problematic. As will be seen in 
Section 4.4, the variance between realized results and these deleverage returns 
is large enough that one need not be concerned by either compounding or 
interest carry in any case. 
Additionally, in Section 4.3.6 below a variable is introduced which is the 
bid/ask spread return value. In order to derive a spread return value for a given 
trade, the estimated bid/ask spread value for the currency pair in question is 
divided by the exchange rate at which said trade was executed. For example, if 
a trader went long EUR/USD at 1.3000 with a spread estimate of 1.5 pips 
(0.00015) then the spread return would be estimated at -0.0115% 
(0.00015/1.3). Estimated trade bid/ask return values are then averaged across 
all trades done by a given trader in a given month on an equal weight basis. 
These bid/ask spread estimates used in the above process are based on 
the snapshot values shown in Figures 3.12 and Figure 3.13 from Chapter 3. 
Unfortunately, the data needed to know the actual spread of a given exchange 
rate at the time a trade was entered is not available. Even if it was, however, 
there would still be a benefit to using a singular estimate value. The objective of 
                                            
51
 The 25th to 75th percentile range of individual deleveraged trade returns is from -1.20% to 
+1.16% 
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the variable is to capture the composition of the different exchange rates traded 
by an individual – or at least the liquidity and volatility characteristics of them. If 
actual spreads were used in the construction of this variable, then any variance 
seen could be more reflective of different trading platforms, times of day, and 
other factors which influence the bid/ask spread experienced by a given trader 
for a specific trade. 
4.3.2. The methodology 
In Barber and Odean (2000) a quintile-based methodology is employed 
to compare investor performance across relative levels of trading activity. As 
noted above, portfolio turnover is the metric of choice for measuring trading 
activity. Performance results are expressed in both absolute and relative terms, 
with the authors using adjustments based on own-benchmark abnormal returns, 
market returns, CAPM, and Fama-French three-factor comparisons to provide 
additional depth to the analysis. This is the foundational basis for the analysis 
which follows. 
For the purposes of this study, turnover is derived for each trader-month 
as the total USD-equivalent volume traded that month divided by the average 
USD-equivalent account balance (cash + open trade equity). Using average 
monthly balance allows the accounting for any deposits and/or withdrawals, 
interest carry, and the impact of trade performance on account value, which at 
times can be meaningful. Only days on which trading activity took place (to 
include the holding of open positions) are included in the average, which allows 
the results to reflect account balances during periods of decision-making.  
In the foreign exchange market there is no market return, nor are there 
factors equivalent to Fama-French. This limits the ability to produce comparable 
benchmark return adjustments. Barber and Odean (2000) construct an own-
performance benchmark based on the returns which would have been achieved 
had no portfolio change been made by a given investor. Since the focus is 
primarily on high frequency traders in this study, a reasonable assumption can 
be made for a baseline of no open positions at the start of each monthly period 
because any prior positions would have been closed. As such, if the trader in 
question makes no trades their return is zero, making the benchmark return 
zero. 
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In regards to the construction of the quintiles, these are done on a 
monthly basis. This allows traders to change quintile as they are more or less 
active from month-to-month. As such, the studies capture time-varying levels of 
potential trader overconfidence. 
4.4. Analysis 
4.4.1. The relationship between turnover and returns 
The starting point for this analysis is replicating the primary Barber and 
Odean (2000) analysis to examine trader returns in relation to relative levels of 
trading activity, specifically using turnover as the metric. To accomplish this, 
each trader-month observation is assigned a quintile based on its relative 
ranking for that month. All observations are then aggregated by their quintiles to 
determine univariate mean values. Table 4.5 provides the descriptive statistics 
for the quintiles, plus statistics on the variation from quintile to quintile and 
between the least active and most active quintiles (Q1 vs Q5).  
Consistent with prior findings in the literature, the Table 4.5 results 
support the idea that higher levels of turnover equate to worse performance, 
both in absolute terms and in relative ones. The difference in return between the 
first and second quintiles is not significant (-1.00% vs -1.34%), but it quickly 
becomes so between the subsequent quintiles. In particular, the 5th quintile 
shows a dramatic worsening of returns (-17.62%), though given the skewness 
of the data, this is at least partly reflective of a wide dispersion of values in that 
highest category.  
Aside from the general turnover/returns relationship linkage in the data, 
one other potentially very significant item is worth noting. The average balance 
values decline noticeably across the turnover quintiles. The smallest accounts 
are thus the ones trading relatively most actively. Trade frequency rises with 
turnover, and trade duration falls correspondingly, which both fit the expectation 
that higher turnover is often (but not only) driven by more frequent trading and 
that more active traders tend to operate in relatively shorter time frames. The 
volume indications increase with turnover, as does average leverage, which are 
both to be expected. 
As outlined in Section 4.1, turnover can be broken down into two 
decisions – trade frequency and leverage. It is noted in Section 4.1.2 that trade 
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frequency can be influenced by potentially conflicting factors which are not 
necessarily linked to overconfidence. While trading more in the negative-sum 
retail forex market has a direct mathematical influence on returns, if trade 
frequency is not such a clean indication of overconfidence, then there should 
not be as much of an impact on returns when looking at that metric. 
Table 4.6 provides descriptive statistics based on that question in Panel 
A. The same quintile methodology is employed as was done using above, 
replacing turnover with monthly trades (trade frequency). As is the case with 
turnover, and as expected mechanically, rankings based on trade frequency 
also show that more activity relates negatively to trader performance.  The 
pattern of worse returns as trading activity increases holds, though not as 
strongly as in the case of turnover. The inter-quintile differences in return are 
not as large, nor are they as statistically significant. 
Interestingly, however, the first four quintiles defined in trade frequency 
terms show worse performance than what is seen in terms of turnover (-3.92% 
to -6.99% as compared to -1.00% to -6.27%). The relative underperformance is 
reversed dramatically in the fifth quintile, however (-8.75% vs. -17.62%). This is 
true for both absolute and relative returns. At least at this aggregate level, trade 
frequency does have a relationship to trader returns. That said, the influence is 
not as strong relative to turnover amongst the most active traders where one 
would expect to see the highest levels of overconfidence-driven trading. 
Worth observing in Table 4.6 is the reverse account balance pattern 
noted in Table 4.5. Here higher levels of trade frequency are associated with 
larger accounts. So between the two sets of results there is a pattern of larger 
traders, which are presumably more sophisticated, trading more frequently, but 
at lower levels of turnover. The implication there is one of lower leverage. This 
will be revisited in Section 4.4.4. 
4.4.2. The relationships between leverage and returns 
The observation of the relationship between trade frequency and returns 
in Table 4.6 brings up the first primary hypothesis – whether leverage is a 
stronger indication of overconfidence in traders than trade frequency. 
Continuing with the established methodology, the data is now quintiled on the 
basis of average trade leverage. Panel B of Table 4.6 provides descriptive 
statistics based on this segmentation. The immediate observation is how close 
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both the return and relative return values for the quintiles based on average 
leverage are to those based on turnover shown in Table 4.5. Statistically, there 
is no significant difference (except in the first quintile), indicating a very close 
relationship between turnover and average trade leverage. It is worth noting as 
well the dramatic decline in average account balance across the leverage 
quintiles, confirming the suggestion above that it is smaller – presumably less 
sophisticated – traders who operate at the highest levels of leverage and thus 
theoretically with the greatest degree of overconfidence. 
The influence of leverage on returns can be examined in another way as 
well. Hypothetical deleveraged returns may be used in the place of actual 
realized returns to strip out the influence of the trade size decision on 
performance. As noted in Section 4.2.1, deleveraged returns are calculated as 
the cumulative return of all trades entered in a month assuming that each trade 
is done at 1:1 leverage, thus just accounting for the exchange rates movements 
captured (market timing). By removing the influence of the leverage decision in 
returns what is left is an evaluation of the combination of skill (or luck) in the 
directional trading of exchange rates, plus the bid/ask spread cost. 
The results of this deleveraging of returns shown in Panel A of Table 4.7 
are informative. When looking at the turnover quintiles, over the first three 
quintiles there is effectively no pattern to the results. It isn’t until Quintiles 4 and 
5 (-1.04% and -2.67%) that the expected pattern emerges. The same can be 
said for the quintiles ranked on trade frequency. In both cases, however, the 
influence of leverage on trading performance can be seen clearly in the 
differential between the deleveraged returns and the realized returns for the 
same quintiles from the prior tables. This is particularly so at the higher levels of 
trading activity. For example, for turnover the difference between the 5th quintile 
actual returns and the hypothetical deleveraged one is nearly 15% (1495bp). 
That said, it is reasonable to expect lower returns on the basis of higher 
trade frequency as a simple mathematical expression of the negative sum 
nature of retail forex trading. More trades means greater cumulative spread 
costs. And since trade frequency is an element of turnover, it is reasonable to 
expect higher turnover to produce lower returns as well. Thus the really 
informative aspect of Table 4.7 is the deleveraged returns of the quintiles 
derived on the basis of average trade leverage. They show no statistically 
significant pattern. The fifth quintile return (-0.77%) is markedly lower than the 
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first quartile one (0.77%), but it is actually the second quintile which shows the 
worst return level (-1.18%). 
On the face of it, that lack of a pattern in performance for the 
deleveraged returns is problematic. After all, if leverage use is supposed to be 
indicative of impaired trading performance, the deleveraged return values 
should be trending lower as one increases in quintile ranking. This is where 
revisiting the patterns of trade frequency is required. Referring back to Panel B 
of Table 4.6, a clear pattern of decreasing trade frequency as leverage is 
increased can be seen. That needs to be taken into consideration. 
Panel B of Table 4.7 accomplishes this using the average trades per 
month for each quintile across the three measures of trading activity to create 
an average deleveraged return per trade. This is where the importance of 
leverage as an indication of overconfidence becomes clearest. Leverage is the 
only one of the three activity measures for which average returns worsen 
progressively from lowest quintile to highest – going from 0.002% in the first 
quintile to -0.023% in the fifth. In the case of trade frequency, the pattern is 
exactly the opposite (-0.105% in the first quintile, -0.007% in the fifth), indicating 
that higher levels of activity are indicative of better (albeit still unprofitable) 
traders. Turnover shows up and down readings, likely as a result of the mixed 
influence of trade frequency and leverage use on that metric.  
High use of leverage is therefore not only bad in terms of its influence on 
realized returns because it exacerbates an already negative return expectation, 
per what is seen in Table 4.6. It is an indication of an overconfident trader 
making worse trades, as per the suggestions of Kahneman and Riepe (1998) 
and Burks et al. (2013). This makes it a better indication of overconfidence than 
either turnover or trade frequency.  
These results thus provide support for Hypothesis 1in showing that 
increased leverage use, to the extent that it indicates increased overconfidence, 
corresponds to lower returns – both in aggregate and in terms of market timing. 
These results also support Hypothesis 2 that leverage use is a better indication 
of overconfidence than is trade frequency. 
4.4.3. The impact of experience on overconfidence 
To confirm the impact of overconfidence on trading activity, the 
introduction of factors which should have an influence on overconfident trading 
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is required. Trader experience, as noted in section 4.1.3, is just such a factor. 
That data is available in the dataset, which allows for testing Hypothesis 3 
regarding the link between experience and the application of leverage by using 
categories based on trader experience. Table 4.8 presents descriptive statistics 
for the dataset divided on the basis of indicated years of trading experience. It 
should be noted that no adjustments are made in trader classification based on 
the amount of time a trader is in the network. The experience indications are 
applied directly as provided for all months where a trader was active. 
The results shown in Table 4.8 indicate that more experienced traders 
are better performers, as is expected. There is a clear, and statistically 
significant, difference between the realized returns of those with 0-3 years of 
experience and those with more (t-value 13.93). Importantly, the difference 
between realized and deleveraged returns for the more experienced traders is 
markedly lower than it is for less experienced ones, and more experienced 
traders use lower levels of leverage as well. There is thus evidence in support 
of the idea that experienced traders are less influenced by overconfidence as 
indicated by their application of leverage. 
It should be observed that Table 4.8 shows more experienced traders 
tend to have larger accounts. They actually do not trade at lower levels of 
turnover, however. If anything, they turn their accounts over more frequently 
than their less experienced peers. While the experienced traders do use less 
leverage, on average, they tend to trade much more frequently. This is 
noteworthy both because it highlights the trade frequency concerns brought up 
in Section 4.1.2, and because their higher trade frequency is not matched by 
lower deleveraged returns. That suggests they are skilled enough to overcome 
the influence of the extra spread costs. In other words, their trade expected 
returns are far better than those of their less experienced peers, even when 
removing leverage from the equation, indicating a lesser influence from 
overconfidence driven trading, as is expected. Thus, support is found for 
Hypothesis 3 both in terms of experienced individuals using less leverage, but 
not necessarily expressing their lower general level of overconfidence via less 
frequent trading. 
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4.4.4. Sophistication and overconfidence 
Sophistication is another factor which may influence the impact of 
behavioural biases like overconfidence on trading activity, and by extension 
returns, as suggested by Hypothesis 4. If one considers the size of a trader’s 
account as an indication of their level of sophistication, which is a common 
regulatory standard backed up by retail aggregator research linking account 
size to returns (Wagner and Shea, 2011), then a test of this hypothesis is 
possible. The results shown in Table 4.8 and in prior tables already provide an 
indication of links between account size, trading activity, and trading 
performance. Table 4.9 does so more explicitly by returning to the quintile 
methodology. In doing so it is seen that traders with larger accounts tend to 
trade at lower turnover levels (811 for the first quintile vs. 219 for the fifth). This 
is driven by significantly lower levels of leverage rather than by less frequent 
trading, as the pattern is actually that larger accounts trade more often than 
smaller ones. Leverage use drops from 30 in the first quintile to 3 in the fifth, 
while trade frequency rises from 38 to 166 respectively. 
On the performance side of things, the expected pattern whereby larger 
accounts experience better returns is clearly seen, as they improve from -
12.85% in the first quintile to -0.83% in the fifth. Further, the spread between 
realized and hypothetical deleveraged returns is significantly narrower for larger 
accounts than for smaller ones, indicating the reduced influence of leverage on 
performance for larger traders. This provides additional support for the idea that 
sophistication, as measured by account size, is a factor in the influence of 
overconfidence on trading activity and performance. Further, the fact that bigger 
traders are more active means they are better performers on a per-trade basis, 
supporting the argument that there is less influence from overconfidence as 
account size rises. As is the case with experience, then, Hypothesis 4 is 
supported from the perspective of sophisticated traders using less leverage, as 
well as in terms of trade frequency not necessarily being negatively linked. 
4.4.5. A model of trader returns 
Hypothesis 5 proposes that even when controlling for experience and 
sophistication, as well as other factors, higher leverage use leads to worse 
monthly returns. The previous sections provide the basis for developing a model 
of trader monthly returns based on leverage and trade frequency as measures 
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of trading activity, along with experience and trader sophistication to test this 
idea. As noted in Section 4.2.1, there is also an indication that traders from the 
United States underperform their peers from other regions, which suggests 
value in including geographic region as an additional control variable.  
This leads to the following base model: 
 
 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 =  α +  𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
+  𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑖  + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
(4.4) 
Where 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the return of Trader i in month t. 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the log of trade leverage of positions entered by Trader i in 
month t. 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑖 is a dummy for indicated experience of Trader i (3 years 
or less = 1). 
𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the log of the avg. account balance of Trader i in month t. 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the log of the number of trades done by Trader i in month t. 
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is a dummy for the global region of Trader i (United States = 1). 
 
As noted in Section 4.1.2, the Balance, Leverage, and Trades variables 
have considerable positive skewness to them. A log transformation to those 
values is therefore applied to minimize the potential for distortions from 
observations well into the tail of the distribution. This also serves in the case of 
the Balance to rescale the coefficient values to more observable levels. To 
further reduce the potential impact of outlier observations, the three variables 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels, as is the Return dependant variable. 
Additionally, since trader-months lacking an entry for either experience or 
geographic region are of no use in this analysis, they are excluded. As the 
number of months included for members varies considerably, the result is an 
unbalanced panel dataset with a starting observation count just over 28,000 
from 4046 individuals. 
Table 4.13 provides descriptive statistics for this sub-sample for the 
purposes of comparison to the full sample. They indicate that the sub-sample 
features somewhat smaller accounts ($15,552 average/ $1,199 median vs. 
$18,017 average/$1,544 median). The sub-sample also has more observations 
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from inexperienced members (63.76% vs. 54.96%) and from US-based traders 
(40.19% vs. 33.27%). Not surprisingly given the results described in the last two 
sections, this results in an increase in the mean monthly turnover (522 vs 492) 
and leverage (13.52 vs 12.81) values, but has little impact on trade frequency 
(78 vs. 80). Monthly returns for the sub-sample group are slightly lower as well 
(-5.96% vs. -5.88%). Overall, though, the sub-sample does not represent a 
radical departure from the broader one. Additionally, since controls for both 
account size and experience level are part of the model developed below in 
equation 4.5, the sample composition shift is not bothersome. 
Table 4.10 provides a set of variable correlations for the sub-sample. Not 
surprisingly, average trade returns are positively correlated to monthly returns 
(0.27). Leverage is negatively correlated to monthly returns (-0.23), but in line 
with the above results that relationship is much less significant for trade 
frequency (-0.06). All of these correlations are based on log values, so there is 
not a question of relative comparisons in this case. The strongest correlation is 
between leverage and account balance (-0.58), which falls in line with the 
results seen in section 4.4.4 above. Leverage is also negatively correlated with 
trade frequency (-0.25) and trade duration (-0.24). In the latter case that most 
likely reflects smaller relative positions sizes being taken in the face of the 
prospect of greater nominal price volatility while holding positions for longer 
periods of time. In the former case, it may reflect holding a general level of risk 
constant as one increases trade frequency. As seen in the experience and 
sophistication analysis, however, other factors may be at work there. 
An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is employed to test 
Hypothesis 5, with clustering on member ID to account for correlation of 
residuals at the individual trader level based on potential unobserved and 
otherwise uncontrolled for heterogeneity between the traders in the sample. 
Robust standard errors are employed to account for the presence of 
heteroscedasticity and non-normality in the random variables. To account for 
general market conditions, the model also controls for time (e.g. monthly) fixed 
effects.52 The regression results are presented in Table 4.11. Based on the 
earlier findings, the expectation is to see a negative coefficient for the Leverage 
and Trades variables, as well as for the Inexperienced and Region dummies 
                                            
52
 This is done by creating a dummy variable for each month of the study, starting at 1 for the 
first month in the study period (July 2008) running to 58 for the final month (April 2013). 
100 
 
since both are set to reflect negative contributors to performance (less 
experienced and U.S.-based trading). The coefficient for the Balance variable, 
however, should be positive.  
The first five columns shown in the table list the result of single 
independent variable regressions including all of the factors just outlined – 
Leverage, Trades, Balance, Inexperienced, and Region. The sixth and seventh 
columns first combine the three random variables and then add the Region and 
Inexperienced dummies in as well. In all tests, the coefficient signs meet 
expectations – Leverage, Trades, Experience, and Region are all negative, with 
Balance positive. Further, the coefficients are economically meaningful across 
the board. For example, a 10% increase in average trade leverage equates to 
an expected reduction of 0.36 percentage points (36bp) in monthly returns per 
the first column results.  
Noteworthy from the sixth column is the reduction of the coefficient 
values for Leverage (-0.0342 vs -0.0372) and Balance (0.0119) vs. 0.0216) and 
the rise for Trades (-0.235 vs. -0.109). The addition of Balance and Trades are 
actually having mostly offsetting effects on the Leverage coefficient. Combining 
Leverage and Trades leads to both coefficients being more negative and more 
significant (-0.041 and -0.019 respectively, though unpublished), but adding in 
Balance has a modest offsetting effect for leverage, which fits with both the 
developed expectations and the strong negative correlation just noted. While 
both Inexperience and Region are negative and both statistically and 
economically significant in the seventh column results, they have very little 
impact on the coefficients for the random variables.  
To strengthen the analysis, an additional regression is run which adds in 
three elements. The first addition is a set of member dummies to account for 
individual trader characteristics not otherwise captured in the model, which 
means dropping the time-invariant Region and Inexperienced dummies. The 
second element is looking at only those members with at least 10 months of 
data, to limit potential outlier effects of those individuals with few monthly 
observations. This narrows the focus to 1,008 individuals covering 18,238 total 
trader-month observations. 
The last introduction to the analysis is two new control variables. One is 
the average holding period (duration) of trades to account for any changes from 
month to month in the amount of time a trader spends in the market per trade. 
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This might reflect a change in trading style or methodology. The other is the 
mean bid/ask spread return for trades done in a given month (always negative) 
mentioned in Section 4.2.1. Since the bid/ask spread tends to reflect the 
liquidity and volatility level of a given exchange rate, it can be viewed as a proxy 
for trade risk from at least the perspective of the price volatility of the 
instrument(s) being traded. As such, the mean value for a given month indicates 
the relative composition of the riskiness of the exchange rates in which one 
trades, weighted by trade frequency. Including this spread return therefore 
provides a risk control variable such that higher (less negative) values indicate 
less risk, while lower (more negative) values point to greater risk.  
Adding the Spread and Duration control variables and dropping the two 
dummy variables adjusts the base model from Equation 4.4 as follows. 
 
 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 =  α +  𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽4𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽5𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡𝑚 
(4.5) 
Where 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is the mean estimated bid/ask spread of trades done by Trader 
i in month t expressed as a negative return. 
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the log of the mean duration (in days) of trades done by 
Trader i in month t. 
Remaining variables as previously defined. 
 
The results of this new model can be seen in the first column of Table 
4.12, again based on a member-clustered OLS regression with robust standard 
errors. The incorporation of the member fixed effects markedly increases model 
fitness as measured by the adjusted R2, but neither that nor the additional 
control variables have a notable impact on the two primary variables of interest 
– Leverage and Trades. The coefficients for both remain negative and highly 
significant, and if anything they are a fraction stronger. Thus, the general 
findings remain. 
4.4.6. A model of overconfident trader performance 
As discussed in Section 4.4.2, it is insufficient to only analyse realized 
returns when attempting to properly judge the impact of overconfidence on 
trading performance when working in the context of a negative sum market. 
Yes, more frequent trading and higher leverage use are shown in the model 
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developed in Section 4.4.5 above to negatively impact on monthly returns, but 
this is only to be expected. If the idea of overconfidence driven trading is that 
performance is impaired by doing poor trades, then it should be possible to 
develop a model which demonstrates this on a per trade basis. As such, the 
following can be proposed: 
 
 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡
=  α +  𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽4𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽5𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡𝑚 
(4.6) 
Where 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the mean exchange rate change 
captured by each trade for Trader i in month t (inclusive of 
spread). 
Remaining variables as previously defined. 
 
Equation 4.6 simply re-expresses Equation 4.5 to allow analysis at the 
trade level to see whether leverage use and/or trade frequency are contributory 
factors to performance. Results for running the equivalent member-clustered 
OLS regression with month and member fixed effects can be found in the 
second column of values in Table 4.12. As is the case previously, the 
expectation is for both Leverage and Trades to be negative and significant if 
they each signal overconfident trading. The reality is that only in the case of 
Leverage (-0.00015) does that hold in the results, however. The coefficient for 
Trades is actually positive and significant at the 99% confidence level 
(0.00013). Thus, increased leverage use is related to diminished market timing 
performance, while the opposite is true for increased trade frequency.  
The results of this final test thus confirms the findings of Section 4.4.2 in 
showing the existence of a negative relationship between leverage and trader 
performance which goes beyond simple monthly returns and looks into an 
overconfident trader’s performance on a per trade basis. They also show that 
trade frequency does not do a good job of serving in the same capacity for 
these active traders. As such, Hypothesis 5, the primary hypothesis of this 
chapter, is supported. Increased leverage is a better indication of 
overconfidence than is increased trade frequency. 
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4.4.7. Robustness checks 
There are a number of decision points with regards to the data 
preparation and analysis done in this chapter which could be seen as having an 
influence on the findings. Some are addressed above. Here are others of note.  
First, a secondary analysis to that from in Section 4.4.1 may be 
performed in which members are assigned to fixed, rather than potentially 
fluctuating turnover quintiles (and by extension trades and leverage). This is 
accomplished by aggregating each member’s data across all of their active 
months, then placing them in a quintile based on their ranking relative to all 
members from that perspective. This serves to hold member classification fixed 
across all observation periods, which allows for analysis on the basis of the 
traders’ general behaviour rather than activity which may be reflective of 
monthly vagaries. The pattern of returns derived from these alternative quintiles 
remains unchanged, however. 
Second, re-running the first three and sixth regressions from Table 4.11 
(leverage; balance; trades; plus leverage, balance, and trades combined) on the 
full 5,357 member sample set produces coefficient values and significance 
indications little changed from the 4,046 sub-sample presented in the table. 
Incorporating “style” dummies based on the member profile indication of 
approach as described in Chapter 2 (technical, fundamental, momentum, news, 
none) fails to improve model fitness or otherwise change the results. 
Additionally, running the average return regression from Table 4.12 without 
member fixed effects has no meaningful effect on the results. Similarly, 
expanding the regression to include the full 4,046 member sub-sample has 
virtually no impact on either the coefficients or the significance of the results. 
These findings are not published.  
Finally, as an alternative to the OLS methodology employed, a 
secondary set of panel regressions were run based on Equations 4.5 and 4.6. 
They were developed with member ID employed as the entity (panel) and the 
previously defined Month included as the time variable (see Footnote 52). 
Because members varied in terms of the amount of time they were in the 
dataset, as well as when they first appeared, the result was an unbalanced 
panel. A Hausman test indicated that a fixed effects (within) regression 
estimator was favoured over using a generalized least squares (GLS) random 
effects estimator. This fits with the general idea of heterogeneity among traders 
104 
 
influencing their returns, which is seen in comparing the Table 4.11 results from 
Column 7 to those from the Monthly Return column in Table 4.12 where adding 
in the member fixed effects markedly improved model fitness, as measured by 
Adjusted R2. Running the fixed effects panel regression with robust standard 
errors produced more significant results than was the case with the OLS 
version. The decision to focus on the latter in the results presented herein was 
made on the basis of selecting the more conservative option. 
4.5. Further Discussion & Concluding Remarks 
The results of the tests performed in this chapter confirm the 
performance shortcomings of retail investors and traders, particularly when 
considered from the perspective of monthly returns. This is especially so in the 
context of a negative sum market such as retail foreign exchange. After all, if 
individual traders are not generally winners anyway, adding increased trading 
activity in one fashion or another will only make things worse. 
The key in really being able to identify overconfident behaviour among 
traders is looking at results even when accounting for the nature of the 
underlying market. Barber and Odean (2000) are able to do this through the use 
of benchmarking, but in retail forex that option is not readily available. An 
alternative approach is required, which in this chapter has been to shift the 
focus from overall returns to per trade performance. Doing so provides a way to 
gauge whether the proposed indications of overconfident trading – higher trade 
frequency and increased leverage as sub-components of increased monthly 
turnover – are, in fact, indicative of overconfident traders making worse 
decisions and/or exchange rate forecasts. The results presented in the prior 
sections suggest that this is indeed the case. Overconfident traders do not 
simply suffer lower returns because of the cost of the added trades, but 
because they make worse trades in the process. 
Noteworthy in the results of this analysis is that the influence of 
overconfidence can be seen even when accounting for trader experience and 
sophistication. As traders mature, and presumably gain skill, they do perform 
better, as indicated in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 and in the signs of the Inexperienced 
and Balance regression coefficients from Table 4.11. It is hypothesized that 
trading maturity leads to the reduction of the influence of behavioural biases. 
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The analysis herein provides general support for that idea. There is little doubt 
that overconfidence, as expressed in the form of using excessive leverage, has 
a negative impact on returns. Clearly, though, more experienced and 
sophisticated traders simply are not as prone to falling into that trap as their 
newer, less sophisticated peers. 
The analysis does offer some interesting areas for potential further 
research, though. One is the need to look closer at account balance. It is used 
here as an indication of trader sophistication, and certainly there is a link 
between larger accounts and better performance as hypothesized (at least in 
terms of monthly returns). Importantly, however, there is an even stronger 
correlation between leverage and account balance (negative in this case), as 
indicated in Table 4.10. This introduces the question whether there is a risk 
aversion effect which happens as traders work with larger accounts – or 
perhaps increased risk seeking in those with smaller accounts. Restating in 
terms of a research question, would increasing the size of a trader’s account by 
adding in additional funds (or withdrawing them) impact the amount of leverage 
they employ in their trades? Alternatively, is the performance of larger accounts 
not necessarily an indication of sophistication, but rather of risk aversion – or 
perhaps some combination of the two? 
This question relates to a potential issue in using leverage use as a 
metric for overconfidence (and necessarily turnover as well). Is increased 
leverage use really a function of overconfidence? Or is it just a change in an 
investor’s desired level of risk? The two are not mutually exclusive. One could 
increase position size (leverage) because of an excess of confidence in their 
market timing ability and/or in order to increase their general level of risk-taking.  
In the context of this research, two elements tend to keep the focus on 
overconfidence rather than changing risk appetite, however. The primary one is 
the observation of changes in market timing performance. If it were simply a 
question of changing one’s risk level via leverage adjustment, there would not 
be an expected impact on monthly returns based on position size changes. 
There is no inherent reason to expect a change in market timing performance 
as measured by deleveraged returns. Secondarily, the regressions in Table 
4.12 control for at least one aspect of an investor’s risk level by incorporating 
instrument selection into the model.  
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The experience angle is one also worth looking at more closely. Here a 
relatively arbitrary cut-off is made based on the way the social network phrased 
its profile question and because of how the performance figures divided in the 
descriptive statistics. No accounting is made for how much additional 
experience traders gained from the time they entered their profile information 
(along with the assumption being made that they did not change it along the 
way). Further, simple calendar time in the market is presumably not the same 
as active trading experience, so it is worth exploring how much actual trading 
has been done rather than use some time metric. The research question could 
be whether less overconfidence is exhibited by those who have made more 
trades, not just by those who have been in the markets for more months or 
years. Unfortunately, the dataset employed here is insufficient to the task. 
Another open question from this analysis is the reason why non-US 
traders significantly outperform US-based traders. Any number of potential 
influencing factors come to mind and could be explored. Of course the analysis 
presented here is based on aggregates. Cross-sectional analysis of different 
types of market participants is worth pursuing to evaluate more specifically the 
differences in behaviour and decision-making between groups of traders (some 
of which is done in Chapters 5 and 6). 
Taken as a whole, this chapter demonstrates that the portfolio turnover 
metric often used to assess relative levels of trading activity with regards to 
measuring overconfidence should be broken down into the component parts of 
trade frequency and leverage for more specific and informative analysis. The 
results suggests that leverage is in fact the better of the two components when 
it comes to observing overconfident trading in the markets, likely due to the 
impact of learning and other influences on trade frequency which could lead to 
higher levels of trading than would otherwise be expected – or even the simple 
fact of positive expectancy traders rationally attempting to maximise returns. 
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Table 4.1 
Descriptive Statistics on Account Balances, Trade Frequency, Transaction 
Volume, Turnover, Return, Trade Holding Period, and Trade Leverage with 
Inexperienced and Regional Proportions 
Sample of 5,357 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 
2008 to April 2013 comprising 34,002 trader-months of observations (one trader-month 
being the performance of one individual in a single month). All results are based on 
aggregated values for traders with multiple accounts (where applicable), with monthly 
returns derived using a weighting based on capital balances for included accounts. 
Returns are based on the compounded daily returns calculated by the social network 
platform (when trading activity took place). Daily Capital Balance and Trade Volume 
values are USD-equivalent based on prevailing exchange rates on the measurement 
dates. Trades indicates the number of completed round-turn positions, with trades 
counting in the month they were initiated in the case of positions which overlap months. 
Turnover is calculated as total volume traded in a month divided by the average daily 
balance. Trade Duration is the average position holding period (open to close) for 
round-turn trades initiated in a month, measured in days. Trade Leverage is the 
average size of the trades initiated in a month relative to the account balance 
(volume/balance), expressed as a multiple of the account balance. Inexperienced 
indicates the proportion of observations which are from traders listing 0-3 years 
experience in their member profile. Region = US indicates the proportion of 
observations which are from traders listing United States as their geographic home 
region in their member profile. 
 
  Mean 
25th 
Percent. Median 
75th 
Percent. 
Standard 
Deviation 
Daily Capital Balance ($)  18,017  348   1,544   6,077  122,580  
Trades 80 6 22 67 329 
Trade Volume ($)  33,706   1,583  6,753  18,481   160,135  
Turnover (X:1) 492 25 104 371 3242 
Return -5.88% -15.29% -1.73% 3.51% 30.74% 
Trade Duration (days) 3.82 0.11 0.46 1.70 21.15 
Trade Leverage (X:1) 12.81 1.44 4.77 13.93 22.45 
Inexperienced 0.5496     
Region = US 0.3327     
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Table 4.2 
Descriptive Statistics of Trading Activity and Performance Based on Data 
Provided in User Profiles – Geographic Region 
Sample of 5,357 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 2008 to 
April 2013 comprising 34,002 trader-months of observations (one trader-month being the 
performance of one individual in a single month). Traders provided a broad geographic 
indication as part of their profile information. Only Asia/Pacific, Europe, and United States 
were offered as options, with some members making no selection. Panel A compares trade 
frequency, Panel B turnover, and Panel C returns. Observations are trader-months for all 
traders in a given category. Most noteworthy is the relative underperformance of United 
States traders in returns. While Europe and Asia/Pacific are not statistically significantly 
different, the United States traders are significantly worse at the 99% confidence level than 
those from both other regions. 
 
Panel A: Monthly 
Trades Mean 
25th 
Percent. Median 
75th 
Percent. 
Standard 
Deviation Observ. 
Asia/Pacific 80 7 25 75 206 5,657 
Europe 78 7 23 65 211 11,178 
United States 77 6 22 63 437 11,311 
No Entry 90 5 20 68 367 5,856 
       
Panel B: Monthly 
Turnover Mean 
25th 
Percent. Median 
75th 
Percent. 
Standard 
Deviation Observ. 
Asia/Pacific 458 29 108 375 1,438 5,657 
Europe 545 27 107 375 4,806 11,178 
United States 531 29 121 414 2,675 11,311 
No Entry 350 13 70 276 1,041 5,856 
       
Panel C: Monthly 
Returns Mean 
25th 
Percent. Median 
75th 
Percent. 
Standard 
Deviation Observ. 
Asia/Pacific -4.82% -15.21% -1.44% 4.47% 35.00% 5,657 
Europe -4.47% -13.46% -1.20% 4.25% 30.42% 11,178 
United States -7.96% -18.62% -2.67% 2.52% 29.38% 11,311 
No Entry -5.58% -12.45% -1.49% 3.28% 29.28% 5,856 
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Table 4.3 
Descriptive Statistics of Trading Activity and Performance Based on Data 
Provided in User Profiles – Experience 
Sample of 5,357 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 
2008 to April 2013 comprising 34,002 trader-months of observations (one trader-month 
being the performance of one individual in a single month). Traders provided an 
experience indication as part of their profile information, with four potential options: 0-1 
years, 1-3 years, 3-5 years, and 5 or more years. Entries were lacking in some cases. 
Panel A compares trade frequency, Panel B turnover, and Panel C returns. 
Observations are trader-months for all traders in a given category. Noteworthy is the 
pattern of higher trade frequency with greater experience show in Panel A. Perhaps 
most meaningful is the split shown in Panel C in the performance of traders with less 
than or greater than 3 years of experience. The difference in mean return values are 
significant at the 99% confidence level. 
 
Panel A: 
Monthly 
Trades Mean 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Standard 
Deviation Observ. 
0-1 years 51 5 17 46 151 6,471 
1-3 years 76 6 21 64 415 12,218 
3-5 years 87 8 27 75 251 3,644 
5+ years 112 11 34 98 317 7,245 
No Entry 79 4 17 59 324 4,424 
       
Panel B: 
Monthly 
Turnover Mean 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Standard 
Deviation Observ. 
0-1 years 503 29 122 422 2889 6,471 
1-3 years 488 28 116 411 1723 12,218 
3-5 years 484 28 108 356 3123 3,644 
5+ years 599 30 105 353 5591 7,245 
No Entry 321 9 53 226 1039 4,424 
       
Panel C: 
Monthly 
Returns Mean 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Standard 
Deviation Observ. 
0-1 years -9.02% -21.24% -3.61% 1.75% 32.04% 6,471 
1-3 years -7.11% -17.61% -2.47% 3.22% 31.37% 12,218 
3-5 years -2.78% -11.67% -0.68% 5.01% 31.44% 3,644 
5+ years -2.50% -9.40% -0.26% 5.10% 28.32% 7,245 
No Entry -6.00% -13.09% -1.94% 2.51% 29.49% 4,424 
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Table 4.4 
Monthly Aggregate Member Mean Returns 
Sample of 5,357 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 
2008 to April 2013 comprising 34,002 trader-months of observations (one trader-month 
being the performance of one individual in a single month). Returns presented are the 
average actualized returns (inclusive of spread) for all traders active in a given month. 
 
Month 
Active 
Members 
Avg. 
Return 
 
Month 
Active 
Members 
Avg. 
Return 
July-08 27 -6.40% 
 
December-10 1,054 -7.91% 
August-08 23 -20.03% 
 
January-11 1,069 -7.65% 
September-08 21 -9.66% 
 
February-11 1,089 -4.75% 
October-08 18 -5.34% 
 
March-11 1,019 -8.55% 
November-08 20 -1.99% 
 
April-11 1,008 -7.36% 
December-08 22 -7.91% 
 
May-11 914 -7.69% 
January-09 28 -5.17% 
 
June-11 852 -6.02% 
February-09 31 -0.93% 
 
July-11 848 -6.13% 
March-09 30 -15.39% 
 
August-11 823 -6.11% 
April-09 38 0.08% 
 
September-11 829 -5.55% 
May-09 40 -10.47% 
 
October-11 766 -4.42% 
June-09 42 -0.60% 
 
November-11 783 -2.07% 
July-09 44 -6.14% 
 
December-11 771 -2.21% 
August-09 55 0.64% 
 
January-12 839 -7.07% 
September-09 52 -4.71% 
 
February-12 854 -5.52% 
October-09 49 -4.63% 
 
March-12 848 -1.24% 
November-09 56 -6.41% 
 
April-12 863 -3.94% 
December-09 87 -5.66% 
 
May-12 888 -6.90% 
January-10 109 -5.04% 
 
June-12 799 -2.51% 
February-10 329 -8.83% 
 
July-12 832 -2.90% 
March-10 538 -9.17% 
 
August-12 793 -5.16% 
April-10 697 -5.96% 
 
September-12 774 -4.16% 
May-10 806 -6.98% 
 
October-12 811 -3.99% 
June-10 917 -8.16% 
 
November-12 740 -2.44% 
July-10 1,038 -9.73% 
 
December-12 666 -7.17% 
August-10 1,062 -9.32% 
 
January-13 782 -8.14% 
September-10 1,081 -10.91% 
 
February-13 803 2.31% 
October-10 1,104 -8.62% 
 
March-13 772 -4.60% 
November-10 1,032 -4.55% 
 
April-13 717 -3.11% 
     
Average: -5.88% 
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Table 4.5 
Descriptive Statistics for Returns and Relative Returns for Trader 
Quintiles Formed on Monthly Turnover 
Sample of 5,357 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 
2008 to April 2013 comprising 34,002 trader-months of observations (one trader-month 
being the performance of one individual in a single month). Quintiles are defined based 
on monthly turnover (total traded volume / average account balance). Avg. Balance is 
the mean daily account balance. Avg. Volume is the mean size of trades done during 
the month. Avg. Duration is the mean open-to-close holding period of executed trades. 
Avg. Leverage is the mean value for the volume of each trade divided by the daily 
account balance on the day the trade was executed. Trades is the number of round-
turn trades initiated during a month (trades which overlap months are counted in the 
month entered). Return is the net return inclusive of spread. Difference to Prior 
compares the quintile to the next lower one, with p-values provided based on a two-
sample T-test. Relative Return adjusts the monthly return by the aggregate average 
return for the given month. The Q1-Q5 column indicates the return differentials 
between the least active (Q1) and most active (Q5) quintiles. 
 
Quintile Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
 Turnover 7 40 113 305 1989 
 Avg. Balance ($) 30,616 20,457 23,327 10,434 5,348 
 Avg. Volume ($) 22,025 30,200 37,341 34,418 44,458 
 Avg. Duration (Days) 12.54 3.47 1.74 0.93 0.43 
 Avg. Leverage (X:1) 3 8 12 15 27 
 Trades 33 35 66 85 182 
 
       Return -1.00% -1.34% -3.12% -6.27% -17.62% Q1-Q5 
Difference to Prior 
 
-0.34% -1.78% -3.15% -11.35% -16.62% 
p value of T-test 
 
0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
       Relative Return 4.88% 4.55% 2.76% -0.39% -11.74% 
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Table 4.6 
Descriptive Statistics for Returns for Trader Quintiles Formed on Monthly 
Trade Frequency and Average Trade Leverage 
Sample of 5,357 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 
2008 to April 2013 comprising 34,002 trader-months of observations (one trader-month 
being the performance of one individual in a single month). Quintiles defined based on 
monthly trades executed for Panel A and month average trade leverage for Panel B. 
Turnover is total traded volume / average account balance. Avg. Balance is the mean 
daily account balance. Avg. Volume is the mean size of trades done during the month. 
Volume is the total value of all trades executed during the month. Avg. Duration is the 
mean open-to-close holding period of executed trades. Avg. Leverage is the mean 
value for the volume of each trade divide by the daily account balance on the day the 
trade was executed. Trades is the number of round-turn trades initiated during a month 
(trades which overlap months are counted in the month entered). Return is the net 
return inclusive of spread. Relative return adjusts the monthly return by the aggregate 
average return for the given month. Difference to Prior compares the quintile to the 
next lower one, with p-values provided based on a two-sample T-test. The Q1-Q5 
column indicates the return differentials between the least active (Q1) and most active 
(Q5) quintiles. 
Panel A: Trade Frequency 
Quintile Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
 Trades 2 9 23 56 310 
 Turnover 39 134 295 568 1,420 
 Avg. Balance ($) 9,030 9,831 11,491 14,912 44,655 
 Avg. Volume ($) 30,246 34,367 35,137 33,783 35,034 
 Avg. Duration (Days) 9.22 4.29 2.66 1.77 1.10 
 Avg. Leverage (X:1) 18.6 15.5 12.9 10.5 6.6 
 
       Return -3.92% -4.12% -5.60% -6.99% -8.75% Q1-Q5 
Difference to Prior 
 
-0.20% -1.48% -1.39% -1.76% -4.83% 
p value of T-test 
 
0.62 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
       Relative Return 1.99% 1.71% 0.28% -1.10% -2.87% 
 
 
 
Panel B: Average Trade Leverage 
Quintile Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
 Avg. Leverage 0.6 2.1 5.2 11.8 44.2 
 Turnover 64 185 287 540 1,380 
 Avg. Balance ($) 58,748 18,373 7,481 4,307 1,410 
 Avg. Volume ($) 18,526 32,410 33,119 40,993 43,382 
 Avg. Duration (Days) 9.09 4.26 2.95 1.83 0.98 
 Trades 172 91 58 48 34 
 
       Return -0.38% -1.94% -3.37% -6.70% -16.96% Q1-Q5 
Difference to Prior 
 
-1.56% -1.43% -3.33% -10.26% -16.58% 
p value of T-test 
 
0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
       Relative Return 5.50% 3.95% 2.51% -0.82% -11.08% 
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Table 4.7 
Deleveraged Returns Across the Trading Activity Quintiles Derived from 
Turnover, Monthly Trades, and Average Trade Leverage 
Sample of 5,357 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 
2008 to April 2013 comprising 34,002 trader-months of observations (one trader-month 
being the performance of one individual in a single month). Panel A indicates monthly 
hypothetical deleveraged returns – calculated assuming all trades done at size = 
account balance at time of trade entry - presented in place of realized returns (with 
returns summed, not compounded). Turnover returns are based on the quintiles formed 
on monthly turnover rankings from Table 4.5. Trades returns and Average Leverage 
returns are based on the quintiles formed on monthly rankings from Table 4.6. The Q1-
Q5 column indicates the return differentials between the least active (Q1) and most 
active (Q5) quintiles. The Difference row compares the deleveraged returns to the 
same quintile realized return, providing an indication of the impact of leverage. Panel B 
presents mean individual trade deleveraged returns based on the aforementioned 
quintile rankings. 
 
Panel A: Deleveraged Returns 
Quintile Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1-Q5 
Turnover 0.82% -0.50% 0.07% -1.04% -2.67% -3.49% 
Difference to Realized Returns -1.82% -0.84% -3.19% -5.23% -14.95% 
 
       Trades -0.21% -0.34% -0.20% -0.53% -2.03% -1.82% 
Difference to Realized Returns -3.71% -3.78% -5.40% -6.46% -6.72% 
 
       Average Leverage 0.31% -1.18% -0.74% -0.95% -0.77% -1.07% 
Difference to Realized Returns -0.69% -0.76% -2.64% -5.75% -16.19% 
 
 
 
Panel B: Per Trade Performance 
Quintile Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Turnover 0.025% -0.014% 0.001% -0.012% -0.015% 
Trades -0.105% -0.039% -0.009% -0.009% -0.007% 
Average Leverage 0.002% -0.013% -0.013% -0.020% -0.023% 
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Table 4.8 
Experience and its Impact on Trading Activity and Returns 
Sample of 5,357 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 
2008 to April 2013 comprising 34,002 trader-months of observations (one trader-month 
being the performance of one individual in a single month). Traders indicated in their 
profile the years of experience they had trading retail foreign exchange upon joining the 
social network. Observations indicates the number of trader-months for a given level of 
trader experience. Monthly trades is the average number of trades executed each 
month, with Avg. Volume indicating the size, in USD, of those trades. Turnover is total 
USD volume for the month divided by average account balance. Return is the realized 
monthly return, while Deleveraged Return indicates cumulative monthly returns of all 
trades initiated in a given month assuming 1:1 leverage. Avg. Duration indicates the 
length trades were held. Avg. Leverage indicates the size of trades relative to account 
size at the time of entry. Avg. Balance is the average of the daily account equity values. 
 
Experience 0-1 1-3 3-5 5+ No Entry 
Observations 6,471 12,218 3,644 7,245 4,424 
Monthly Trades 51 76 87 112 79 
Avg. Volume ($) 21,209 23,741 35,693 45,862 57,964 
Turnover 503 488 484 599 321 
Return -9.02% -7.11% -2.78% -2.50% -6.00% 
Deleveraged Return -1.29% -0.43% -0.60% -0.57% -0.62% 
Avg. Duration (Days) 3.18 3.87 4.18 4.46 3.25 
Avg. Leverage (X:1) 17.25 14.41 10.98 9.49 8.80 
Avg. Balance ($) 5,399 9,287 26,587 32,278 30,167 
 
 
Difference between returns for those with 0-1 or 1-3 years indicated experience and 
those with 3-5 or 5+ years is significant at the 99% confidence level (t-value 13.93). 
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Table 4.9 
Descriptive Statistics for Returns for Trader Quintiles Formed on Average 
Monthly Account Balance as a Proxy for Trader Sophistication 
Sample of 5,357 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 
2008 to April 2013 comprising 34,002 trader-months of observations (one trader-month 
being the performance of one individual in a single month). Quintiles defined based on 
monthly average daily account balance. Avg. Leverage is the mean value for the 
volume of each trade divide by the daily account balance on the day the trade was 
executed.  Avg. Volume is the mean size of trades done during the month. Volume is 
the total value of all trades executed during the month. Avg. Duration is the mean 
open-to-close holding period of executed trades. Trades is the number of round-turn 
trades initiated during a month (trades which overlap months are counted in the month 
entered). Return is the net return inclusive of spread. Difference to Prior compares the 
quintile to the next lower one, with p-values provided based on a two-sample T-test. 
The Q1-Q5 column indicates the return differentials between the least active (Q1) and 
most active (Q5) quintiles. Deleveraged returns indicates cumulative monthly return of 
all trades initiated in a given month assuming 1:1 leverage. 
 
Quintile Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
 Avg. Balance ($) 120 587 1,760 4,931 82,386 
 Turnover 811 602 425 406 219 
 Avg. Volume ($) 2,582 7,240 14,408 29,286 114,601 
 Avg. Duration (Days) 279 2.48 3.16 4.48 6.15 
 Avg. Leverage (X:1) 30.1 15.0 9.4 6.7 3.0 
 Trades 38 53 65 80 166 
 
       Return -12.85% -7.48% -5.01% -3.28% -0.83% Q1-Q5 
Difference to Prior 
 
5.37% 2.47% 1.73% 2.45% 12.02% 
p value of T-Test  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
       Deleveraged Return -0.82% -0.74% -1.09% -0.57% -0.11% 0.72% 
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Table 4.10 
Correlation of Trader Returns, Leverage, Trades, Experience, Account Balance, and Geographic Region 
Sample of 4,046 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 2008 to April 2013 comprising 28,074 trader-months of 
observations (one trader-month being the performance of one individual in a single month). Leverage is the log of the average trade leverage 
employed in a given month. Balance is the log of the average daily aggregated account balance for a trader in a given month. Trades is the log of the 
number of round-turn trades initiated in a given month. Spread is the estimated mean bid/ask spread expressed as a return (always negative). 
Duration is the logged average holding period, measured in days. Inexperienced is a dummy in which traders indicating 3 years or less of experience 
are given a value of 1 and all others 0. Region is a dummy in which traders indicating they are United States based are given a value of 1 and all 
others 0. All random variables exclusive of Spread winsorized at 1% and 99%. P-values provided in parentheses. 
 
Return Avg. Trade Return Leverage Balance Trades Duration Spread Region Inexperienced 
Return 1.00 
        
          Avg. Trade Return 0.27 1.00 
       
 
(0.00) 
        Leverage -0.23 -0.05 1.00 
      
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
       Balance 0.18 0.05 -0.58 1.00 
     
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
      Trades -0.06 0.08 -0.25 0.28 1.00 
    
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     Duration 0.01 -0.15 -0.24 0.10 -0.20 1.00 
   
 
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
    Spread -0.01 0.00 0.16 -0.05 0.02 -0.17 1.00 
  
 
(0.40) (0.64) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   Region -0.06 -0.02 0.05 -0.10 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 1.00 
 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.23) 
  Inexperienced -0.09 -0.04 0.14 -0.18 -0.13 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 1.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.07) (0.27) 
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Table 4.11 
Regression Model Performance for Leverage, Experience, Trade Frequency, Sophistication, Trader Geographic Region, and 
Trading Style on Trader Monthly Returns, with Month Fixed Effects 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 =  α +  𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +  𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑖  + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
Sample of 4,046 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 2008 to April 2013 comprising 28,074 trader-months of 
observations (one trader-month being the performance of one individual in a single month). Leverage is the log of the average trade leverage in a 
given month. Balance is the log of the average daily aggregated account balance for a trader in a given month. Trades is the log of the number of 
round-turn trades initiated in a given month. Inexperienced is a dummy in which traders indicating 3 years or less of experience are given a value of 1 
and all others 0. Region is a dummy in which traders indicating they are United States based are given a value of 1 and all others 0. Coefficient 
values are expressed such that, for example, a 1 point increase in the log of average trade leverage results in a 372bp reduction in monthly returns 
using the value from the in the first test. Results are from an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression clustered on member with robust standard 
errors (indicated in parenthesis) to account for heteroscedasticity and non-normality. All random variables winsorized at 1% and 99%. Standard errors 
in parentheses. (* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01) 
Test 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Intercept 0.0252 -0.2141*** -0.0167 -0.0250 -0.0272 -0.0134 0.0304 
 
(0.0414) (0.0413) (0.0425) (0.0426) (0.0412) (0.0417) (0.0414) 
Leverage -0.0372*** 
    
-0.0342*** -0.0342*** 
 
(0.0014) 
    
(0.0018) (0.0017) 
Balance 
 
0.0216*** 
   
0.0119*** 0.0103*** 
  
(0.0010) 
   
(0.0012) (0.0012) 
Trades 
  
-0.0109*** 
  
-0.0235*** -0.0243*** 
   
(0.0015) 
  
(0.0016) (0.0016) 
Region 
   
-0.0289*** 
  
-0.0229*** 
    
(0.0052) 
  
(0.0045) 
Inexperienced 
    
-0.0429*** 
 
-0.0342*** 
     
(0.0052) 
 
(0.0047) 
Adjusted R2 5.79% 3.78% 1.39% 1.23% 1.53% 7.88% 8.38% 
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Table 4.12 
Trading Activity Influence on Monthly and Mean Trade Returns, with 
Month and Trader Fixed Effects 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 =  α + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  
+ 𝛽5𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡𝑚 
Sample of 1,008 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 
2008 to April 2013 with at least 10 months of trading activity data comprising 18,238 
trader-months of observations (one trader-month being the performance of one 
individual in a single month). Leverage is the log of the average trade leverage in a 
given month. Balance is the log of the average daily aggregated account balance for a 
trader in a given month. Trades is the log of the number of round-turn trades initiated in 
a given month. Spread is the estimated mean bid/ask spread expressed as a return 
(always negative). Duration is the logged average holding period, measured in days. 
Coefficient values are expressed such that, for example, a 1 point increase in the log of 
average trade leverage results in a 369bp reduction in monthly returns using the value 
from the in the first test. Results are from an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
clustered on member with robust standard errors. All random variables exclusive of 
Spread winsorized at 1% and 99%. Standard errors in parentheses. (* p<0.05; ** 
p<0.01; *** p<0.001) 
 
Test Monthly Return 
Avg. Deleveraged 
Trade Return 
Intercept 0.0545 -0.00018 
 
(0.0553) (0.00175) 
Leverage -0.0369*** -0.00015** 
 
(0.0030) (0.00006) 
Balance 0.0156*** -0.00003 
 
(0.0036) (0.00005) 
Trades -0.0261*** 0.00013*** 
 
(0.0021) (0.00004) 
Duration -0.0026*** -0.00009*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.00002) 
Spread 35.2075 -1.33905 
 
(33.4803) (1.56838) 
Adjusted R2 15.20% 9.34% 
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Table 4.13 
Regression Sub-Sample Descriptive Statistics on Account Balances, 
Trade Frequency, Turnover, Return, Trade Holding Period, and Trade 
Leverage with Inexperienced and Regional Proportions 
Sample of 4,046 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 
2008 to April 2013 comprising 28,074 trader-months of observations (one trader-month 
being the performance of one individual in a single month) including only members with 
sufficient demographic data to include in the Table 4.11 regressions. All results are 
based on aggregated values for traders with multiple accounts (where applicable), with 
monthly returns derived using a weighting based on capital balances for included 
accounts. Returns are based on the compounded daily returns calculated by the social 
network platform (when trading activity took place). Daily Capital Balance and Trade 
Volume values are USD-equivalent based on prevailing exchange rates on the 
measurement dates. Trades indicates the number of completed round-turn positions, 
with trades counting in the month they were initiated in the case of positions which 
overlap months. Turnover is calculated as total volume traded in a month divided by 
the average daily balance. Trade Duration is the average position holding period (open 
to close) for round-turn trades initiated in a month, measured in days. Trade Leverage 
is the average size of the trades initiated in a month relative to the account balance 
(volume/balance), expressed as a multiple of the account balance. Inexperienced 
indicates the proportion of observations which are from traders listing 0-3 years 
experience in their member profile. Region = US indicates the proportion of 
observations which are from traders listing United States as their geographic home 
region in their member profile. 
 
  Mean 
25th 
Percent. Median 
75th 
Percent. 
Standard 
Deviation 
Daily Capital Balance ($)  15,552  285   1,199   5,156  116,567  
Trades 78 6 23 66 321 
Turnover (X:1) 522 28 112 392 3,534 
Return -5.96% -15.71% -1.79% 3.58% 31.31% 
Trade Duration (days) 3.93 0.11 0.45 1.68 22.50 
Trade Leverage (X:1) 13.52 1.61 5.21 15.04 23.11 
Inexperienced 0.6376     
Region = US 0.4019     
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Chapter 5: Social Network Participation 
Influence on Retail Traders 
5.1. Introduction 
With the statement “Investing in speculative assets is a social activity,” 
Shiller et al. (1984) express the view that market participants actually interact 
with each other in a meaningful fashion, contrary to the isolationist concept of 
the investor presented in classic efficient markets theory. Although the authors 
are not explicitly talking about social networks, they do capture the general idea 
of groups of investors linked by a set of overlapping interests. Broad research 
into social networks has a lengthy history,53 but its specific application in the 
realm of finance has only relatively recently gained momentum, no doubt 
motivated in part by the proliferation of online networking platforms.54 
The challenge for the finance social network research in ascertaining the 
degree of information transmission and its influence on linked individuals is 
identifying actual connections. They are often informal, and as such 
undocumented. This leads to research based on the presumption of network 
connections rather than on specifically identified ones, meaning the individuals 
in question are assumed to be socially connected based on commonalities in 
background, position, or demographics rather than documented interactions 
(Hochberg et al., 2007, Cohen et al., 2008, Horton and Serafeim, 2009, Cohen 
et al., 2010, Horton et al., 2012, Pool et al., 2014). As information from online 
social networks becomes more readily available, researchers are beginning to 
use observed network connectivity in their analysis, however (Antweiler and 
Frank, 2004, Mizrach and Weerts, 2009, Simon, 2013, Heimer, 2014b, Simon 
and Heimer, 2014). 
It is important to note that while it may be desirable to have documented 
direct social connectivity and interaction – and even better, the content of that 
interaction - the lack thereof does not limit the potential to examine social 
influence (Horton and Serafeim, 2009). One branch of the financial literature 
relates to the idea of herding, which is largely based on indirect information 
transmission as investors make decisions based on what they observe of 
                                            
53
 See Borgatti et al (2009) for a history and review of social network research. 
54
 See Boyd & Ellison (2007) for a general review of the early research into on-line social 
networks. 
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market participants who act ahead of them in the markets (Keynes, 1936, 
Banerjee, 1992, Bikhchandani et al., 1992, Froot et al., 1992, Nofsinger and 
Sias, 1999, Barber et al., 2009c). There is also a growing related literature on 
peer effects which seeks to explain financial decision-making in a social context 
from an observational perspective (Duflo and Saez, 2002, Ng and Wu, 2010, 
Cooper and Rege, 2011, Kaustia and Knüpfer, 2012, Ahern et al., 2014, 
Bursztyn et al., 2014, Frydman, 2015). Another research branch seeks to 
understand the actual transmission of information between and amongst 
investors with some sort of social connection (Shiller and Pound, 1989, Milton 
and Raviv, 1993, Antweiler and Frank, 2004, Feng and Seasholes, 2004, Brown 
et al., 2008). In the context of the financial markets, the development of online 
social networks provides considerable opportunity to extend the literature. They 
are platforms for investors to not just receive observational signals which can 
relate to herding and/or peer effects, but to also receive specific information 
beyond what others have done in the market. As such, they offer the potential to 
link the branches of research.  
By design, the social research into financial markets participants includes 
an assumption that the information transmitted through these social networks is 
of value – meaning it is fundamental in nature and non-public. The main focus 
of the literature thus far is on the equity markets, so that is perhaps a 
reasonable expectation. Given the breadth of investment options in the stock 
market, the ability of any given member to have considerable knowledge of a 
large portion of even public fundamental information across many companies is 
virtually nil. Even professional analysts tend to specialize by industry. As such, it 
is straightforward to envision value accruing to members of a network of equity 
market investors via the transmission of fundamental information, even if it isn’t 
technically non-public.55 
What about a smaller, less information-dense market like foreign 
exchange?56 In forex - and other small markets - the fundamentals are confined 
to a much narrower dataset. Macroeconomic information related to a given 
currency is readily available and there are only a limited number of currencies 
                                            
55
 This does require accepting the idea that the transmission of new fundamental information is 
not as efficient as earlier theorized. Hong & Stein (1999) explore this by developing a theory of 
under-reaction and momentum trading based in part on a relatively slow diffusion of news. 
56
 The use of the characterization of “small” here is in regards to the number of available 
instruments, not the amount of volume transacted. 
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commonly traded.57 As such, market participants can much more easily stay up-
to-date. This is especially true given the relatively slow general nature of 
change in key factors such as inflation, trade, capital flows, and interest rates. 
Further, in the case of a network of retail traders in one of these small markets, 
it is highly unlikely that truly informed market participants (professionals) would 
be involved and sharing what they know. As such it can be reasonably 
concluded that no real new exogenous fundamental information is available to 
members of a small-market retail trader network.  
So where is the value of membership aside from perhaps some non-
financial change to ones quality of life (psychic benefit)? One possible 
alternative form of information which may pass between investors and other 
financial markets participants is in the form of education. This can either be 
direct – for example specific information on how to execute a buy order - or 
indirect learning by observation. These types of alternative transmission can 
occur regardless of market size and despite the absence of meaningful 
fundamental information. That said, even if some form of information benefit 
does accrue to participants in a trader social network, other social aspects may 
provide offsetting effects such as overconfidence (Han and Yang, 2013). This 
broadly suggests the presence of useful information in a network - exogenous 
non-public fundamental information or otherwise - is no guarantee of actual net 
benefit accruing to members. 
Examining the potential existence of non-fundamental and/or non-public 
information within an investor social network and its impact on members, 
alongside potential social effects, is the subject of this chapter. The analysis of 
the activity of traders in a retail forex trader social network offers an opportunity 
to evaluate member activity and performance in a situation where the non-
fundamental information aspects of the transmission process can be highlighted 
due to the expected lack of exogenous non-public fundamental information.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 
reviews the prior literature and develops the primary hypotheses of the chapter. 
Section 5.3 provides documentation of the data and methodologies being 
                                            
57
 While there is a large number of traded currencies, the vast majority of the volume is in a very 
narrow sub-set of this group. Table 3.4 in Chapter 3 provides a breakdown with respect to the 
volume distribution for a collection of retail forex traders. Broader volume distribution information 
may be found in BIS (2014). 
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employed in the research, with Section 5.4 containing the analysis. Section 5.5 
concludes and presents considerations for future research. 
5.2. Socially Influenced Trading 
5.2.1. Herding behaviour and peer effects 
One of the underpinnings of efficient market theory is that the errors of 
non-rational actors are random. However, if there is a social dynamic to the way 
traders and investors operate, the potential exists for there to be a non-random 
aspect to the errors of market participants in their valuation of securities. The 
behavioural finance research into the limits to arbitrage by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) and those following on address the implications of these non-random 
errors and the potential for the deviations from fundamental value they create to 
persist. Herding behaviour, whereby a large number of individuals act in a 
similar fashion, is at the core of the idea of persistent non-random errors in 
pricing. This is a process modelled by Cao et al. (2011), and has been used to 
explain momentum effects in the financial markets. 
Keynes (1936) is often given credit for introducing the idea of herding 
among investors. He does so from the perspective of an iterative process 
employed by individuals (professional money managers in this case) whereby 
rather than simply evaluating a security on the basis of its valuation, the actions 
of other investors are also considered. For example, an investor would buy if 
they believe other investors will buy, thereby driving price higher.58 It should be 
noted, however, that while herding from this perspective is a conscious 
decision, it need not always be the case. In their review of herding behaviour, 
Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) use the terms “intentional herding” and 
“spurious herding” to differentiate what they identify as two types of behaviour. 
Intentional herding employs the observation of others (peer effects), while 
spurious herding is herding motivated by common factors.59 For the purposes of 
                                            
58
 This could also be viewed from a momentum trading perspective, which is the basis of the 
herding observed by Grinblatt et al (1995) and Nofsinger and Sias (1999) with respect to 
institutional investors. 
59
 The authors use the example of a change in interest rates motivating investors to shift asset 
allocations as an example of this sort of common factors spurious herding. 
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this thesis, the focus is on the intentional variety, though as the authors admit, 
distinguishing the two in practice is at best challenging.60 
Banerjee (1992) investigates the mechanisms of intentional herding and 
develops a model of investor behaviour which demonstrates how individuals 
use the decisions of prior movers in their own decision-making. The result is the 
investor uses their own information less intensely. Bikhchandani et al. (1992) 
follow a similar course as they propose the informational cascade concept in 
which investors act on the basis of the actions of those who have gone before 
them, while Froot et al. (1992) demonstrate that short time horizon speculators 
not only herd on common information in an effort to learn what other informed 
traders know, but may incorporate non-fundamental information into that 
process. Shiller (1995) sees an information cascade effect as well, but is 
dissatisfied with the first-mover approach taken in the prior research. He instead 
puts forth differences in group information transmission as a motivating factor in 
information cascades, which suggests the influence of a social network 
structure on the herding process.  
Regardless of the precise mechanism, however, the potential result of a 
reliance on others’ information by investors, and not their own, is the creation of 
an inefficient market equilibrium. Instead of contributing to the proper valuation 
of a security with their “vote” for its worth, investors are essentially allowing 
others ahead of them to use their vote by proxy. Cipriani and Guarino (2008) 
show how herding effects can spill over to other markets, leading to persistent 
disconnects between price and valuation. Conceptually, this information 
cascade mechanism for herding behaviour is different than the iterative one 
outlined by Keynes. However, to the extent that both can create self-reinforcing 
patterns, they arrive at the same destination. 
Demonstrating that it is not just investors who herd, Welch (2000) 
empirically evaluates the investment recommendations of securities analysts, 
finding that the most recent recommendation has a positive influence on the 
next two analysts’ forecasts and that the consensus overall has a positive 
influence on analyst recommendation revisions.61 As the author points out, the 
motivation for this herding is difficult to ascertain. It could be a case of acting in 
                                            
60
 See Bikhchandani, et al (1998) for a more general review of herding concepts. 
61
 Interestingly, this analyst herding has the potential to create a second level of herding as 
investors react to the published recommendations. 
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a fashion which is perceived to be more professionally beneficial rather than 
trying to be as accurate as possible. Herding on the basis of professional rather 
than performance considerations is specifically discussed in Scharfstein and 
Stein (1990) where a model is put forth in which an investment manager uses 
“…investment decisions to manipulate the labor market’s inferences regarding 
their ability…” Such non-performance motivations are also potential 
explanations for the Hong et al. (2005) findings based on an epidemic thought 
process that money managers in the same city are inclined to make similar 
portfolio changes. The same holds true for the Matvos and Ostrovsky (2010) 
finding that mutual funds are more likely to oppose management when other 
funds are more likely to do so, all else being equal. Regardless of the 
motivation, however, the broader idea of individuals using information from 
those preceding them is valid. 
Shive (2010) continues the empirical work in the individual investor arena 
by employing an epidemic based approach using Finnish data to examine how 
the holdings of investors influence the behaviour of their investor peers. The 
analysis indicates the estimated rate of transmission of “rumours” through social 
contact predicts investor behaviour. Han and Hirshleifer (2015) develop a model 
whereby active trading strategies are transmitted between members of a social 
network on a “bragging” basis, which is tested empirically by Simon and Heimer 
(2014) with findings supportive of just such a transmission occurring.62 While 
the propagation of strategies does not relate to herding on the basis of the 
observation of prior movers, it does speak to herding on the basis of common 
decision-making factors – spurious herding per the Bikhchandani and Sharma 
(2000) definition. From the perspective of individual decision-making, this ties in 
with Bursztyn et al. (2014), who demonstrate the importance of both social 
learning and social utility in the decision-making of investors when deciding to 
purchase an asset. 
5.2.2. Information transmission 
The research into herding behaviour and information cascades often 
assumes individuals can only gain information from other market participants by 
observing their behaviour. As Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000) note, 
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 Simon and Heimer (2014) reference a pre-publication working paper version of Han and 
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“Individuals can observe each other’s actions, but not the private information or 
signals that each player receives.” Thus, they can see what others are doing, 
but not why they are doing it. The latter must be inferred in some fashion unless 
there is also direct communication between individuals. This is the basis of the 
investor social network concept. Shiller and Pound (1989) find empirically that 
information is transmitted among investors in a direct fashion in that investors 
learn of investment opportunities from their peers. Their research, based on 
survey work, is presented in an epidemic model context in line with some of the 
herding work mentioned in the previous section, but conceptually it lays the 
groundwork for research into the broader idea that information is exchanged 
between and amongst market participants directly rather than just through 
observation.  
One line of research which has recently developed from this idea looks at 
the link between how social an individual is and their investing behaviour. Hong 
et al. (2004) find that investors who interact more with their neighbours or attend 
church are more likely to invest in the financial markets than their relatively less 
social peers. This is supported by Shanmugham and Ramya (2012) who use a 
survey-based approach among Indian investors to link social activity to 
investment activity, finding increased social interaction is related to an 
increasingly favourable attitude towards trading. Simon (2013) finds a positive 
relationship between the number of friends an individual has and the frequency 
of their trading, while Heimer (2014a) finds that social interaction is more 
apparent among active investors than among passive ones. 
Backing out to a more community perspective, a number of examples in 
the literature use a commonality of geography to draw links between social 
connectivity (at least presumed) and trading activity. Dorn et al. (2008) examine 
the correlation of trading done by customers of a German brokerage, finding 
they place similar trades. Kaustia and Knüpfer (2012), using Finnish data, 
observe that the returns of local peers influence an investor’s stock market entry 
decision, especially where the environment is better suited to social learning. 
Ng and Wu (2010) find that word-of-mouth influences on trading and investing 
behaviour are strong among investors using a common brokerage branch. This 
is a follow-up to the broader Feng and Seasholes (2004) use of Chinese data to 
explore commonality of investing decisions and activity by those geographically 
linked. They find that investors living near a given company’s headquarters 
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react similarly to information releases. The community idea is also pursued by 
Brown et al. (2008) who examine how it relates to ownership of stocks among 
members. They find that the ratio of stock market participation in an investor’s 
local community influences that individual’s decision whether to invest. Further, 
they show that the effects are stronger in communities identified as more social, 
which is indicated as evidence of word-of-mouth communication.  Li (2014) 
narrows the focus down to the family level in finding that stock market 
participation increases if an individual’s immediate family members become 
active investors. 
Being social and/or being part of a community, however, does not 
necessarily lead to the transmission of information between market participants, 
even if the research makes a general assumption along those lines.63 A path of 
inquiry using data from chat rooms and discussion forum sites offers an 
opportunity to observe actual documented interactions between investors. 
Antweiler and Frank (2004) investigate the influence of stock investing message 
boards and identify a link to trading volume and returns (to a small degree), and 
thus find that interactions are predictive of volatility. Banerjee and Kremer 
(2010) similarly hypothesize that disagreement between market participants 
over the interpretation of fundamental information leads to greater volume and 
volatility. This follows on from a similar conceptual model that Milton and Raviv 
(1993) develop based on variation in the way investors interpret new 
information which finds that absolute price changes and volume are positively 
correlated. From a different perspective, Mizrach and Weerts (2009) find 
profitable returns and a lack of evidence for the disposition effect when looking 
at the trading activity of a group of chat room traders. These findings provide 
support for the idea that financial markets participants are influenced by their 
interactions with each other beyond just simply observing what others are 
doing, and by extension such interactions can influence prices, which is the 
argument made by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2009) in making the case that 
“…thought and behavior contagion should be incorporated into the theory of 
capital markets.” 
That said, recent research presents some challenges to the worth of 
information transmitted through market participant connections and exchanges. 
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Colla and Mele (2010) find that the value of information linkages do have 
impacts on market depth and trading profits, but only based on the degree to 
which they provide positively or negatively correlated signals. Han and Yang 
(2013) demonstrate that the transmission of exogenous information improves 
market efficiency, but find that social communication tends to crowd out such 
information due to “free ride” effects.64 Further, social communication is 
indicated as impairing market efficiency when the information transmitted is 
endogenous in nature. Bakker et al. (2010) also find that social information 
transmission can impair market efficiency on the basis of a model developed 
using different trust networks, which are demonstrated to delay price 
stabilization significantly. This makes intuitive sense, as the requirement of a 
trust decision before processing new information must necessarily slow the 
information dissemination process. There is also the communication of 
confidence, which is addressed by Bloomfield et al. (1996). The authors there 
find considerable difference between the performance of groups where 
members can effectively communicate confidence and those where they 
struggle to do so. 
The question which follows from there, however, is what exactly 
comprises the information being transmitted between investors and traders? 
The general presumption in much of the research is that the information is of an 
exogenous fundamental nature related to the valuation of a given security. This 
is certainly the basis of the work of Colla and Mele (2010) and Han and Yang 
(2013) just noted. The extent to which such fundamental information is of any 
value to its recipient is in large part based on the degree to which it is non-
public, or at least not yet fully publically disseminated, and that it is exogenous 
to the network of social connections in question. Significant challenges can be 
made on both grounds, depending on the nature of the network and the 
information involved. For example, material non-public information such as that 
which is shown to be transmitted in the Ahern (2015) examination of the social 
networks of insider traders and information about pending orders shared 
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trades – which could actually be said to make the herding process more efficient – then they 
have no motivation to seek out the information upon which they might free ride. Presumably, 
that would improve the efficiency of the social information transmission process. 
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between market professionals – as in the so-called LIBOR scandal65 and the 
subsequent exchange rate fixing scandal66 - is a different prospect than stock 
tips shared between unsophisticated, non-insider investors.67 
5.2.3. Social capital 
Beyond the actual information content of a network of investors, there is 
the question of its structure and the impact that may have on how information is 
transmitted. This is where investor social capital becomes part of the equation 
with respect to how they are able to acquire and potentially share information. 
Shiller (1995) indirectly introduces this idea in suggesting that the structure of a 
social group (network) can influence the way information cascades and the 
herding effects which may follow.  
The concept of social capital is defined “…broadly as the features of 
social structure that facilitates action…” according to Adler and Kwon (2000) in 
their review. The authors go on to indicate two primary ways the literature has 
tackled the subject. One is to explore the way an individual is linked to others 
and how those linkages can influence and facilitate their actions and 
performance. The other is to evaluate the structure of a network collectively. 
The two are not mutually exclusive and can potentially overlap. The authors use 
the example of a firm, which is both a collective network internally and part of 
other networks externally. Bringing that into a financial context, a bank 
represents both an internal social network amongst employees as well as 
having its own “individual” social capital with respect to its linkage to other 
banks, institutions, and individuals in the global financial network.  
Although the literature related to social networks and social capital from a 
financial perspective is relatively limited to-date, there has been some research 
focused on the collective network with regards to market structure and prices. 
Notably, Baker (1984) examines the structure of an options market, finding that 
the social structures observed affect both the magnitude and direction of option 
price volatility. Of course much of the herding research mentioned previously 
can be considered to relate to general market social structure as well. The focus 
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of this thesis where social capital is concerned, however, is on the individual 
member aspect. 
Sandefur and Laumann (1998) outline the benefits of a good network 
position (high social capital), which are “… information, influence and control, 
and social solidarity.” From a trader or investor perspective, the tendency may 
be to think in terms of the first of those three benefits. That is, after all, the basis 
of what has been discussed in the preceding sections as the big focus of the 
financial literature related to the relationship between individual market 
participants. Influence and control is something which certainly can be a factor 
in networks of certain types of actors, particularly those who would generally be 
thought of as informed players. While that could also come into play from a 
social perspective among uninformed market participants, it is not something 
expected to impact on returns in any sort of direct fashion. 
Similarly, social solidarity is not a benefit of social capital which one 
would expect to contribute in any direct way toward a trader’s or investor’s 
performance. It is, however, something which is very much contributory to 
answering the question “Why do traders join a social network?” Market 
participation is often a very solitary endeavour for non-professionals. Man being 
a social animal, there will always be a natural inclination for those who share 
the common interest of the financial markets in coming together to interact and 
associate with each other, however. This provides a kind of psychic benefit. The 
question which will at least start to be addressed in this thesis is whether 
alongside that benefit there is an offset with respect to performance by any sort 
of negative aspect of social interaction. Further, social solidarity speaks to the 
question of trust, and as such has an indirect influence on performance through 
the process by which a socially connected investor processes information 
received from another individual or group. 
Returning to the question of the sources or forms of social capital, the 
two primary ones are closure and brokerage (Burt, 2002). Both relate mainly to 
the first of the benefits listed above – information. Specifically, they are 
concerned with the dissemination of information through a social network. 
Closure views a network structure in terms of how interconnected its members 
are from the perspective of distance. The shorter the distance any piece of 
information must travel, the faster it will get there and the less degraded that 
information will be (at least in theory). From this perspective, it is beneficial to 
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be more closely connected with others in the network as it means greater 
access to information and its faster acquisition. From a trading perspective it is 
clear how this could be beneficial.68 The connectivity relationship to returns is 
the subject of an examination of trading on the Istanbul exchange by Ozsoylev 
et al. (2011) where more central network members are found to trade earlier 
and earn greater profits than those on the periphery. 
The second form of social capital, brokerage, comes from the idea of 
structural holes. Structural holes are bridge points where two or more otherwise 
unconnected groups within a social network are linked. The individual who does 
that linking is in a position to potentially benefit in two primary ways. One of 
those benefits is control of information – brokerage. In other words, the one who 
bridges the groups is in a position to gain advantage from the sharing (or not 
sharing) of the information present in one group with another where it has not 
yet reached. The other benefit to filling a structural hole in a network is greater 
access to a more diverse set of information. This addresses a concern when it 
comes to the idea of closure, namely redundancy. Someone with a high degree 
of closure in their network connections may actually receive relatively little in the 
way of novel information. A network member able to establish a brokerage 
position, however, can avoid this problem through connection diversity and thus 
has access to a more useful overall set of information than does others. 
Social capital has been much researched in other contexts, but has only 
started to generate a body of literature in the finance arena. The previously 
mentioned Horton et al. (2012) and Horton and Serafeim (2009) are two 
examples of this. The relative newness of investor and trader online social 
networks along with the limited availability of data related to them means 
research on the subject in only in its infancy. This thesis represents a step 
toward expanding that line of exploration. 
5.2.4. Social network membership influence on performance 
Retail foreign exchange traders are the focus of this thesis. As noted 
above, forex can be viewed as a small market from the perspective of the 
breadth of available tradable instruments. As such, it is one where fundamental 
information is readily available to all participants and is slow-changing. That 
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transmission of new information to all market participants, which essentially means everyone 
has an equally perfect degree of network closure. 
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being the case, membership in a social network of such individuals would not 
seem to offer the benefit of availing members of new exogenous non-public 
fundamental information. The question can therefore be asked what 
informational benefit, if any, it does offer.  
There are potentially other types of information which could reside within 
the network that may prove of use to members. As noted at the end of Section 
3.3 of Chapter 3, there are at least some indications of what individuals 
perceive as the benefit to joining a social network. Education is one of those 
motivations, which suggests there are those who join the network looking to 
gain trading skill by observing and/or interacting with those they perceive to be 
more experienced, informed, and/or successful than themselves. Banerjee 
(1992) at least conceptually supports this from the perspective that investors 
use the behaviour of other investors to provide them with information they do 
not have. The conclusion there is primarily one of herding effects in terms of 
investment decisions, but it should be that trading education (reliable or 
otherwise) can be viewed in a similar fashion, as Han and Hirshleifer (2015) and 
Simon and Heimer (2014) have done in viewing the propagation of high volatility 
trading strategies through a network. As Barber et al. (2013) document in the 
case of speculators in the Taiwan market, some small fraction of traders are 
persistently profitable, so there likely will exist within any reasonably large trader 
network a group of members from whom others can at least attempt to seek 
knowledge, successfully or otherwise.  
Given the tendency amongst retail forex traders toward high frequency 
trading - as suggested by the CitiFX surveys (CitiFX, 2010a, CitiFX, 2010b) and 
the indication from Chapter 3 that the sample data for this thesis shows more 
than 75% of trades were held for less than 10 hours according to the distribution 
of holding periods shown in Table 3.2 - the use of fundamental analysis as a 
primary motivator is prohibitive. These traders are simply in and out of their 
trades too quickly and too frequently (on average) for the relatively infrequent 
changes in fundamental information to be a driver of their decision making. In 
any case, that is all public information and Evans (2002) finds that public news 
is rarely the driver of exchange rates in the short term, which is where these 
traders mainly operate. Since retail traders are not privy to the primary sources 
of information moving exchange rates in the high frequency time frame (e.g. 
order flow at the inter-bank level), the focus shifts to the transmission of 
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strategies using available public information. That being the case, one could 
view the knowledge of anomalous market patterns such as momentum  
(Gourinchas and Tornell, 2004, Bloomfield et al., 2009b, Baillie and Chang, 
2011), carry trade effects (Chaboud and Wright, 2005, Galati et al., 2007, 
Burnside et al., 2008, Bacchetta and Wincoop, 2010, Baillie and Chang, 2011, 
Burnside et al., 2011a), and clustering of stop-loss orders (Osler, 2003) as a 
form of private information endogenous to a social network comprising such 
traders. Thus, it could be that trading strategies and other educational elements 
rather than fundamental information are being transmitted. Ellison and 
Fudenberg (1995) demonstrate the value of word-of-month communication with 
respect to social learning, even in an environment where contact is not frequent 
or widespread. Liu et al. (2014) find evidence for effects from both direct (word-
of-mouth) and indirect communication (observation) from this perspective. 
The ability of new traders to learn of these strategies from experienced 
network members is predicated on two assumptions. In the case of learning 
through observation, the requirement is that an inexperienced investor is able to 
extrapolate a trading strategy by observing transactions. This is not impossible, 
but it becomes increasingly unlikely as the number of variables involved in the 
trading strategy increase (assuming the experienced trader even allows such 
observation of their trading activity in the first place). The alternative learning 
scenario is an exchange of information through direct interaction. Given the 
adversarial nature of the retail forex market, as described in Chapter 2 based on 
the Treynor (1999) definition, the expectation is that there would be a general 
reluctance among profitable traders to share their “secrets”. Stein (2008) 
proposes a model in which there is mutual sharing of investment information 
and ideas,69 but its first assumption is that the parties are on equal footing. This 
is hard to argue in a situation where there is a decidedly heterogeneous mixture 
of experience and sophistication, as in retail forex or other non-professional 
networks. For that matter, there is a reasonable question as to how interested 
profitable traders are in even joining the network in the first place. However, 
profitable investors do join social networks, as documented in at least one case 
in Section 5.3 below. The degree to which they then interact with others and/or 
allow themselves to be observed suggests they see an informational benefit of 
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their own and/or seek a benefit to network membership beyond information 
acquisition, as per Sandefur and Laumann (1998). 
An alternative source of useful information available to members of the 
network is the ability to observe the collective sentiment of their peers. The 
concept of sentiment could be thought of as related to the herding effects 
discussed earlier. It is a subject which is receiving meaningful and increasing 
attention - Barberis et al. (1998), Brown and Cliff (2004), Baker and Wurgler 
(2006), Baker and Wurgler (2007), Tetlock (2007), Stambaugh et al. (2012), and 
Baker et al. (2012) being noteworthy examples.  
As shown in Figure 3.11 of Chapter 3, there were ways the social 
network members included in this study could track the position imbalances of 
their fellow retail traders on a collective basis. They could potentially also track 
the activities of those members with whom they were “friends” - and even others 
who made their trading activity available to the whole network - in perhaps a 
less formal fashion.  
The question then becomes one of the value of such sentiment data, 
assuming one is capable of aggregating it in some useable fashion. The 
literature supports the case for imbalances among investors as indications of 
sentiment being informative of future price movement in the equity market 
(Chordia and Subrahmanyam, 2004, Kumar and Lee, 2006, Andrade et al., 
2008, Barber et al., 2009b, Kelley and Tetlock, 2012). Klitgaard and Weir (2004) 
extend that research to analyse positional imbalances in the futures market for 
currencies and demonstrate how using such information can provide an 
indication of future price movement, so there is at least some basis to believe 
observed imbalances in retail forex could also prove informative. 
As indicated in Chapter 2, however, the retail segment of the forex 
market likely has little impact on pricing because it is relatively small in size70 - 
especially when so much of its volume is concentrated in the largest 
currencies71 - and it is perceived as being uninformed.72 The implication is 
therefore that if one were to use the indications of social network member 
positioning in forex it might be as a contrarian indication rather than in 
anticipation of a potential positive impact on future exchange rates. Given the 
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high proportion of losing traders in the market,73 this is perhaps not an irrational 
position to take.74 If the positional imbalances of retail forex traders are indeed 
informative of future exchange rate movement in some fashion, the presumption 
is that this sort of information would be more likely to be employed successfully 
by more experienced traders. The issue with this idea is that even if such 
sentiment information were deemed worth including in the decision-making 
process, which Elton et al. (1998) contend may not be the case even in markets 
where retail imbalances are likely more influential on future prices movement – 
there is a problem with regards to time frame. Such imbalances simply operate 
at a higher time frame (days, weeks, or months) than active retail forex traders 
tend to occupy. If one is trading positions lasting hours on average, as is the 
case in the retail foreign exchange market, imbalances which might be 
indicative of exchange rate moves over the next month or longer simply are not 
going to be a major decision-making factor.  
Building on these theories, the starting point for the analysis of this 
chapter is whether there is an informational benefit to be had from network 
membership. Generally, none would be expected. If there is indeed an 
educational benefit to be had by the less experienced network members, and 
no real informational benefit to be had by the more sophisticated members, then 
only the former group should see any relative gain from network membership, 
however. Thus, two initial hypotheses may be formulated. 
Hypothesis 1: Traders see no general informational benefit from social 
network membership, therefore membership has no impact on returns. 
Hypothesis 2: Unprofitable traders gain a relative benefit over their more 
profitable peers, therefore their changes in returns after joining the network are 
relatively better. 
These hypotheses are tested in Section 5.4.1. 
5.2.5. Network membership influence on trading frequency 
In Hong et al. (2004) a model is proposed in which individuals who are 
more social are more likely to participate in the stock market, all else being 
equal. This is noted as being motivated by one of two potential drivers (or a 
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combination thereof). One is a learning aspect in which individuals come to 
understand the potential value of investing, learn how to execute trades, etc. 
The other is the more social element of talking about investments with friends, 
which could be seen as related to the attention effect observed by Barber and 
Odean (2008) with respect to headline grabbing stocks. To the extent that 
involvement in a social network may increase an individual’s enjoyment of the 
trading process – their entertainment level – this too could motivate a higher 
level of trading activity as per the Dorn and Sengmueller (2009) findings with 
respect to German investors.  
The research regarding both questions to-date is developing. Ivković and 
Weisbenner (2007) find a link between the investment activity level of a 
household and that of their neighbours. The Shive (2010) analysis of investors 
in Finland finds that social contact in the context of the proportion of investors in 
a municipality predicts individual trading. Shanmugham and Ramya (2012) find 
via a survey of Indian investors that one’s level of social interaction links 
positively to their attitude towards trading, while Heimer (2014a) extends on 
Hong et al. (2004) by linking more social individuals with more active market 
participants. Mitton et al. (2014) work from a neighbourhood perspective, linking 
social interaction and investor enthusiasm to increased speculative activity – in 
this case lottery ticket sales. Broadly speaking, it could be as simple as having 
friends talking about their trading and the markets keeping the idea of trading at 
the fore of one’s mind. 
From a trader network context, whatever social influence motivates an 
individual to take part in the markets has already happened, removing it from 
consideration at this stage. That leaves two perspectives which can be taken in 
viewing the socially motivated trading question with respect to an intentionally 
joined social network. The first is to consider that merely joining the network 
indicates an increase in social behaviour. As such, it should have an influence 
on one’s trading activity according to the literature. Since retail forex trading is 
almost exclusively done online, no consideration needs to be given to any 
potential change in behaviour engendered by moving to an online environment 
to take part in an online social network per the findings of Choi et al. (2002). 
This leads to the third hypothesis of this chapter. 
Hypothesis 3: Traders become more active in the markets after joining a 
social network. 
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The second perspective with regards to socially motivated trading is just 
how social is an individual. This steps beyond the simple act of being social as 
indicated by joining a network and gets into the finer points of whether one 
develops friends in the network, and if so how many. A further hypothesis can 
therefore be developed that those with more friends trade more activity.  
Hypothesis 4: Increased social connectivity for an individual results in 
greater frequency of trading. 
Section 5.4.2 addresses the relationship between social activity and 
trading with respect to these hypotheses. 
5.2.6. Overconfidence 
De Carolis and Saparito (2006) link social network participation, and 
particularly social capital, with the cognitive biases of overconfidence, illusion of 
control, and representativeness. The context is the realm of entrepreneurship, 
but conceptually the application to investing and trading is straightforward. 
Overconfidence specifically is seen as being driven by three aspects of social 
network membership. The first is one’s position within the network in that better 
and/or faster access to information can lead one to overestimate their level of 
knowledge.75 The second is the trust a member puts in their network contacts. 
The last is the shared meanings and language which create a bond between 
network members. 
Building on the suggestion of Barber and Odean (2001b) and Barber and 
Odean (2002) that increased access to information can lead to overconfidence, 
Park et al. (2013) goes a step further by adding confirmation bias to the mix. 
They suggest that investors use social interactions to confirm views they 
already hold rather than seeking out new information (or at least alongside 
doing so). This leads to overconfidence, which drives what the authors describe 
as “…less carefully considered investment decisions.” Their survey based 
findings related to a Korean message board system indeed point to just such a 
bias, which leads to excessive trading and impaired returns. A similar 
observation is made by Gu et al. (2008) in an analysis of Yahoo! Finance 
message board activity. Meaningfully, given the context of the discussion of this 
                                            
75
 While not presented in a social network context, Hirshleifer, et al. (1994) demonstrate how 
overconfidence can be motivated by investors anticipating earlier access to information. 
139 
 
chapter, there is no specific requirement that the information in question be 
novel, private, or fundamentally-related.  
Two hypotheses can therefore be derived. 
Hypothesis 5: Membership in a social network increases trader 
overconfidence.  
Hypothesis 6: Better social network position leads to greater 
overconfidence in traders. 
These hypotheses are tested in Section 5.4.3. 
5.2.7. Social network membership and risk seeking/avoidance 
The direct interaction of individuals in a social context creates risks 
beyond that of the type of herding outlined earlier, namely groupthink and group 
polarization. Whereas herding is generally viewed in the context of information 
acquisition and usage without necessarily requiring a direct social interaction, 
groupthink and group polarization are very much to do with social psychology. 
When examining individual traders and investors, groupthink is not a meaningful 
consideration as it is focused on consensus building in a group decision-making 
context.76 While this could be seen in a case such as an investment committee 
where a unified decision must be made (buy/sell, portfolio allocation, etc.), it 
does not readily apply when considering the actions of individual market 
participants. Group polarization, which addresses changes in individual views 
when part of a group dynamic, is certainly relevant to investors interacting with 
each other, though. 
Myers and Lamm (1976), in their oft-cited review, state “… group 
polarization refers to an increase in the extremity of the average response of the 
subject population.” What this means is that those inclined toward risky 
behaviour will tend to be influenced by the group dynamic to make more risky 
decisions while those inclined toward less risky behaviour will tend to become 
even more risk averse. Shiller (1987) is among the first to bring the idea of 
group polarization into the context of investing.  
Barber et al. (2003) attempt to explicitly examine the role of group 
dynamics in comparing decision-making between investment clubs and 
individuals. They find empirically that a rhetorically based shift toward safer 
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stocks 77 occurs among the clubs as compared to individual investors. Burton et 
al. (2006) use laboratory experiments to ascertain the link between group 
polarization and asset prices, finding those with the most extreme views are 
much more influential than those with the most conservative, but they do not 
evaluate whether group involvement moves members toward more extreme 
behaviours or views, leaving it an open question. 
Unfortunately, the data available for the research here includes traders 
with an excessive level of demographic diversity to be able to evaluate them 
from the perspective of group polarization. That does not, however, preclude 
examining other types of social network influence related to risk preference. 
Research into peer effects points to such a linkage. Cooper and Rege (2011) 
find in laboratory experiments that observing others taking on risk increases 
one’s likelihood of also doing so. Ahern et al. (2014) find convergence in risk 
aversion among randomly grouped MBA students. Along a parallel line of 
thinking, Lu (2011) finds that the performance of peers influences the degree of 
risk taking by retirement plan investors. In research specifically related to 
participation in an online social network, Zhu et al. (2012) find on the basis of 
field and laboratory study that membership increases risk seeking behaviour. 
These peer and social effect observations provide the grounds for two 
further hypotheses to be explored in this chapter.  
Hypothesis 7: Membership in a social network results in traders shifting 
toward more risky trading vehicles. 
Hypothesis 8: Traders with better social network position trade more 
risky instruments. 
These hypotheses are tested in Section 5.4.5. 
5.3. Data & Methodology 
5.3.1. Data and returns 
The dataset described in Chapter 3 forms the basis for the analysis 
which follows, meaning a collection of more than 5,000 members of an on-line 
retail forex trader social network with varied degrees of trading activity spanning 
the period of July 2008 to May 2013. As a starting point, the same initial filtering 
as that described in Section 4.3.1 of Chapter 4 is applied in terms of eliminating 
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 As opposed to an actual move toward lower risk stocks. 
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the incomplete month of May 2013 and the likely erroneous observations where 
mean trade leverage in a given month exceeds the 200:1, which is at the high 
end of broker-permitted leverage use.  
Because a main focus in this chapter is on changes in trader 
performance once they have become part of the network, a sub-set of the data 
is employed including only those members with activity from both before they 
joined the network and after doing so. To avoid including periods which feature 
both member and non-member activity (e.g. a trader joined midway through a 
month, resulting in part of the month as a member and part as a non-member), 
the month in which a trader joined the network is excluded. The resulting sub-
set is 445 members with 5,610 trader-month observations and 519,512 total 
completed round-turn transactions. 
The analysis performed in this chapter is done at two levels. One is a 
monthly view with regards to trader returns and trade frequency. The former are 
the realized values derived in the process described in Section 3.9 of Chapter 3 
whereby in the case of a member having multiple trading accounts they are 
combined on an account balance weighted basis. The latter is simply the sum of 
all completed round-turn transactions which are initiated in a given month 
across all available accounts for the trader in question. 
The second basis for analysis is at the individual transaction level when 
evaluating leverage, the bid/ask spread, and excess returns – the latter being 
the exchange rate move captured by a trade net of the bid/ask spread. The 
decision to not simply use monthly aggregates across the board (since returns 
and trade frequency mandate them) is that trade level analysis is more readily 
generalized with respect to potential impact at the market level, rather than 
merely at an individual one. 
5.3.2. Estimated monthly friend connections 
As noted in Chapter 3, the dataset includes only two discreet points of 
friend link observations – April 2012 and May 2013. It does not include 
information on when those links were made, nor on when links were broken.78 
As a result, it is impossible to develop an actual time series of friend links, per 
se. Because the number of friends an individual has in a given month is 
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 The only way to know of the existence of broken friend links is to observe ones which exist in 
the April 2012 data, but do not in the May 2013 data. 
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potentially meaningful information in the context of the transmission of data 
between members in the social network, it is worth at least attempting to 
estimate monthly friend connections using the data that is available in the 
dataset. Note that in this context the focus is on all of a member’s friend 
connections, not just connections to others who are among the 445 members 
subject to this chapter’s analysis, as just outlined in Section 5.3.1 above. 
A very simple approximation of the number and individual connections 
each member had in any given month would be the final May 2013 values, or 
April 2012 for the months up to that point. Friends tend to be accrued over time 
rather than all at once, however. As such, using the final connections across all 
months would persistently over-estimate connections, potentially by a very large 
margin. As such, an alternative estimation solution is desirable. 
The estimation problem is here being approached from the perspective 
the earliest possible point at which two given friends could have connected. 
This is done by comparing the dates each member joined the network. Since no 
friend link could have been formed any earlier than the month the later of the 
two members sharing a link joined the network, that later date is the first 
possible month for a given friend link. For example, if Member A and Member B 
are known to be connected and Member A joined in January while Member B 
joined in July, then July is the earliest possible month for them to have become 
friends – at least in terms of the social network. Lacking any other basis in the 
data upon which to operate, the assumption is made that the known friend 
connections were initiated in this first possible month. 
Working from that assumption, a running tally of total friend connections 
for every member in each month of their membership is derived by summing 
their estimated new friend connections up to that point: 
 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  ∑ 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑡
𝑖=1
 
(5.1) 
Where 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the total estimated friend connections for member i in 
month t. 
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the estimated new friend connections member i 
gained in month t. 
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Thus, in any given month the estimated number of friends for a certain 
network member is the sum of the total number of the first possible monthly 
connections for that member over all months they have been in the network to 
that point. This can be thought of as providing a time series of the maximum 
number of possible friend connections any given individual could have had in a 
given month in the dataset. Alternatively, one could think of this methodology as 
stripping out from each month’s set of linkages the friend connections which 
could not have been in place because one or more of the members were not yet 
in the network. See Figure 5.1 for a more visual indication of how the estimated 
friend accumulation process worked. 
A short-coming of this methodology is that it essentially assumes a new 
member instantly connects with all of their friends who were already in the 
network at the moment of their registration. This concern is somewhat 
moderated by the fact that the data tested in the analysis to come does not 
include the month a member actually signed up, as per Section 5.3.1 above. 
This allows for there to have been a slower friend building process for new 
members. Unfortunately, this doesn’t alter the fact that for existing members the 
new friend linkages are added instantly. For them, though, the additions are 
likely to be more gradual and thus to have a smaller impact. 
A second short-coming of this methodology is that it has no way of 
handling “de-friending”. Since there is no indication in the dataset of when a 
given member cut ties with another, there is no way to work that into the friend 
approximation process. Fortunately, the disconnection of existing friend links is 
not frequent (at least so far as can be seen in the data). There are 832 
instances of members having fewer friends in the May 2013 snapshot than they 
had in the April 2012 by a total count of 2040 connections. Of those members, 
nearly 64% reduced their friend links by 10% or less. Only 18% cut those links 
by 25% or more, with nearly half that number representing members who 
completely severed all connections (or had connections with them severed). In 
fact, two members account for 962 of those separated links. Thus, in the broad 
context, the inability to incorporate de-friending behaviour into the estimation 
process is likely to be of minor consequence. 
The estimation process is begun by working back from the May 2013 
data to establish friend connections made between then and April 2012. 
Validation of the methodology is made in two ways by comparing the estimated 
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April 2012 connections with the actuals. First, members with no difference in the 
number of connections between April 2012 and May 2013 are evaluated. This is 
the bulk of the membership – 4,465 out of 5,901 individuals with friend 
connections as of the later date. In 98.95% of those cases, the estimates match 
the actual exactly.  
The second test is the case of the 1,498 members where the actual May 
2013 friend count differs from the actual April 2012 one.79 Of course, this group 
includes individuals who had not actually registered yet as of the earlier date - 
approximately 350 members in all - leaving 1,143 where estimates could be 
made. Of that group, the estimated friend links are exactly equal in 23% of 
cases, meaning that for nearly 84% of members the estimated April 2012 friend 
links generated by the process outlined above matched the actuals. Of the 
remainder, there are 140 cases of over-approximation and 737 cases of under-
approximation. The mean overestimate is nearly 43%, while the mean 
underestimate is almost 19%. Those variations seem large, but are heavily 
influenced by cases with small friend counts. All together, they represent a total 
variation of 2157 friend links, which is fractionally over 6% of the total number of 
April 2012 actual connections for the members involved (34,922). There were 
nearly 41,000 recorded friend links as of April 2012, so the total variation 
between the estimated value and the actual one is just over 5%.With this 
confirmation of what would seem to be a reasonable level of accuracy of the 
methodology, the same process is repeated using the April 2012 actuals to 
estimate the friend links in the months prior, going back to the beginning of the 
dataset - or at least to the point where the social network began and the first 
friend connections were developed. 
The intuition is to expect accuracy degradation as one moves further 
back from one of the actual snapshot points. Having the April 2012 connection 
data allows for a reset point after working back from May 2013, but from there it 
is over 3 years back to the first network registrations with no additional 
correction points available. The rapid growth in membership in 2010 could 
challenge the accuracy of the estimates in that time frame, but there simply is 
no way to test. In fact, it isn’t even possible to test the idea that estimates 
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 It should be noted this 1,498 number includes 62 members with friend connections in April 
2012 who subsequently de-friended all of their friends as of May 2013 resulting in a 0 friend 
count at that measurement point. Thus, the total number of members with friends at some point 
in the study period is 5963. 
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worsen with distance from the start point. That need not be a major hurdle, 
however. If the monthly estimates derived are viewed as a close approximation 
of the maximum number of friends a given member could have had at that point 
then a basis for comparisons over time is established. In any case, these 
estimates should provide a more realistic friend link approximation than simply 
assuming the April 2012 or May 2013 friend links were fixed across time – 
especially for those members with long network histories and/or many friends.  
5.3.3. Deriving social capital metrics 
In order to perform the analysis of network position documented in 
Section 5.4.5 below, it is required that certain measures are derived – 
specifically, those for closure centrality (closeness) and brokerage position 
(‘dyadic constraint’ or betweenness). Closeness measures the degree to which 
an individual is connected with other members in terms of distance. The more 
directly linked one is to others in the network, the more close they are, which is 
used to gauge one’s information access and speed of acquisition. 
Betweenness, on the other hand, measures the degree to which a network 
member connects otherwise unconnected members and/or groups. This 
presumably provides the opportunity to acquire information which is of greater 
diversity, and thereby value. 
The start point for calculating social capital measures is the estimated 
member friend connections just outlined above in Section 5.3.2. They are seen 
as providing a better indication of network position than using one of the fixed 
reference points (April 2012 or May 2013), especially for the earlier parts of the 
data set when fewer members are involved. Again, as is noted in Section 5.3.2 
above, the network estimation is on the whole of membership, not just on those 
individuals included in the analysis to come. The values for both closeness and 
betweenness which are used in the analysis in the next section are those 
generated using the Pajek software package for each month of the study, the 
method for which can be found in the appendix to Horton et al. (2012).  
It should be noted that the member privacy setting described in Section 
3.3 of Chapter 3 is used in developing the social capital metrics. If one member 
has their privacy option set to not allow anyone to see their trading activity then 
any friend connections have only a 1-way flow of information from the member 
with the less restrictive setting to the private one, rather than being a standard 
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2-way linkage. In the case of two members both having their privacy settings on 
maximum, no information will actually be transmitted between the two, so no 
connection actually exists for the purposes of deriving the social capital.80  
5.3.4. Trade excess return 
Although it is not used directly in the analysis which follows, one new 
measure of trader performance is utilized for classification purposes. That is 
trade excess return, which is a slight variation on the deleveraged returns used 
in Chapter 4. It is calculated as the return value of the exchange rate move 
captured by the trade, exclusive of the bid/ask spread. For example, if a trader 
entered a long position in USD/JPY at 100 and exited at 110 and there is a 
bid/ask spread of 0.05, the excess return value for that trade would be 10.05% 
[(110+0.05) / 100)].81 
The advantage of using trade excess return rather than a more standard 
return value is that it removes two potential influencing factors. One is position 
size, which may be a function of one or more decision processes or factors 
unrelated to market timing – overconfidence and account balance to name two 
with previously demonstrated links. The other is instrument selection, which 
speaks to the cost of the trade. Excess return allows for a narrow focus on just 
the ability of a trader to pick profitable entry and exit points, regardless of other 
considerations at play. As such, it is used to identify one of the focus analysis 
groups, as will be described in the next section. 
5.3.5. Defining the groups for analysis 
To put the hypotheses developed in Section 5.2 to the test, two groups of 
network members can be defined. The first comprises those members most 
likely to be beneficiaries of educational information. For analysis purposes, this 
group of unsophisticated (unprofitable) traders is defined as those in the bottom 
quartile of mean monthly returns based on pre-membership observations (-
8.91% or worse). Presumably, the poor pre-network performance of these 
individuals is indicative of some sort of educational lack on their part. 
For the second group the reverse is the consideration – namely 
identifying traders who would not be expected to benefit meaningfully from an 
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 This is an extremely rare circumstance, and even the number of instances of 1-way only 
connections is relatively small. 
81
 The trader would have entered by buying at the offer of 100, and exiting at the bid of 110. The 
offer at exit would be 110.05, so the market would have moved by 10.05% in full. 
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educational perspective. These profitable traders comprise the top quartile in 
terms of mean pre-membership trade excess returns (as described in Section 
5.3.4 above). The decision to define this group based on trade level returns 
rather than monthly returns is made from the perspective that market timing is 
likely to be the area most directly related to the presence of actionable 
information in the social network, while other elements which may contribute to 
aggregated returns (leverage use, trade frequency, etc.) may be influenced by 
other factors, as hypothesized. 
5.4. Analysis 
5.4.1. Network influence on member returns 
In Section 5.2.4 it is argued that a network of retail traders in a small 
market environment such as foreign exchange do not benefit from exogenous 
information passing through the network (Hypothesis 1). Further it is 
hypothesized that while those unprofitable individuals needing education may 
gain some benefit from endogenous information in the network, no such benefit 
would be expected to accrue to already knowledgeable (profitable) traders 
(Hypothesis 2). That being the case, the former group would be expected to 
experience a relative performance gain as members while the latter would, 
excluding other effects, see no real impact from network membership. 
Table 5.1 offers a set of top level descriptive statistics. They indicate that 
in general terms mean monthly returns are significantly lower for in-network 
observations by approximately 1.80%. Table 5.2 provides support for this 
finding in the form of a paired means comparison of member vs. non-member 
monthly returns on a calendar basis which indicates a nearly 3.00% difference. 
As such, an early indication of not just a general lack of valuable information in 
the network, but also potentially of some sort of negative – presumably social – 
effect at work on members. 
Addressing the two study groups defined above, Table 5.3 presents a 
means comparison of pre-membership to post-registration performance for the 
full 445 trader sample, as well as for those in the bottom quartile based on pre-
membership mean monthly returns (the unprofitable group), and for those in the 
top quartile based on pre-membership mean excess trade returns (the profitable 
group). The means in this case are based on winsorized values at the 1% and 
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99% levels to reduce possible outlier influence. This also serves to moderate 
any potentially extreme variations for members with limited observations. 
The difference in network effects on the unprofitable and profitable study 
groups is stark. In the case of the unprofitable traders, the indications of an 
educational benefit are strong. Mean monthly returns are a highly significant 
10.90% (1,090 basis points) higher in-network, though still quite poor (-8.74%). 
For the profitable traders, as hypothesized, there is no sign of an information 
advantage accruing. The surprising finding is that these top quartile performers 
are significantly worse off as members of the social network with monthly 
returns 641 basis points lower per month according to the means comparison. 
To confirm these findings with regards to Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, 
two models of member return changes can be developed as follows: 
 
 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 =  α +  𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽3𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖  
+  𝛽4𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
(5.2) 
 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 =  α +  𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖  +  𝛽4𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  
+ 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
(5.3) 
Where 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the return of Trader i in month t. 
𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the log of the average daily account balance of Trader i in 
month t. 
𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy for network status of Trader i in month t 
(member = 1). 
𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 is a dummy set to 1 if Trader i is among the bottom 
quartile of traders based on pre-membership mean monthly trade 
returns. 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 is a dummy set to 1 if Trader i is among the top quartile of 
traders based on pre-membership mean excess trade returns. 
𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is an interaction term equal to 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 x 
𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 . 
𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is an interaction term equal to 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 x 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 . 
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 Through the use of the interaction terms, these models allow for 
observation of changes in monthly returns with respect to membership for the 
two study groups relative to the rest of the sample. Balance is included as a 
control on the basis of the findings in Chapter 4 that larger accounts exhibit 
higher returns, all else being equal. At this point the other potential control 
variables related to trader activity – leverage use, trade frequency, changing 
risk preference indicated by variability in the spread of the currency pairs 
traded, and the duration of trades – are excluded. Any or all of them may be 
subject to network effects, as will be analysed in sections to come. As such, 
leaving them out at this stage allows for the observation of the overall effect in 
the form of changes in monthly returns. 
Table 5.4 presents a correlation analysis of the monthly level aggregates 
and associated dummy variables. As expected, Membership and the social 
capital measures (Friends, Closeness, Betweenness) are positively correlated. 
Of note, the Profitable dummy has a fairly low, though still positive, correlation 
with Return. This would seem to be contradictory, but recall from Section 5.3.5 
that the profitable group is defined based on market timing performance rather 
than monthly returns. The implication of the low correlation is that market timing 
is actually a relatively minor factor in trader profitability. This could be said to 
back up the influence of trade frequency and leverage use on returns, at least in 
terms of a negative sum market, as outlined in Chapter 4. Also noteworthy is 
the negative correlation between the Unprofitable dummy and Balance, as well 
as the positive correlation to Leverage, which are both in line with the findings 
from last chapter. 
The above models also incorporate month fixed effects. Month is an 
incremented value starting at 1 for July 2008 observations and finishing at 58 
for April 2013. This is used to control for conditions in the market which may 
impact all traders. Forex trading being two-sided, meaning equal exposure will 
be long and short, no general market effect might be expected. In the retail 
forex context, however, that two-sided nature includes market makers and other 
liquidity providers who are not part of this study where the focus is on individual 
account holders. In Chapter 2 it is shown that there can be imbalances with 
respect to individual account holder positions. As such, there is the potential for 
a broad market impact on trader performance in any given month, thus 
warranting the inclusion of the month fixed effects in the model. 
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Table 5.5 presents the results of running an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression with clustering on member to account for correlation of residuals at 
the individual trader level. Robust standard errors are derived to address 
heteroscedasticity and non-normality. Return and Balance are winsorized at 1% 
and 99% to limit the influence of outlier observations on the results. The 
Membership column of results is a general test of the influence of membership 
on returns. The results are highly significant, indicating that being a network 
member impairs returns by 406bp. This finding cannot be strictly said to indicate 
a lack of an informational benefit accruing to these profitable traders because it 
is possible some sort of network effect is overwhelming the information gain. 
However, to the extent that any information element is present, but not sufficient 
to counter other effects, the results provide support for at least the spirit of 
Hypothesis 1 that traders see no general information benefit from social network 
membership. The question of what is driving that decline in performance is the 
subject of the sections which follow. 
The Unprofitable column adds in the Unprofitable dummy, which 
predictably has a significantly negative coefficient (-0.1112). The third column 
brings in the MemberUnprofitable interaction term. The results indicate that the 
unprofitable group generally remains unprofitable after joining the network, but 
the highly significant coefficient for the interaction term (0.1530) indicates that 
these traders are much more positively influenced by network membership than 
are others. As such, Hypothesis 2 that unprofitable traders gain a relative 
benefit over their more profitable peers is supported. 
The Profitable column of results from Table 5.5 turns the focus to the 
profitable group – the more successful market timers who would not be 
expected to see an educational benefit, and who presumably would be best 
position to make use of any valuable information which may pass through the 
network. Here the Profitable dummy shows a positive coefficient (0.0424), as is 
expected. The last column brings in the MemberProfitable interaction term, 
which is significantly negative at -0.0498, further supporting Hypothesis 2. 
5.4.2. Does being social increase trading activity? 
In Section 5.2.5 it is hypothesized that increase social behaviour would 
drive increased trading activity. In a negative sum market where the expected 
return of each trade is negative –at least in terms of the primarily price-taker 
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market participants examined in this study – more trading would on average 
mean lower returns. As such, an increase in trading activity would help to 
explain the declining fortunes of the profitable traders observed above. 
Table 5.3 provides a means comparison of monthly trades. It shows that 
generally across all members trade frequency is higher for network members. 
This holds for the unprofitable, but in the case of the profitable one there is no 
significant change in trading frequency. The means analysis, however, is 
potentially subject to an outsized influence from more active traders. There is 
considerable skew in monthly trade frequency, as can be observed in Table 5.1. 
That being the case, confirmation must be sought at the trader level. Properly 
testing the Hypothesis 3 idea that network membership increases activity is 
accomplished by developing a pair of monthly trade frequency models for 
unprofitable and profitable members, respectively: 
 
 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  α +  𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽3𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡  
+  𝛽4𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽5𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡  
+  𝛽6𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖  +  𝛽7𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
(5.4) 
 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  α + 𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽3𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡  
+ 𝛽4𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽5𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,  
+ 𝛽7𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
(5.5) 
Where 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the number of round-turn transactions initiated by Trader i in 
month i. 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the log of the average leverage ratio (trade size relative to 
account balance) for trades entered by Trader i in month i. 
𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the log of the average holding period (in days) for trades 
entered by Trader i in month i. 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is the mean bid/ask spread return value (always negative) for 
trades done by Trader i in month i. 
Remaining variables as previously defined. 
 
Unlike in the returns case where the decision variables potentially subject 
to network membership influence are excluded, in this case they are 
incorporated as controls to allow for the isolation of the network effect on trade 
frequency. Generally speaking, the expectation is that shorter trade holding 
periods (Duration) are linked to higher trade frequency as a simple function of 
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time. Smaller spreads (less negative spread returns in this case) are also 
positively related to more frequent trading on the basis that they represent lower 
transaction costs, allowing for more trades for a given level of expenses. 
Leverage is the remaining decision variable for a trader aside from market 
timing. The expectation may be that those who trade relatively larger positions 
would do so less frequently from the perspective of total market exposure, 
though opposing arguments could be made on a per trade risk basis. 
Here again an OLS regression is employed with member clustering. 
Month fixed effects are included and all the random variables aside from Spread 
are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Spread is excluded as the narrowest spreads 
are generally to be found among trades in EUR/USD. Therefore, winsorizing at 
1% would involve a large portion of the sample. Additionally, the spread return 
values are based on a very constrained set of values, avoiding the prospect of 
outlier observations. 
The results for these models are found in Table 5.6. The coefficients of 
all the activity variables are significant and in line with the expectations. The 
other parts of the results are not consistent with the means analysis, however. 
Membership is not generally indicated as having any impact on trade frequency. 
In general terms, the unprofitable group is indicated as trading more frequently 
than the others (0.27), with the reverse true for the profitable segment (-0.49). 
The profitable group sees no relative effect from network membership. The 
unprofitable traders, however, are indicated as trading relatively less frequently 
(-0.39) as network members. This may be an education impact. Adding the 
interaction term pushes the coefficient for Unprofitable up to 0.49, however, on 
net the unprofitable traders still trade relatively more than others. Regardless, 
these findings reject the Hypothesis 3 idea that social network membership 
tends to make traders more active in the market. 
Simply being a member of the network seems not to lead to higher 
trading activity, but there remains the question of the impact of higher levels of 
network connectivity (more friends) from Hypothesis 4. To examine that 
question, the models from Equations 5.4 and 5.5 can be modified slightly to 
incorporate the estimated number of friends an individual has in a given month. 
153 
 
 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  α +  𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽3𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡  
+  𝛽4𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽5𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡  
+  𝛽6𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖  +  𝛽7𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽8𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
(5.6) 
 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 =  α + 𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽3𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡  
+ 𝛽4𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽5𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,  
+ 𝛽7𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽8𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
(5.7) 
Where 
𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is 1 + the log of the estimated number of friends connects for 
Trader i in month t. 
𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is an interaction term equal to 
𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 x 𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡. 
𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is an interaction term equal to 
𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 x 𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡.  
Remaining variables as previously defined. 
 
Note the two second level interaction terms incorporating a member’s 
estimated friend count – MemberUnprofitableFriends and 
MemberProfitableFriends. They allow for analysis of the relative impact of 
membership on trade frequency with respect to connectivity level.  
Table 5.7 presents the member-clustered OLS regression results based 
on the above models. The coefficient for the Friends variable is positive and 
significant in all cases, but a caveat must be made. If the regressions are run 
excluding two members who have far more friends than any others,82 that 
significance disappears. In both cases the addition of the Friends dummy sees 
Membership shift to negative and significant for all five sets of results, with 
coefficient values between -0.22 and -0.28 (very slightly less negative when 
excluding the two high-friend members). That combination of results suggests 
some small influence in having more friends on how frequently one trades. 
Overall, however, there is little support for Hypothesis 4 - that being more social 
in terms of being more connected leads to more frequent trading. 
                                            
82
 The two members in question have over 1000 and over 500 friends respectively based on the 
May 2013 observation. By comparison, 99% of members have 119 friends or fewer. The theory 
is that these two members are network managers who connected with other members as part of 
their work, not as part of their trading (though both obviously traded to have been included in the 
sample data). 
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5.4.3. Does social network membership drive overconfidence? 
In Section 5.2.6 it is hypothesized that being part of a social network 
drives overconfidence from a couple of different perspectives. In Chapter 4 an 
analysis of leverage use found it to be a better indication of potentially 
overconfident trading than either account turnover or trade frequency, the two 
primary measures in the extant literature. It is possible, therefore, to use trade 
leverage to ascertain whether network involvement drives overconfidence from 
both the general membership perspective of Hypothesis 5 and the network 
position perspective of Hypothesis 6. With respect to the findings from Section 
5.4.1 above, to the extent that leverage use increases among network 
members, it would help explain the drop in returns for the profitable group. 
The evidence is against an increase in overconfidence for network 
members, however. Panel B from Table 5.1 indicates lower leverage use by 
members, which is also reflected in Table 5.2 with respect to both the 
unprofitable and profitable groups. This can be further analysed for the 
purposes of testing Hypothesis 5 by adapting the model from Equations 5.2 and 
5.3 thus: 
 
 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  α +  𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽3𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
(5.8) 
 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡,i =  α + 𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  
+  𝛽4𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
(5.9) 
 
Note that with the analysis of leverage a shift is made to work at the 
transaction level rather than in terms of monthly aggregates, as is the case with 
monthly returns and trade frequency. This is reflected in the change of subscript 
in the equation to replace Month m with Transaction i. Thus, the control 
variables are Trader t’s state as of the time of the trade in question being 
initiated. Otherwise, the variables are as previously defined. The transition to 
transaction level analysis offers the opportunity for a more generalizable set of 
results based on a larger number of observations.  
Table 5.8 provides correlations for the key study variables at the 
transaction level comparable to the monthly ones from Table 5.4. As previously 
noted, and expected, the membership and social capital are all highly 
correlated. The social capital metrics also show as being positively correlated to 
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Balance, suggesting that larger traders are more integrated ones. If the 
expectation is that bigger traders are better ones and that better traders will 
tend to draw friendship requests, this makes sense. Excess Return does not 
correlate highly with any of the variables involved. Beyond that, the Table 5.8 
figures are basically in line with those from Table 5.4.  
At the trade level the other activity variables – trade frequency, duration, 
and spread – must be dropped. This reflects the decision-making factors at this 
level. Trade frequency is an aggregate which is decided higher up in the 
process. The Duration of any given trade is not generally a decision made by 
the trader, but rather the result of what happens in the market after the trade is 
initiated. In the case of Spread, it is dropped because currency pair fixed effects 
are being added alongside the month fixed effects used to this point. Since 
spread is a function of the currency pair traded, including it as a random 
variable is redundant. 
Table 5.9 provides the member-clustered OLS regression results based 
on the above models (again with robust standard errors). Membership is not 
significant in any of the tests. Unprofitable traders are indicated as generally 
using more leverage (0.31), and profitable ones generally use less (-0.32). This 
is likely to be viewed as expected given the relative levels of presumed 
sophistication, but none of the coefficient values are strongly significant. In fact, 
the Profitable dummy loses significance entirely when the MemberProfitable 
interaction term is introduced. Not only does this finding offer no evidence in 
support of Hypothesis 5 with respect to network membership increasing trader 
overconfidence, in the case of the profitable traders it also does not fit the 
Kuhnen (2014) proposal that negative outcomes (declining returns) tend to 
make one more conservative on the basis that the profitable traders experience 
a drop in returns once in-network (more on this in the next section as well).  
The question of whether increased information availability influences 
greater overconfidence can be addressed by a more granular analysis based on 
the member’s network position. This can be evaluated with respect to 
Hypothesis 6 in two ways. The first is to bring closeness centrality in to the 
model to approach the question from the perspective of the volume of available 
in formation and the prospective speed at which it is received. 
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 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  α +  𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽3𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽5𝑁𝑜𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖  + 𝛽6𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽7𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
(5.10) 
 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  α +  𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  
+  𝛽5𝑁𝑜𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖  + 𝛽6𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽7𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
(5.11) 
Where 
𝑁𝑜𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖 is a dummy set to 1 if Trader i shows no friends as of the 
May 2013 observation point. 
𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the estimated closeness centrality measure for Trader i at 
the time of transaction t. 
𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is an interaction term equal to 
𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 x 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡. 
𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is an interaction term equal to 
𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 x 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡.  
Remaining variables as previously defined. 
 
Recall that closeness is derived from the estimated friend connections of 
the member in a given month, as described in Section 5.4. The NoFriends 
dummy is incorporated to control for members who never connect with other 
members of the network. This allows for the interaction terms to only reflect 
members with the potential to have some degree of centrality. Results for the 
regressions can be found in Table 5.10. Generally, Closeness is not significant 
with respect to leverage. It does show as just barely significant when including 
the Profitable dummy variable, but not when excluding the two high-friend 
members discussed in Section 5.4.2 above. Similarly, the coefficient for the 
MemberUnprofitableClose interaction term is positive and significant in the third 
column of results, but that falls out when excluding the two members. The 
MemberUnprofitable interaction term does show as negative and significant 
regardless, but the significance is weak. 
The other way to evaluate the influence of potential information 
availability effects on leverage use can be accomplished by using the 
betweenness brokerage social capital measure. Betweenness is less about 
volume of information and speed of access and more about potential 
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information diversity. Analysis on this basis can be accomplished by replacing 
Closeness in Equations 5.10 and 5.11 with Betweenness, the derivation of 
which is also described in Section 5.4.  
 
 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  α +  𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽3𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽5𝑁𝑜𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖  + 𝛽6𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽7𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
(5.12) 
 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  α +  𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  
+  𝛽5𝑁𝑜𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖   + 𝛽6𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽7𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
(5.13) 
Where 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is 1 + the log of the estimated closeness centrality 
measure for Trader i at the time of transaction t. 
𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is an interaction term equal to 
𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 x 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡. 
𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is an interaction term equal to 
𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 x 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡.  
Remaining variables as previously defined. 
 
Table 5.11 provides the results from running the OLS regressions with 
member level clustering and robust standard errors. Once again, the NoFriends 
dummy is included to control for members who never connected with other 
members, thus had no opportunity to develop a brokerage position. The pattern 
in this case follows that above. When including the two high-friend count 
members the Betweeness coefficient is negative and significant, but when they 
are excluded no significance is seen. In the case of the betweenness interaction 
terms, there is no noteworthy result. This means Hypothesis 6 that better social 
network position leaders to greater overconfidence is not supported. 
5.4.4. Does social network membership impact risk aversion? 
To a degree the question of the impact of social network membership on 
risk aversion is addressed in the analysis of leverage above. However, the 
hypotheses from Section 5.2.7 can be further evaluated by looking at the 
relative spread levels of the currencies being traded by those in the network. 
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Doing so will indicate whether network membership tends to see traders shift 
toward lower or higher risk currency pairs. The means comparison from Table 
5.3 shows that trade spread return values are less negative (bid/ask spreads 
become smaller) for members than non-members, indicating potential increased 
risk aversion motivated by network membership. With regards to Hypothesis 7, 
this can be further analysed by modifying the models from Equation 5.8 and 5.9: 
 
 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =  α +  𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽4𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽5𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  
+ 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
(5.10) 
 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =  α +  𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽5𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
(5.11) 
 
Again, the focus is at the transaction level rather than the monthly 
aggregates. Trade leverage is included in the model as something which the 
trader can control on a trade-by-trade basis. In this case, the currency pair fixed 
effects must be dropped due to their redundancy with the dependant variable 
Spread. The results from the member-clustered OLS regressions is presented 
in Table 5.12. While the means comparison suggests network membership 
tends to shift traders toward less risky currency pairs (less negative spread 
values indicating higher liquidity, lower volatility exchange rates), the 
regressions results do not support that finding. In all cases, the Membership 
dummy fails to come through as significant, so there is no evidence in support 
of Hypothesis 7 that being more social shifts one toward more risky trading 
vehicles. 
As in the case of leverage, it is worth taking a more granular view from 
the perspective of closeness and betweenness to see if the presumed 
informational implications of network connectivity impact on risk aversion may 
be observed in this context. To test Hypothesis 8, the spread models can be 
extended to include both measures. 
 
 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =  α +  𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽4𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽5𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  
+  𝛽6𝑁𝑜𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖  +  𝛽7𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽8𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
(5.14) 
 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =  α +  𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽5𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  
+  𝛽6𝑁𝑜𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖  +  𝛽7𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽8𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
(5.15) 
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 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =  α +  𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽4𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽5𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡   
+  𝛽6𝑁𝑜𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖  +  𝛽7𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽8𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑈𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
(5.16) 
 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =  α +  𝛽1𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽5𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  
+  𝛽6𝑁𝑜𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖  +  𝛽7𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+  𝛽8𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
(5.17) 
 
Tables 5.13 and 5.14 respectively include the results from the closeness 
and betweenness regressions, following the same methodology as in the prior 
regressions. In the case of the former, there is a general positive indication for 
Closeness with respect to spread, showing that more central members tend to 
trade in currency pairs with more narrow spreads. The significance is lower 
when excluding the two high-friend members discussed in the last two sections, 
but it is mainly still retained. This is contrary to the hypothesis, however. It is 
possible that this simply reflects network members connecting with each other 
on the basis of the currency pairs they trade. 
The betweenness regressions provide a stronger set of results. First, the 
coefficient for the brokerage position metric generally is positive and highly 
significantly, indicating that members with higher betweenness tend to trade in 
less risky currency pairs. The Betweenness coefficients are lower when 
excluding the two high-friend members, but they remain positive and significant. 
Unlike in the case of closeness, this is not a situation where selection of friends 
on the basis of currency pairs traded could be suggested as being a factor, as 
that would tend to reduce brokerage position rather than improve it. 
Looking at the unprofitable vs. profitable traders, a decidedly split effect 
is observed, however. The former are indicated as following the just noted 
pattern, but the latter go in the other direction. Profitable traders with greater 
brokerage position tend to trade in more volatile currency pairs. The implication 
is that as a member’s brokerage position (betweenness) improves they actually 
experience lower levels of risk aversion. While this does provide some selective 
evidence in favour of Hypothesis 8 with respect to greater information access 
driving more risk-seeking behaviour, it is not overly compelling. As indicated in 
Panel C of Table 5.1, the 25% to 75% range of observations for Betweenness is 
0 to 0.00034, making the economic meaningfulness of the Table 5.14 findings 
dubious. As such, there is more cause to reject Hypothesis 8 than support for it. 
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5.4.5. Robustness checks 
There are a number of decision points with regards to the data 
preparation and analysis done in this chapter which could be seen as having an 
influence on the findings. Some are addressed above. Here are others of note.  
First, with regards to the friend estimation process outlined in Section 
5.3.2, it is possible to add a lag to reflect the fact that people do not instantly 
connect. For example, rather than a new friend connection being counted in the 
later of the friends’ network registration months, it would only be counted as 
developing one month later. Two factors rule out continuing on this path. Of 
primary consideration, introducing any lag automatically cuts out connections 
which actually did happen during the period skipped over. Perhaps more 
importantly, the accuracy testing does not provide significantly different results. 
Second, no minimum activity filter is applied in generating the results 
presented in this chapter. Analysis of the monthly aggregates (return and 
trades) done whereby only traders with at least three months of data pre- and 
post-registration provides a similar set of results. The values are somewhat 
different, as would be expected, but they lead to equivalent conclusions. The 
same is true when applying a minimum 50 trades filter for the transaction based 
analysis looking at leverage use and spread (currency pair selection). 
Third, the month of the study is the time fixed effect variable employed in 
the regressions throughout this chapter. Using a day or week measure instead 
produces no difference in the results. The hypothesis to explain this is that there 
are too many offsetting positions. This means members are on both sides of 
any broad market effect, thus seeing them cancel out. 
Finally, running the analysis developed in this chapter using an 
alternative panel regression approach per the previous discussion on page 103 
(still with robust standard errors) generally produces results with high 
significance levels. As such, the OLS results are presented as representing the 
more conservative of the two approaches. 
5.5. Conclusions & Further Discussion 
The primary focus of this chapter has been to consider the question of 
individual investors operating in the context of a social structure. In this case it 
is in the context of an online social network for foreign exchange traders. Social 
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networks are often viewed as sources of useful information to connected 
members. That information is transmitted amongst members is not in question. 
The nature of the social network as described in Chapter 3 is such that unless a 
member has set their privacy preference to not allow anyone to see their activity 
(a very small minority), then at a minimum all of their friends receive a feed of 
their activity via their personal dashboard. All members could view the position 
balance indications for the membership, and additional information was also 
being passed through the voluntary mechanisms such as private messages and 
discussion boards, among other media. 
While it is acknowledged that information is available in the network and 
being transmitted across connections, the question is the value of what’s being 
exchanged. The challenge made is that a group of retail (non-professional) 
traders lacks access to the sort of fundamental non-public information which is 
of value on a trade-by-trade basis. Thus, members will not receive from each 
other much, if anything which is actually actionable in their decision-making. 
The findings of Section 5.4.1 with respect to traders who would seem to be 
most likely to be able to make use of any such information – those who have 
demonstrated good market timing ability (profitable traders) - at least make the 
case that if there is any exogenous fundamental information circulating in the 
network, it’s value is very limited. Being able to examine actual interactions 
between members would allow for a better analysis on this basis, but the 
outcomes in the form of returns makes a pretty strong case by themselves. 
The alternative form of information discussed in this chapter is education 
- something endogenous to the network. The dramatic improvement in returns 
by the most unsophisticated (unprofitable) traders suggests that education is 
happening. Table 5.5 provides evidence. The basis for it is unclear, however. Is 
it a simple case of observation, as is a feature of the herding literature? Or is 
this educational gain a case of direct interaction of traders with each other? 
Maybe it is some of each.  
The question from there is how an individual chooses others to observe 
and/or with whom to communicate, how they weight what they see and hear, 
and how they process the incoming information. Each of these factors 
presumably could play a major part in determining the final value of any 
information received as a member of a social network. The high frequency 
nature of the retail forex market means individuals may simply struggle to 
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process the high volume of information coming through in the form of the 
stream of transactions executed, orders entered, and positions held by their 
friends, even if those friends are relatively few in number. That makes weighting 
and/or filtering an extremely important consideration. 
Aside from the information question – or perhaps alongside it when 
considering the educational perspective – is the idea of some type of social 
impact on member performance. The negative shift in returns for the profitable 
traders shown in Table 5.5 makes a strong case for just such a factor. 
Unfortunately, the hypothesized ways network participation may influence 
members are not borne out by the evidence. In fact, in some places the 
indications are contrary to the hypotheses, such as in the reduction in trading 
frequency highlighted in Table 5.6 when social effects are expected to incline 
investors to trade more often. This might be a function of the profitable traders 
being sophisticated enough to resist the social/behavioural influences and the 
unprofitable traders offsetting such effects through the education process. 
Admittedly, the limits of the available data in terms of when members 
connect with each other open up the possibility that an inaccurate 
representation of the network has been developed. The estimation process 
outlined in Section 5.3.2 provides a best guess given the available information, 
but clearly runs the risk of having mistimed connections and cannot account for 
disconnected relationships. This may be of limited concern for members with 
higher numbers of friends, particularly when analysing a member’s raw friend 
count, but for less-connected members there could be some significance. And 
in the case of the social capital measures, there is the risk that missing 
connections – or ones still in place which should have been dropped – could 
result in a distorted network map. Tests on a more complete dataset would offer 
the opportunity to confirm the results presented in Sections 5.4. 
Additionally, the lack of specific interaction data and a broader set of 
demographic information constrains the ability to consider the impact of 
particularly influential and/or susceptible network members per the findings of 
Aral and Walker (2012) that certain groups are more influential or susceptible 
and that members influence each other differently based on considerations 
such as age, gender, and marital status. Such an exploration would allow for a 
deeper understanding of the direction of information flow and whether and how 
influence is projected through the network. 
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With regards to the behavioural findings (or lack thereof) in relation to 
trading frequency, overconfidence, and risk aversion it is worth keeping in mind 
that there is a self-selection aspect to the data. It is possible that simply being 
willing to become part of the sort of social network in question is an influencing 
factor in the behavioural aspects of the analysis herein. For example, the 
willingness to share one’s trading activity in real-time suggests a certain 
inherent level of confidence. This could be a higher level of confidence – 
perhaps an overconfidence of sorts – than seen in the general trading 
population. As such, it might preclude seeing a change in behaviour upon 
joining the network because that variation is already accounted for by the 
selection process.  
Importantly, a final consideration is the actual market timing effectiveness 
of the traders in question. The lack of another meaningful explanation for the 
large drop in monthly returns for the more sophisticated (profitable) traders 
strongly suggests that they have become impaired in the ability to profitably 
forecast exchange rate movements and manage their entry and exit points. At 
the same time the unprofitable members improve in this area markedly, which 
factors heavily in their improved monthly returns. The evidence for this can be 
found in Table 5.3 which shows how trade excess returns drop significantly for 
profitable members and rise significant for the unprofitable ones. Analysis of this 
with respect to the profitable group is the subject of Chapter 6. 
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Figure 5.1 
Friend Estimation 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑚,𝑡 =  ∑ 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑚,𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
 
 
 
 
For each pair of connected members (friends) the earliest possible month in 
which they could have linked with each other is the later of their respective 
registration months. Thus, if Member A joined in t=0 and Member B joined in 
t=4, then t=4 is the earliest possible point at which A and B could have become 
friends. Lacking a better reference point, this period was considered to be the 
point at which the friend linked was initiated for the purposes of estimating how 
many friends each member had in a given month and for deriving social capital 
measures. In terms of friend count, this then became a summation of all the 
estimated friend connects of a given member from their initial registration in the 
network to the current month. 
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Table 5.1 
Descriptive Statistics for Pre-Membership vs. Post-Entry Periods and Social Capital Measures for Social Network Traders 
Sample of 445 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for July 2008 to April 2013, including 5,610 total trader-month observations (one month of a single 
trader’s performance) and 519,152 round-turn transactions. The month a trader joined the network is excluded. The non-member columns include trader-months 
and transactions from before joining the network, with the member columns including those from after doing so. Return is the realized monthly return. Balance is the 
average daily capital level summed for all accounts (where more than one). Trades is the number of round turn positions opened in a month. Leverage is the ratio of 
trade size to account balance for a trade. Duration is the holding period of a trade measured in days. Spread is the return value of the bid/ask spread of a trade 
relative to entry price (always negative). Friends is the estimated number of friend connections a member in a given month. Closeness is the centrality social capital 
metric based on the estimated friend links for that month. Betweenness is the brokerage social capital metric based on the estimated friends links for that month. (* 
p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01) 
 
Panel A: Monthly Data 
 
Non-Member: 2474 Observations Member: 3136 Observations 
  
 
Mean Std. Dev. 25% 75% Mean Std. Dev. 25% 75% Change 
Balance 22,641.57 127,738.30 700.15 8,903.85 44,533.45 234,811.50 934.07 14,853.25 21,891.87*** 
Trades 81.63 198.09 8 76 101.15 220.19 9 87 19.53*** 
Return -1.25% 30.52% -11.73% 6.99% -3.04% 27.95% -9.45% 4.75% -1.795%** 
 
 
Panel B: Trades Data 
 
Non-Member: 201,942 Observations Member: 317,210 Observations 
  Leverage 5.29 17.63 0.39 3.95 3.38 12.37 0.14 2.33 -1.91*** 
Duration 1.57 12.15 0.011 0.366 1.65 11.50 0.020 0.662 0.077** 
Spread -0.0150% 0.0096% -0.0184% -0.0077% -0.0138% 0.0092% -0.0169% -0.0076% 0.00119%*** 
 
 
Panel C: Social Capital Measures (215 members, 1577 observations) 
 
Mean Std. Dev. 25% 75% 
Friends 45.97 177.45 3.00 17.00 
Closeness 0.34010 0.05863 0.30435 0.37426 
Betweenness 0.00449 0.02401 0.00000 0.00034 
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Table 5.2 
Comparison of Returns of Members in a Trader Social Network with Non-
Members on a Month-by-Month Basis 
Panel A: Calendar Month Comparison of Means 
Sample of 445 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 
2008 to April 2013, including 5,610 total trader-month observations (a single trader’s 
performance in one month). Paired mean monthly return comparison of Member vs. 
Non-Member returns on a calendar month basis. Months with less than 20 traders in 
each category excluded, leaving 34 total month observations. 
Group Mean Std. Error Std. Deviation 95% Conf. Interval 
Members -0.0317 0.0062 0.0363 -0.0444 -0.0190 
Non-Members -0.0025 0.0064 0.0375 -0.0156 0.0106 
Difference -0.0292 0.0088 0.0515 -0.0472 -0.0112 
      mean(Difference) = mean(member - non-member) t = -3.3068 
Ho: mean(Difference) = 0 
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Table 5.3 
Implications of Membership on Monthly Returns, Trade Frequency, 
Leverage Use, Currency Pair Selection, and Excess Trade Returns for 
Individuals in a Retail Forex Traders Social Network 
Sample of 445 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 
2008 to April 2013, including 5,610 total trader-month observations (a single trader’s 
performance in one month) and 519,152 round-turn transactions. The month a member 
joined the network is excluded. Monthly Return is aggregated on an account balance 
weighted basis for members with multiple trading accounts. Monthly Trades is the 
count of all transaction entered in a given month across all accounts. Trade Leverage 
is the ratio of transaction volume to mean monthly account balance for a given trade. 
Trade Spread is the return value of the bid/ask spread (always negative) for a given 
trade based on the position entry exchange rate. Trade Excess Return is the exchange 
rate move captured by a given transaction in percent terms relative net of the bid/ask 
spread with no position size (leverage) factor. Return, trades, and leverage values 
based on winsorization at 1% and 99%. The indicated significance of the difference 
between the mean values (Diff) are from an unpaired T-test. (* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** 
p<0.01) 
 
 
Base Unprofitable Profitable 
Monthly Return Count     Mean  Count    Mean Count    Mean 
Member 3,136  -3.38% 675  -8.74% 743  -1.01% 
Non-Member 2,474  -1.82% 526  -19.64% 432  5.40% 
 
Diff: -1.56%*** Diff: 10.90%*** Diff: -6.41%*** 
Monthly Trades 
 
  
 
  
  Member 3,136  96.29 675  80.47 743  58.61 
Non-Member 2,474  77.08 526  55.43 432  51.57 
 
Diff: 19.21*** Diff: 25.04*** Diff: 7.04 
Trade Leverage 
 
  
 
  
  Member 317,210  3.00 57,411  5.69 44,621  1.99 
Non-Member 201,942  4.40 29,300  10.19 22,345  2.16 
 
Diff: -1.40*** Diff: -4.50*** Diff: -0.16*** 
Trade Spread 
 
  
 
  
  Member 317,210  -0.0138% 57,411  -0.0140% 44,621  -0.0165% 
Non-Member 201,942  -0.0150% 29,300  -0.0155% 22,345  -0.0172% 
 
Diff: 0.0012%*** Diff: 0.0016%*** Diff: 0.0006%*** 
Trade Excess 
Return 
 
  
 
  
  Member 317,210  0.001% 57,411  0.004% 44,621  0.034% 
Non-Member 201,942  0.026% 29,300  -0.013% 22,345  0.152% 
 
Diff: -0.0252%*** Diff: 0.0171%*** Diff: -0.119%*** 
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Table 5.4 - Correlations of Study Variables (Monthly Observations) 
Sample of 445 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 2008 to April 2013, including 5,610 total trader-month observations (a single 
trader’s performance in one month). Return is the monthly value. Balance is the log of the average daily aggregated account balance for a trader in a given month. 
Trades is the logged number of completed round-turn transactions begun in the month. Leverage is the log of the average trade leverage employed in a given 
month. Duration is the log of the mean holding period (in days) of trades done in a given month. Spread is the mean return value of the bid/ask spread of trades 
done in a given month (always negative). Membership is a dummy set to 1 for in-network observations. Friends is the log of 1 + the estimated number of 
connections the member had that month. Closeness is the centrality social capital metric based on the estimated number of friends a member has in a given month. 
Betweenness is the log of 1+ the brokerage social capital metric based on the estimated number of friends a member has in a given month. Profitable is a dummy 
set to 1 for individuals whose mean excess trade returns pre-membership were in the top quartile. Unprofitable is a dummy set to 1 for individuals whose mean 
monthly trade returns pre-membership were in the bottom quartile. Return, balance, trades, duration, and leverage values based on winsorization at 1% and 99%. P-
values indicated in parentheses. 
 
Return Balance Trades Leverage Duration Spread Friends Closeness Betweenness Membership Profitable Unprofitable 
Return 1.00 
           
             Balance 0.18 1.00 
          
 
(0.00) 
           Trades 0.01 0.34 1.00 
         
 
(0.65) (0.00) 
          Leverage -0.16 -0.64 -0.26 1.00 
        
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
         Duration -0.01 0.10 -0.23 -0.24 1.00 
       
 
(0.32) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
        Spread 0.01 -0.07 0.05 0.19 -0.13 1.00 
      
 
(0.48) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       Friends -0.03 0.08 0.11 -0.13 -0.02 0.02 1.00 
     
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.07) 
      Closeness -0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.11 -0.01 -0.02 0.89 1.00 
    
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.61) (0.19) (0.00) 
     Betweenness 0.01 0.14 0.16 -0.15 -0.02 0.07 0.46 0.26 1.00 
   
 
(0.34) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
    Membership -0.03 0.10 0.02 -0.15 -0.06 -0.07 0.46 0.54 0.09 1.00 
  
 
(0.03) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   Profitable 0.08 0.08 -0.11 -0.16 0.10 -0.14 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 0.08 1.00 
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.31) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Unprofitable -0.22 -0.29 -0.06 0.23 0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.14 1.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.40) (0.47) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.81) (0.00) 
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Table 5.5 
Implications of Membership on Monthly Returns for Individuals in a Retail 
Forex Traders Social Network, with Month Fixed Effects 
𝑹𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏𝒊,𝒕 =  𝛂 + 𝜷𝟏𝑩𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜷𝟐𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜷𝟑𝑼𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊  
+  𝜷𝟒𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑼𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝒕  + 𝒖𝒊,𝒕 
Sample of 445 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 
2008 to April 2013, including 5,610 total trader-month observations (a single trader’s 
performance in one month). The month a member joined the network is excluded. 
Balance is the log of the mean daily account balance across all active member 
accounts, winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Membership is a dummy set to 1 for 
months in which an individual is part of the network. Unprofitable is a dummy set to 1 
for individuals whose mean monthly trade returns pre-membership were in the bottom 
quartile. Profitable is a dummy set to 1 for individuals whose mean excess trade 
returns pre-membership were in the top quartile. Member-Unprofitable and Member-
Unprofitable are interaction terms equal to Membership x Unprofitable and Profitable 
respectively. Results are from an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression clustered 
on member with robust standard errors using month fixed effects, and are expressed in 
terms of monthly return, which is aggregated on an account balance weighted basis for 
members with multiple trading accounts. Standard errors indicated in parenthesis 
below the coefficient values. (* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01) 
Test Membership Unprofitable 
Member-
Unprofitable Profitable 
Member-
Profitable 
Intercept -0.1961*** -0.1099* -0.0765 -0.1942*** -0.1962*** 
 
(0.0566) (0.0584) (0.0611) (0.0565) (0.0564) 
Balance 0.0218*** 0.0157*** 0.0151*** 0.0212*** 0.0212*** 
 
(0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
Membership -0.0406*** -0.0322*** -0.0644*** -0.0418*** -0.0314*** 
 
(0.0103) (0.0094) (0.0088) (0.0101) (0.0114) 
Unprofitable 
 
-0.1112*** -0.1979*** 
  
  
(0.0150) (0.0188) 
  Member-Unprof 
  
0.1530*** 
  
   
(0.0248) 
  Profitable 
   
0.0424*** 0.0731*** 
    
(0.0101) (0.0166) 
Member-Prof 
    
-0.0498** 
     
(0.0206) 
Adjusted R
2
 3.65% 6.42% 7.84% 4.07% 4.20% 
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Table 5.6 
Implications of Membership on Trade Frequency for Individuals in a Retail 
Forex Trader Social Network, with Month Fixed Effects 
𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒔𝒊,𝒕 =  𝛂 +  𝜷𝟏𝑩𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕  + 𝜷𝟑𝑫𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒕  
+  𝜷𝟒𝑺𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊,𝒕  +  𝜷𝟓𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑𝒊,𝒕  +  𝜷𝟔𝑼𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊  
+  𝜷𝟕𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑼𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝒖𝒊,𝒕 
Sample of 445 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 2008 to April 
2013, including 5,610 total trader-month observations (a single trader’s performance in one 
month). The month a member joined the network is excluded. Balance is the log of the mean 
daily account balance across all active member accounts. Leverage is the log of the mean trade 
leverage for all transactions entered in the month. Duration is the log of the mean holding period 
(in days) for all transactions entered in the month. Spread is the mean bid/ask spread return 
value (always negative) of all trades entered in the month. Balance, Leverage, and Duration are 
all winsorized at 1% and 99% Membership is a dummy set to 1 for months in which an individual 
is part of the network. Unprofitable is a dummy set to 1 for individuals whose mean monthly 
trade returns pre-membership were in the bottom quartile. Profitable is a dummy set to 1 for 
individuals whose mean excess trade returns pre-membership were in the top quartile. Member-
Unprofitable and Member-Unprofitable are interaction terms equal to Membership x Unprofitable 
and Profitable respectively. Results are from an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
clustered on member with robust standard errors using month fixed effects, and are expressed 
in terms of the log of the number of trades entered in the month. Standard errors indicated in 
parenthesis below the coefficient values. (* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01) 
Test Membership Unprofitable 
Member-
Unprofitable Profitable 
Member-
Profitable 
Intercept 1.53*** 1.36** 1.30** 1.56*** 1.55*** 
 
(0.57) (0.59) (0.59) (0.57) (0.57) 
Balance 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Leverage -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21*** 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Duration -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Spread 1296.49** 1320.77** 1341.57** 1033.94** 1035.57** 
 
(549.53) (541.14) (539.71) (527.16) (528.02) 
Membership -0.13 -0.15 -0.07 -0.12 -0.11 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) 
Unprofitable 
 
0.27* 0.49*** 
  
  
(0.15) (0.15) 
  Member-Unprof 
  
-0.39* 
  
   
(0.22) 
  Profitable 
   
-0.49*** -0.47*** 
    
(0.12) (0.15) 
Member-Prof 
    
-0.04 
     
(0.19) 
Adjusted R
2
 21.29% 21.68% 21.89% 22.67% 22.66% 
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Table 5.7 
Implications of Friend Connections on Trade Frequency for Members of a 
Retail Forex Trader Social Network, with Month Fixed Effects 
𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆𝒔𝒊,𝒕 =  𝛂 +  𝜷𝟏𝑩𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕  + 𝜷𝟑𝑫𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊,𝒕  
+  𝜷𝟒𝑺𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊,𝒕  +  𝜷𝟓𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑𝒊,𝒕  +  𝜷𝟔𝑼𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊  
+  𝜷𝟕𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑼𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜷𝟖𝑭𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒊,𝒕
+  𝜷𝟕𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑼𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝑭𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒊,𝒕 + 𝒖𝒊,𝒕 
Sample of 445 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 2008 to April 
2013, including 5,610 total trader-month observations (a single trader’s performance in one 
month). The month a member joined the network is excluded. Balance is the log of the mean 
daily account balance across all active member accounts. Leverage is the log of the mean trade 
leverage for all transactions entered in the month. Duration is the log of the mean holding period 
(in days) for all transactions entered in the month. Spread is the mean bid/ask spread return 
value (always negative) of all trades entered in the month. Membership is a dummy set to 1 for 
months in which an individual is part of the network. Unprofitable is a dummy set to 1 for 
individuals whose mean monthly trade returns pre-membership were in the bottom quartile. 
Profitable is a dummy set to 1 for individuals whose mean excess trade returns pre-membership 
were in the top quartile. Member-Unprofitable and Member-Unprofitable are interaction terms 
equal to Membership x Unprofitable and Profitable respectively. Friends is the log of 1 plus the 
estimated number of friend connections for the trader in that month. Balance, Leverage, 
Duration, and Friends are all winsorized at 1% and 99%. Member-Unprofitable-Friends and 
Member-Profitable-Friends are interactions terms which are calculated as the prior interaction 
terms x Friends. Results are from an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression clustered on 
member with robust standard errors using month fixed effects, and are expressed in terms of 
the log of the number of trades entered in the month, winsorized at 1% and 99%. Standard 
errors indicated in parenthesis below the coefficients. (* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01) 
Test Friends Unprofitable 
Unprofitable-
Friends Profitable 
Profitable-
Friends 
Intercept 1.49*** 1.26** 1.26** 1.52*** 1.55*** 
 
(0.57) (0.59) (0.58) (0.57) (0.57) 
Balance 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Leverage -0.19*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.21*** 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Duration -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Spread 1157.73** 1200.64** 1200.45** 927.41* 937.74* 
 
(516.53) (505.60) (505.98) (507.17) (508.04) 
Membership -0.27*** -0.23** -0.22** -0.25** -0.28** 
 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Unprofitable 
 
0.48*** 0.48*** 
  
  
(0.15) (0.15) 
  Member-Unprof 
 
-0.34 -0.35* 
  
  
(0.21) (0.21) 
  Friends 0.12** 0.12** 0.12** 0.11* 0.13** 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Mem-Unprof-
Friends   
0.01 
  
   
(0.19) 
  Member-Prof 
   
0.00 0.16 
    
(0.18) (0.21) 
Mem-Prof-Friends 
    
-0.17 
     
(0.11) 
Adjusted R
2
 21.95% 22.57% 22.55% 23.16% 23.30% 
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Table 5.8 - Correlations of Study Variables (Trades) 
Sample of 445 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 2008 to April 2013, including 519,152 round-turn transactions. Excess Return is 
the trade return in exchange rate terms (no position size factor) net of the bid/ask spread. Balance is the log of the average daily aggregated account balance for the 
trader in the month of the observed trade. Leverage the logged value of the ratio of trade size to account balance. Duration is the log of the trade holding period (in 
days). Spread is the return value of the bid/ask spread (always negative). Membership is a dummy set to 1 for in-network observations. Friends is the log of 1 + the 
estimated number of connections the member had that month. Closeness is the centrality social capital metric based on the estimated number of friends a member 
has in a given month. Betweenness is the log of 1+ the brokerage social capital metric based on the estimated number of friends a member has in a given month. 
Profitable is a dummy set to 1 for individuals whose mean excess trade returns pre-membership were in the top quartile. Unprofitable is a dummy set to 1 for 
individuals whose mean monthly trade returns pre-membership were in the bottom quartile. Excess return, balance, duration, and leverage values based on 
winsorization at 1% and 99%. P-values indicated in parentheses. 
 
Excess Return Balance Leverage Duration Spread Friends Closeness Betweenness Membership Profitable Unprofitable 
Excess Return 1.00 
          
            Balance 0.01 1.00 
         
 
(0.00) 
          Leverage 0.02 -0.61 1.00 
        
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
         Duration -0.07 0.08 -0.22 1.00 
       
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
        Spread -0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.15 1.00 
      
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       Friends 0.00 0.25 -0.19 0.07 0.14 1.00 
     
 
(0.46) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
      Closeness -0.02 0.18 -0.15 0.07 0.14 0.90 1.00 
    
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.07) 
     Betweenness 0.01 0.25 -0.22 0.16 0.14 0.69 0.53 1.00 
   
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
    Membership -0.03 0.20 -0.17 0.10 0.06 0.45 0.55 0.19 1.00 
  
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   Profitable 0.05 0.08 -0.12 0.18 -0.10 -0.14 -0.12 -0.09 0.04 1.00 
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Unprofitable -0.01 -0.33 0.26 0.03 -0.01 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 0.05 -0.08 1.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Table 5.9 
Membership Impact on Leverage Use for Individuals in a Retail Forex 
Trader Social Network, with Month and Currency Pair Fixed Effects 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕 =  𝛂 +  𝜷𝟏𝑩𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜷𝟐𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜷𝟑𝑼𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝒕  
+  𝜷𝟒𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑼𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝒕  + 𝒖𝒊,𝒕 
Sample of 445 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 
2008 to April 2013, including 519,152 round-turn transactions. The month a member 
joined the network is excluded. Balance is the log of the mean daily account balance 
across all active member accounts, winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Membership 
is a dummy set to 1 for months in which an individual is part of the network. 
Unprofitable is a dummy set to 1 for individuals whose mean monthly trade returns pre-
membership were in the bottom quartile. Profitable is a dummy set to 1 for individuals 
whose mean excess trade returns pre-membership were in the top quartile. Member-
Unprofitable and Member-Unprofitable are interaction terms equal to Membership x 
Unprofitable and Profitable respectively. Results are from an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression clustered on member with robust standard errors using month and 
currency pair fixed effects, and are expressed in terms of the log of trade leverage, 
which is expressed as a multiple of account balance and winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
Standard errors indicated in parenthesis below the coefficient values.  
(* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01) 
Test Membership Unprofitable 
Member-
Unprofitable Profitable 
Member-
Profitable 
Intercept 5.26*** 5.04*** 5.02*** 5.24*** 5.24*** 
 
(0.57) (0.59) (0.60) (0.57) (0.57) 
Balance -0.55*** -0.53*** -0.53*** -0.54*** -0.54*** 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Membership 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 
 
(0.22) (0.20) (0.23) (0.22) (0.24) 
Unprofitable 
 
0.31* 0.47* 
  
  
(0.17) (0.27) 
  Member-Unprof 
  
-0.25 
  
   
(0.26) 
  Profitable 
   
-0.32* -0.35 
    
(0.18) (0.31) 
Member-Prof 
    
0.05 
     
(0.29) 
Adjusted R
2
 43.58% 43.87% 43.92% 43.87% 43.87% 
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Table 5.10 
Implications of Centrality on Leverage Use for Members of a Retail Forex 
Trader Social Network, with Month and Currency Pair Fixed Effects 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕 =  𝛂 +  𝜷𝟏𝑩𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜷𝟐𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜷𝟑𝑼𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝒕  
+  𝜷𝟒𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑼𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑵𝒐𝑭𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒊  
+  𝜷𝟔𝑪𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜷𝟕𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑼𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝑪𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝒖𝒊,𝒕 
Sample of 445 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 2008 to April 
2013, including 519,152 round-turn transactions. Balance is the log of the mean daily account 
balance across all active member accounts, winsorized at 1% and 99% Membership is a 
dummy set to 1 for months in which an individual is part of the network. Unprofitable is a dummy 
set to 1 for individuals whose mean monthly trade returns pre-membership were in the bottom 
quartile. Profitable is a dummy set to 1 for individuals whose mean excess trade returns pre-
membership were in the top quartile. Member-Unprofitable and Member-Unprofitable are 
interaction terms equal to Membership x Unprofitable and Profitable respectively. Closeness is 
the centrality social capital measure based on the estimated friend connections for the trader in 
that month. Member-Unprofitable-Close and Member-Profitable-Close are interactions terms 
which are calculated as the prior interaction terms x Closeness. Results are from an Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression clustered on member with robust standard errors using month 
and currency pair fixed effects, and are expressed in terms of the log of trade leverage, 
winsorized at 1% and 99%. Standard errors indicated in parenthesis below the coefficients.  
(* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01) 
Test Close Unprofitable 
Unprofitable-
Closeness Profitable 
Profitable-
Closeness 
Intercept 5.21*** 5.00*** 4.99*** 5.19*** 5.16*** 
 
(0.55) (0.57) (0.57) (0.54) (0.54) 
Balance -0.54*** -0.52*** -0.52*** -0.54*** -0.53*** 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Membership 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.14 0.17 
 
(0.21) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) 
No Friends -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 
 
(0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Closeness -0.56 -0.51 -0.78 -0.72* -0.84* 
 
(0.44) (0.43) (0.48) (0.42) (0.44) 
Unprofitable 
 
0.47* 0.47* 
  
  
(0.27) (0.27) 
  Member-Unprof 
 
-0.30 -0.53* 
  
  
(0.27) (0.30) 
  Mem-Unprof-Close 
  
1.64** 
  
   
(0.75) 
  Profitable 
   
-0.37 -0.37 
    
(0.28) (0.28) 
Member-Prof 
   
-0.01 -0.15 
    
(0.25) (0.26) 
Mem-Prof-Close 
    
1.17 
     
(0.90) 
Adjusted R
2
 43.75% 44.06% 44.27% 44.14% 44.21% 
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Table 5.11 
Brokerage Position Impact on Leverage for Individuals in a Retail Forex 
Trader Social Network, with Month and Currency Pair Fixed Effects 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕 =  𝛂 +  𝜷𝟏𝑩𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜷𝟐𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜷𝟑𝑼𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝒕  
+  𝜷𝟒𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑼𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑵𝒐𝑭𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒊  
+  𝜷𝟔𝑩𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜷𝟕𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑼𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝑩𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏𝒊,𝒕
+ 𝒖𝒊,𝒕 
Sample of 445 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 2008 to April 
2013, including 519,152 round-turn transactions. Balance is the log of the mean daily account 
balance across all active member accounts, winsorized at 1% and 99% Membership is a 
dummy set to 1 for months in which an individual is part of the network. Unprofitable is a dummy 
set to 1 for individuals whose mean monthly trade returns pre-membership were in the bottom 
quartile. Profitable is a dummy set to 1 for individuals whose mean excess trade returns pre-
membership were in the top quartile. Member-Unprofitable and Member-Unprofitable are 
interaction terms equal to Membership x Unprofitable and Profitable respectively. Betweenness 
is the log of 1 plus the brokerage social capital measure based on the estimated friend 
connections for the trader in that month. Member-Unprofitable-Between and Member-Profitable-
Between are interactions terms which are calculated as the prior interaction terms x 
Betweenness. Results are from an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression clustered on 
member with robust standard errors using month and currency pair fixed effects, and are 
expressed in terms of the log of trade leverage, winsorized at 1% and 99%. Standard errors 
indicated below the coefficients.  
(* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01) 
Test Between Unprofitable 
Unprofitable-
Betweenness Profitable 
Profitable-
Betweenness 
Intercept 5.04*** 4.82*** 4.82*** 5.01*** 5.01*** 
 
(0.55) (0.57) (0.57) (0.54) (0.54) 
Balance -0.52*** -0.51*** -0.51*** -0.52*** -0.52*** 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Membership 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 
 
(0.19) (0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20) 
No Friends -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 
 
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
Betweenness -5.81*** -5.84*** -5.85*** -6.25*** -6.25*** 
 
(1.34) (1.38) (1.38) (1.40) (1.40) 
Unprofitable 
 
0.50* 0.50* 
  
  
(0.27) (0.27) 
  Member-Unprof 
 
-0.34 -0.36 
  
  
(0.27) (0.26) 
  Mem-Unprof-Betw 
  
30.96 
  
   
(38.70) 
  Profitable 
   
-0.37 -0.37 
    
(0.29) (0.29) 
Member-Profitable 
   
-0.01 -0.02 
    
(0.26) (0.26) 
Mem-Prof-Betw 
    
55.36 
     
(45.14) 
Adjusted R
2
 44.32% 44.66% 44.67% 44.72% 44.72% 
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Table 5.12 
Implications of Membership on Currency Pair Selection for Members of a 
Retail Forex Trader Social Network, with Month Fixed Effects 
𝑺𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊,𝒕 =  𝛂 +  𝜷𝟏𝑩𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜷𝟐𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜷𝟑𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑𝒊,𝒕
+  𝜷𝟒𝑼𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝒕  +  𝜷𝟓𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑼𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝒕  + 𝒖𝒊,𝒕 
Sample of 445 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 
2008 to April 2013, including 519,152 round-turn transactions. The month a member 
joined the network is excluded. Balance is the log of the mean daily account balance 
across all active member accounts. Leverage is the log of the leverage used in the 
transaction. Balance and Leverage are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. 
Membership is a dummy set to 1 for months in which an individual is part of the 
network. Unprofitable is a dummy set to 1 for individuals whose mean monthly trade 
returns pre-membership were in the bottom quartile. Profitable is a dummy set to 1 for 
individuals whose mean excess trade returns pre-membership were in the top quartile. 
Member-Unprofitable and Member-Unprofitable are interaction terms equal to 
Membership x Unprofitable and Profitable respectively. Results are from an Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression clustered on member with robust standard errors 
using month and currency pair fixed effects, and are expressed in terms of the bid/ask 
return value for the trade (always negative). Standard errors indicated in parenthesis 
below the coefficient values.  
(* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01) 
Test Membership Unprofitable 
Member-
Unprofitable Profitable 
Member-
Profitable 
Intercept -0.000146*** -0.000140*** -0.000140*** -0.000144*** -0.000144*** 
 
(0.000031) (0.000031) (0.000032) (0.000029) (0.000029) 
Balance 0.000001 0.000000 0.000000 0.000001 0.000001 
 
(0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003) 
Leverage 0.000003 0.000003 0.000003 0.000003 0.000003 
 
(0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003) 
Membership 0.000007 0.000008 0.000008 0.000008 0.000007 
 
(0.000008) (0.000008) (0.000009) (0.000008) (0.000009) 
Unprofitable 
 
-0.000009 -0.000012 
  
  
(0.000015) (0.000019) 
  Mem-Unprof 
  
0.000005 
  
   
(0.000019) 
  Profitable 
   
-0.000028** -0.000028** 
    
(0.000011) (0.000013) 
Mem-Prof 
    
0.000001 
     
(0.000014) 
Adjusted R
2
 5.71% 5.83% 5.84% 6.65% 6.65% 
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Table 5.13 
Implications of Centrality on Currency Pair Selection for Individuals in a 
Retail Forex Trader Social Network, with Month Fixed Effects 
𝑺𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊,𝒕 =  𝛂 +  𝜷𝟏𝑩𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜷𝟐𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜷𝟑𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑𝒊,𝒕
+  𝜷𝟒𝑼𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝒕  +  𝜷𝟓𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑼𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝒕  
+  𝜷𝟔𝑵𝒐𝑭𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒊  +  𝜷𝟕𝑪𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊,𝒕
+  𝜷𝟖𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑼𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝑪𝒍𝒐𝒔𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝒖𝒊,𝒕 
Sample of 445 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 2008 to April 
2013, including 519,152 round-turn transactions. Balance is the log of the mean daily account 
balance across all active member accounts. Leverage is the log of the leverage used in the 
transaction. Balance and Leverage are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Membership is a 
dummy set to 1 for months in which an individual is part of the network. Unprofitable is a dummy 
set to 1 for individuals whose mean monthly trade returns pre-membership were in the bottom 
quartile. Profitable is a dummy set to 1 for individuals whose mean excess trade returns pre-
membership were in the top quartile. Member-Unprofitable and Member-Unprofitable are 
interaction terms equal to Membership x Unprofitable and Profitable respectively. Closeness is 
the centrality social capital measure based on the estimated friend connections for the trader in 
that month. Member-Unprofitable-Close and Member-Profitable-Close are interactions terms 
which are calculated as the prior interaction terms x Closeness. Results are from an Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression clustered on member with robust standard errors using month 
and currency pair fixed effects, and are expressed in terms of the bid/ask return value for the 
trade (always negative). Standard errors indicated in parenthesis below the coefficients.  
(* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01) 
Test Close Unprofitable 
Unprofitable-
Closeness Profitable 
Profitable-
Closeness 
Intercept -0.000142*** -0.000138*** -0.000138*** -0.000140*** -0.000138*** 
 
(0.000030) (0.000031) (0.000031) (0.000028) (0.000029) 
Balance 0.000001 0.000000 0.000000 0.000001 0.000000 
 
(0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003) 
Leverage 0.000003 0.000004 0.000004 0.000003 0.000003 
 
(0.000003) (0.000002) (0.000002) (0.000002) (0.000002) 
Membership -0.000010 -0.000010 -0.000011 -0.000010 -0.000012 
 
(0.000009) (0.000009) (0.000009) (0.000009) (0.000010) 
No Friends -0.000017* -0.000017* -0.000017* -0.000019* -0.000020* 
 
(0.000010) (0.000010) (0.000010) (0.000010) (0.000010) 
Closeness 0.000071*** 0.000071*** 0.000076*** 0.000062** 0.000071*** 
 
(0.000025) (0.000023) (0.000024) (0.000025) (0.000026) 
Unprofitable 
 
-0.000012 -0.000012 
  
  
(0.000018) (0.000018) 
  Member-Unprof 
 
0.000009 0.000014 
  
  
(0.000017) (0.000020) 
  Mem-Unprof-
Close   
-0.000030 
  
   
(0.000058) 
  Profitable 
   
-0.000034*** -0.000034*** 
    
(0.000012) (0.000012) 
Member-Prof 
   
0.000016 0.000027* 
    
(0.000012) (0.000015) 
Mem-Prof-Close 
    
-0.000094* 
     
(0.000051) 
Adjusted R
2
 8.27% 8.36% 8.39% 9.00% 9.18% 
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Table 5.14 
Implications of Brokerage Position on Currency Pair Selection for Retail 
Forex Traders in a Social Network, with Month Fixed Effects 
𝑺𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊,𝒕 =  𝛂 +  𝜷𝟏𝑩𝒂𝒍𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜷𝟐𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜷𝟑𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑𝒊,𝒕
+  𝜷𝟒𝑼𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝒕  +  𝜷𝟓𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑼𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝒕   
+  𝜷𝟔𝑵𝒐𝑭𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒊  +  𝜷𝟕𝑩𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒔𝒔𝒊,𝒕
+  𝜷𝟖𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑼𝒏𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝑩𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏𝒊,𝒕 + 𝒖𝒊,𝒕 
Sample of 445 retail aggregator based foreign exchange traders for the period July 2008 to April 
2013, including 519,152 round-turn transactions. Balance is the log of the mean daily account 
balance across all active member accounts. Leverage is the log of the leverage used in the 
transaction. Balance and Leverage are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Membership is a 
dummy set to 1 for months in which an individual is part of the network. Unprofitable is a dummy 
set to 1 for individuals whose mean monthly trade returns pre-membership were in the bottom 
quartile. Profitable is a dummy set to 1 for individuals whose mean excess trade returns pre-
membership were in the top quartile. Member-Unprofitable and Member-Unprofitable are 
interaction terms equal to Membership x Unprofitable and Profitable respectively. Betweenness 
is the log of 1 plus the brokerage social capital measure based on the estimated friend 
connections for the trader in that month. Member-Unprofitable-Between and Member-Profitable-
Between are interactions terms which are calculated as the prior interaction terms x 
Betweenness. Results are from an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression clustered on 
member with robust standard errors using month and currency pair fixed effects, and are 
expressed in terms of the bid/ask return value for the trade (always negative). Standard errors 
indicated below the coefficients.  
(* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01) 
Test Between Unprofitable 
Unprofitable-
Betweenness Profitable 
Profitable-
Betweenness 
Intercept -0.000136*** -0.000131*** -0.000131*** -0.000134*** -0.000134*** 
 
(0.000030) (0.000031) (0.000031) (0.000029) (0.000029) 
Balance 0.000000 -0.000001 -0.000001 0.000000 0.000000 
 
(0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003) (0.000003) 
Leverage 0.000004 0.000004* 0.000004* 0.000004 0.000004 
 
(0.000003) (0.000002) (0.000002) (0.000002) (0.000002) 
Membership -0.000001 -0.000001 -0.000001 -0.000002 -0.000002 
 
(0.000007) (0.000008) (0.000008) (0.000008) (0.000008) 
No Friends -0.000020* -0.000020** -0.000020* -0.000022** -0.000022** 
 
(0.000010) (0.000010) (0.000010) (0.000010) (0.000010) 
Betweenness 0.000432*** 0.000432*** 0.000430*** 0.000399*** 0.000400*** 
 
(0.000069) (0.000069) (0.000068) (0.000070) (0.000070) 
Unprofitable 
 
-0.000015 -0.000015 
  
  
(0.000018) (0.000018) 
  Member-Unprof 
 
0.000009 0.000005 
  
  
(0.000018) (0.000018) 
  Mem-Unprof-Betw 
  
0.005155* 
  
   
(0.002949) 
  Profitable 
   
-0.000034*** -0.000034*** 
    
(0.000012) (0.000012) 
Member-Prof 
   
0.000015 0.000016 
    
(0.000012) (0.000012) 
Mem-Prof-Betw 
    
-0.008640*** 
     
(0.002497) 
Adjusted R
2
 8.88% 9.01% 9.11% 9.65% 9.69% 
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Chapter 6: Observer Effects on Trader 
Performance 
6.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 5 the focus is on the transmission of information between and 
amongst financial markets participants and the potential impact of both the 
receipt/processing of that information and those interactions on investor activity 
and performance. In this chapter the focus shifts to looking at things from the 
reverse perspective – the influence on investors of their transmission of 
information and the realization that their behaviour and actions in the market are 
observable by others. This line of examination is motivated in part by an 
anecdote shared with me by one of the managers of the retail social network 
which is the source of the data used in this thesis. 
In Section 3.2 of Chapter 3 a trade copying process is described by 
which the transactions of one or more members of the social network could 
automatically be copied in the accounts of other members. The “leaders” whose 
trades got copied were selected by the network’s management based on prior 
performance and suitability for replication. In one instance a trader selected to 
be a leader saw his performance completely fall apart once he went live and 
started having his trades copied. Things did not improve with time, so the 
managers eventually pulled him from his leader position. Immediately after that, 
his performance resumed its prior excellence. 
As researchers, it would be easy to dismiss a case like this as simply 
reflecting a random fluctuation in investor performance. In talking with this 
trader, though, the management learned that he felt an anxiety while being a 
leader he did not feel when simply trading for himself – an anxiety which 
negatively influenced his trade decision-making. This is despite the fact that he 
was not required or requested to do anything different than what he had been 
doing before being accepted into the copying program. In fact, the whole idea 
was that he just keep doing what he was doing! 
There are two potential ways of examining the anxiety response 
described by this trader. On the one hand, he may have become anxious about 
the idea that his performance was influencing the returns of others. This is the 
sort of reaction one might witness in new money managers and other 
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professionals given fiduciary roles for the first time. The other is that the mere 
idea his trades and/or performance were being closely observed may have 
influenced his mental state, leading to impaired decision-making. While both 
conceptual ideas are worth consideration and research, it is the latter which is 
the focus of this chapter in the context of social network participation. 
The idea that being observed can change behaviour is far from a new 
concept. There is a considerable literature in psychology and related areas on 
the subject (Zajonc, 1965, Wicklund and Duval, 1971, Adair, 1984, Munger and 
Harris, 1989, Hartmann and Wood, 1990, Leary and Kowalski, 1990, Seta and 
Seta, 1995, Grant and Dajee, 2003, Uziel, 2007). From a business perspective, 
a large portion of the management literature could be said to focus on the area 
of performance under observation. Ellingsen and Johannesson (2007) provide 
one example with respect to employees being motivated in their behaviours by 
the desire to be respected by their co-workers and peers, as well as their 
employers. While the employer aspect may not feature when considering a 
social network of individual investors, the respect of one’s peers certainly does. 
The finance literature thus far only barely touches on the thought 
processes of individual investors under observation. While the herding, peer, 
and developing social effect literature documented in Chapter 5 demonstrates a 
realization of the influence on Investor B of what they see Investor A doing, the 
research does not yet look meaningfully at the decision-making of Investor A 
with regards to what Investor B will glean from their activity and performance. 
Where it does so, the focus is either on professionals (Lakonishok et al., 1991, 
Morey and O'Neal, 2006) or on filtered sharing (Han and Hirshleifer, 2015). 
The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to expand the finance literature in 
the area of individual investor activity under observation by examining members 
of a trader social network. Doing so may provide an understanding of the 
potential impact of regulatory moves toward increased transparency on 
individual investor activity and performance. In a related fashion, it could also 
lead to greater understanding of the influence of technological developments 
which facilitate the observation of investors by their peers via social networks, 
performance sharing websites, etc. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 
reviews the prior literature and develops the primary hypotheses of the chapter. 
Section 6.3 provides documentation of the data and methodologies being 
181 
 
employed in the research, with Section 6.4 containing the analysis. Section 6.5 
concludes and presents considerations for future research. 
6.2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
6.2.1. Observer effects 
In the social sciences it is understood that the act of observing an 
individual can influence their behaviour. In a review of the relevant literature in 
the area of applied behavioural analysis, Hartmann and Wood (1990) describe 
the concept of reactivity whereby the presence of an observer introduces a 
novel stimulus to the observed, thereby resulting in an alteration of their 
behaviour. It does not necessarily even matter if an individual is actually being 
observed, only that they believe they might be. This is the basis of the idea of 
the “panopticon effect” whereby the belief that one is constantly under potential 
surveillance influences one’s behaviour (Reiman, 1995).83  
Hartmann and Wood (1990) go on to outline five factors which are 
suggested to contribute to reactivity. Most of these factors relate to the 
framework in which a subject is being observed. They include the individual 
characteristics of the subject on the presumption that certain types of individuals 
- those who are naturally more open and/or confident, those who are oblivious 
to being observed (like young children), and those who are insensitive – are 
less likely to be influenced by observation. For example, Grant and Dajee 
(2003) find differences between introverts and extraverts in performance of 
simple math tasks based on audience. Similarly, Uziel (2007) indicates 
differences in how individuals react to an audience based on personal 
characteristics such as positive/negative orientation and self-esteem levels. 
The factors of reactivity also include the degree to which the subject is 
consciously aware of being observed, who is doing the observing, and how they 
are presented. An example of this comes from Seta and Seta (1995) who find 
differences in how individuals perform and the way their task interest varies 
depending on the degree to which the audience is aware of the observed 
individual’s prior performance. The expressed or suspected motivation for the 
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 The mirrored or blacked out coverings over security cameras in stores are variations on the 
panopticon idea in that one can never know whether they are actively being observed or not. 
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observation is also a consideration. One could think of these factors as relating 
to the degree of influence observation has on the subject. 
The remaining factor is the valence of the behaviour, which speaks to 
what actually changes in the subject. The implication here is that observation 
will tend to encourage socially appropriate or desirable behaviours while also 
tending to discourage undesirable or inappropriate ones - or those that 
otherwise would be considered private. An example is provided by Munger and 
Harris (1989) in their finding of increased restroom hand-washing by women in 
the presence of an observer. The research even goes so far as to suggest that 
simply the idea of being watched, such as the presence of the image of a set of 
eyes, can influence behaviour on this basis (Bateson et al., 2006). 
The behavioural change need not be something related to social 
acceptability, however. The now famous “Hawthorne Effect” in which workers in 
a plant were theorized to be more productive while being observed speaks 
potentially to two alternative ways of considering observer effects.84 One is that 
generally speaking subjects will do what they think will make them look best, be 
that being more productive for their managers in the Hawthorne case or more 
likely to adhere to social norms in the hand-washing one noted above. The 
other is that observation can improve subject satisfaction – at least when the 
observer holds a certain status relative to the subject.85 
The presence of observer effects motivates two potential questions with 
respect to investors and traders. The first is the sort of behavioural change to be 
expected in those being observed. The second is whether there is any 
difference in the type or degree of behavioural change seen based on the 
manner of the observation taking place. 
At the institutional level, observation is a fact of life for traders and 
investors. Compliance and regulatory considerations mandate varying levels of 
direct and indirect oversight. For some, such as individual dealers at banks and 
other financial institutions, the observation can be highly granular. Their 
transactions could be monitored throughout the day and the execution of them 
may be directly observed by co-workers and/or managers in real time. In the 
case of rogue traders, there is generally a specific effort to circumvent 
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 See Adair (1984) for a review of the research related to the Hawthorne Effect. 
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 One of the Hawthorne theories developed was that increased worker productivity related to 
the satisfaction of knowing management paid attention to them. 
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observation to mask one’s unauthorized trading or hide losses and/or a failure 
in oversight by management.86 At the other end of the observational frequency 
spectrum are funds mandated to file periodic (e.g. quarterly) reports of holdings, 
which may be subject to so-called “window dressing” (Lakonishok et al., 1991, 
Morey and O'Neal, 2006). 
Compliance and regulatory oversight are not the only sources of trader 
and investor observation. There is also the direct observation of trading activity 
by other market participants. From this point of view, the activity in the market 
by one participant can be information used by another in their own decision-
making. This potentially could be the basis for the type of intentional herding 
described by Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000), and the general idea of an 
information cascade, or alternatively an information contagion, as discussed in 
Chapter 5. Traders are informed by what they specifically see being done by 
market participants who are earlier actors than themselves. Hasbrouck (1988) 
provides evidence for this, in particular finding that larger trades are more 
informative than smaller trades, which speaks to the desirability of watching the 
bigger market players.  
Direct observation by other market participants could also be viewed 
from an adversarial perspective, to use the Treynor (1999) terminology, in that 
one trader’s activity could be used advantageously by others above and beyond 
any information it might provide from a pricing perspective. For example, if one 
trader knows another trader’s positional exposure or intentions, they might be 
able to take advantage of that in the form of more favourable pricing in a 
transaction between the two, or being positioned ahead of a price move driven 
by what the other will do in the future. Direct observation of competitor trading is 
possible in open-outcry markets,87 though they are few and far between now. 
The focus has shifted to electronic platforms, which still provide a level of 
participant visibility. Institutional level traders and investors are already 
incentivized from a cost perspective to limit the impact of their activities on 
price, which is a large element of the research into optimal order placement 
strategies (Keim and Madhavan, 1995, Cont and Kukanov, 2013). Above and 
beyond the financial costs, however, large market participants are also 
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incentivized from an adversarial perspective to mask their market activities to 
avoid others gaining a competitive advantage. 
Returning to the question of observation effects, in the case of 
institutional investors there are therefore answers to both the question of what 
changes may be expected under observation and the potential impact of the 
observational structure on those behavioural changes. What of individual 
investors, though? 
Because individuals operate almost exclusively through intermediaries, 
the direct visibility of their actions generally is virtually nil. Further, as per 
Hasbrouck (1988), their trades are individually of much less informational value 
with regards to price, if any at all, so there is little incentive for other market 
participants to attempt to observe them directly. Moreover, in order to observe 
the market activity of a given individual, said individual must explicitly share 
their activity. Han and Hirshleifer (2015) focus on this sharing from the 
perspective of what individuals provide to others and the impact that has on the 
recipients in a social context. This is based on the assumption that market 
participants will tend to shade what is shared in a way which casts themselves 
in a favourable light by perhaps downplaying or omitting their failures. The result 
is the propagation of trading strategies which tend to have attention-inducing 
outcomes, meaning those with a high volatility of returns.  
The reasonable assumption is that individuals are not simply making all 
of their trading activity publicly available – at least not in real time. For most of 
the history of the financial markets it was effectively impossible to share this sort 
of data in a timely fashion. Modern technology, however, has changed that. 
Now it is possible for essentially any market participant to share their trading 
and investing activity with others as it happens. It is the behavioural impact 
potentially motivated by doing so which is now the question.  
Individual investors and traders do not have the regulatory or compliance 
oversight to motivate rogue trader or window dressing type of behaviour. The 
existence of social networks, chat rooms, forums, and other vehicles by which 
they meet and exchange ideas suggests that at least some do not see 
themselves as being in direct financial competition with others. Individually their 
trades are of little value to others from a pricing perspective,88 so there is no 
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need to hide or mask their activity to avoid it being used against them the way it 
might be for a professional money manager. What that would seem to leave is 
behavioural change motivated by perceived reputational impact. 
6.2.2. Impression management 
Leary and Kowalski (1990) provide an oft-cited review of the impression 
management literature. This is a subject area which explores the way 
individuals seek to present themselves to control how they are seen by others – 
their reputation. The authors break impression management down into two 
processes - impression motivation and impression construction. The former is 
the process by which individuals find it desirable to attempt to control how 
others see them. The latter is the process by which motivated individuals 
actually seek to go about shaping how they are seen. In turn, each of these 
processes can be broken down into factors.  
In the case of impression motivation, the drivers in question are social 
and material outcomes, self-esteem maintenance, and development of identity. 
Essentially, someone may become motivated to engage in impression 
management because they desire the benefits of it such as approval, friendship, 
assistance, etc.; because they are looking for self-esteem enhancing reactions; 
and/or because they are seeking to develop a certain identity. With respect to 
the outcomes motivation, the finance literature has touched on the idea that 
analysts (Welch, 2000) and money managers (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990, 
Hong et al., 2005) may attempt to shape how they are perceived with respect to 
career development and other perception considerations. They do so by making 
decisions influenced by what they see their peers doing rather than based on 
what they think is the right performance choice (stock forecast, portfolio 
investment, etc.), potentially resulting in herding effects. 
When considering individual traders and investors, one can easily 
understand how the perception of being a savvy market participant among 
one’s peers could relate to all three factors and thereby motivate an individual 
toward impression management in a social context. This is even more the case 
when one’s activities are public. To quote Leary and Kowalski (1990): 
“Overall, the more public one's behavior, the more likely one is to be 
concerned with how it appears to others, and the more motivated one will be to 
impression-manage… Publicity affects impression motivation because public 
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behaviors are more likely to be relevant to the accomplishment of one's goals 
than are private behaviors. Indeed, all three of the motives we have described 
are more likely to be fulfilled when one's behaviors are public rather than 
private.” 
On this basis, an individual making their trading activity public is more 
likely to be involved in impression management the more visible that activity is 
to others – or at least how visible it is perceived to be. How one then goes about 
managing that impression is said to be based on five factors. These are self-
concept, desired and undesired identity images, role constraints, target values, 
and current or potential social image. Of the quintet, the second and the fifth 
would seem to be the most relevant in the current context. They speak to 
individuals seeking to present themselves in the most (least) desirable 
(undesirable) fashion from the perspective of those whose impression is 
perceived to matter, along with how they currently see themselves regarded by 
others and how they would like to be regarded in the future. 
The question then becomes what sort of behaviour an individual seeking 
to manage their impression of being a savvy market participant - or at least not 
a completely clueless one – would be observed. The research thus far with 
respect to investors in a position to share their trading activity with others 
publicly is unfortunately more focused on the information content of investor 
interactions (Antweiler and Frank, 2004), their interaction structure (Gu et al., 
2008), and their influence on behavioural effects (Mizrach and Weerts, 2009, 
Park et al., 2013). Mizrach and Weerts (2009) in particular analyse trades 
posted in real-time, which most aligns with the question of the behavioural 
implications of being fully public, but their study lacks data for the included 
traders from before they became involved in the chat room observed. As such, 
it is not possible to ascertain the degree, if any, to which the traders may have 
changed their behaviour upon entering the chat room – or in fact if they did 
other trades outside the chat room (unobserved) which were of a different 
nature than those reported inside it. 
The closest the research at the individual investor level comes to 
addressing the impression management question to-date is Han and Hirshleifer 
(2015). In that research the authors propose a self-enhancing transmission 
mechanism driven by what could be described as a “bragging” type of 
interaction between socially connected investors through which individuals are 
187 
 
motivated to selectively share their greatest successes. The result is the 
propagation of high variance trading strategies through a network. Simon and 
Heimer (2014) test this concept empirically and find support for this type of 
transmission taking place when examining traders in an online social network. 
Heimer (2014b) works from a similar conceptual framework in terms of looking 
at social interactions, but with a different type of outcome analysed (an 
increased impact of disposition effect influences). The problem in both cases is 
the concentration on what investors say they are doing (or have done) rather 
than on what can actually be seen of their actions and performance, however. 
The question at hand is whether, and if so how, individuals change their actual 
trades when they know or believe they are being observed by others with no 
possibility of filtering. 
There are two ways of approaching this issue. The first is in terms of the 
decision-making leading up to the trades which are then executed. This 
includes the selection of the instrument(s) to be traded, the market-timing 
strategy employed, and the degree of leverage used (how large a trade is 
relative to account size). While the specific strategy employed cannot be 
observed directly by simply looking at transactional data, it is possible to 
examine instrument selection and potentially leverage use. The latter, in 
particular, is a meaningful consideration where it may signal overconfidence. 
This is addressed in Section 6.2.4. 
The second way to approach the issue is in terms of what happens once 
the trade is entered. That essentially is the question of when the trade is exited. 
This is necessarily related to the selection of market-timing strategy, which is 
not directly observable. From a behavioural perspective, the disposition effect is 
directly related to the timing of position exits, however.  
6.2.3. Disposition effect 
Shefrin and Statman (1985) theorize what has become known as the 
disposition effect based on the concept of loss aversion put forth by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979). The disposition effect suggests that investors are quick to 
take profits for fear of giving back some or all of their gains, while at the same 
time are slow to exit losing trades in hopes they will turn around. Experienced 
market participants are well aware of this effect, at least informally, which leads 
to the commonly shared advice to “Cut your losers and let your winners run.” 
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Odean (1998a) empirically tests for the disposition effect among investors, 
finding evidence for it in account holders of a discount stock broker. It is also 
documented among Finnish investors by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), among 
day traders by Jordan and Diltz (2004), among professional traders by Coval 
and Shumway (2005) and Locke and Mann (2005), among Taiwanese investors 
by Barber et al. (2007), and among retail foreign exchange traders by Nolte and 
Voev (2011).  
In a social context, Heimer (2014b) finds that increased interaction 
between traders in a social network results in an increase in the observation of 
the disposition effect among retail forex market participants. That study, 
however, only looks at trader visibility from the perspective of the exchange of 
messages, which is a filtered form of publicity. It fails to account for the fact that 
the actual unfiltered trading activity of those in the study is visible in real-time to 
other network members, and potentially beyond. 
Barberis and Xiong (2009) extend the conceptual framework with respect 
to the disposition effect to demonstrate that realized returns are more subject to 
it than are unrealized ones. Meaningfully for the current discussion, Barberis 
and Xiong (2012) go one step further with a broader examination of the concept 
of realization utility, which captures the utility - financial or otherwise - received 
immediately by an investor upon exiting a position. Viewing trade disposition in 
this fashion goes beyond loss aversion as the motivating factor behind being 
quicker to take profits than losses, one which comes about from investors 
thinking not in terms of overall returns, but rather as each investment being a 
discreet event - an “investing episode” to use the authors’ terminology. This has 
implications from an impression management perspective, as the utility derived 
at the closure of a trade could in part be the perceived benefit to one’s social 
reputation within an investor peer group, especially since individual transactions 
are more frequent signal points to others than would be a simple reporting of 
period returns. Further, automatically shared trades are more frequent signal 
points than are those shared via chat room discussion and other forms of 
manual trade sharing, which is subject to filtering. It is suggested by the authors 
that less sophisticated investors would more likely fall victim to such a mind-set. 
Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012) provide a number of challenges to the 
disposition effect theorizations, pointing to other potential explanations beyond 
realization preference. Interestingly for the current discussion as it relates to 
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foreign exchange market speculators, the authors find that investors in the case 
of short holding periods exhibit a higher likelihood of selling larger losers than 
smaller ones, however. They indicate this is in contrast to the idea that investors 
avoid realizing large losers, but by definition at some point a loss must be 
realized. If there is indeed an aversion to taking a loss, then one would least 
expect small losses to be taken as they would be expected to be viewed by 
investors as the types of losses that could be reversed. 
Regardless of the latter point, if there is evidence that investors exhibit a 
different level of disposition effect when being observed than when not being 
observed, then it would be potential evidence for at least some realization 
preference at work – in this case in the form of impression management. What 
needs to be considered is in what form changes in disposition can be expected, 
and in whom they would most likely be seen. 
6.2.4. Overconfidence 
As noted in Section 6.2.3 above, leverage is part of the pre-entry 
decision-making process for each trade in that it is directly linked to the size of 
the position in question. In Chapter 4 a connection between investor 
performance and overconfidence is drawn, using leverage as a key metric. It 
extends on the prior literature’s assertion that overconfidence drives increased 
trading activity (Odean, 1998b, Barber and Odean, 2000, Gervais and Odean, 
2001) and goes one step further to link overconfidence to impaired returns not 
just on the basis of additional costs driven by that larger transactional volume, 
but also worsened market timing performance based on the idea that it 
indicates biased decision-making (Kahneman and Riepe, 1998, Burks et al., 
2013). What it does not address in a meaningful fashion, however, is the 
potential source(s) of overconfidence. 
In looking at social network participation, Chapter 5 does broach the 
subject of what can motivate investor overconfidence, and by extension 
increased leverage use, however. Both Barber and Odean (2001b) and Barber 
and Odean (2002) draw a connection between greater access to information 
and overconfidence, the idea being that greater availability of news and data 
can lead to overestimation of one’s knowledge. De Carolis and Saparito (2006) 
narrow the focus to social network participation as a source of that information, 
particularly concentrating on network position (social capital) which speaks to 
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the speed of access and the degree of trust involved in information acquisition. 
What investors do with the information they gather from their social contacts is 
the subject of both Gu et al. (2008) and Park et al. (2013) who find confirmation 
bias at work. Investors seek to affirm their prior beliefs, contributing to 
overconfidence. Unfortunately, the analysis in Chapter 5 finds little to support 
the argument that social networks motivate overconfidence – at least from an 
information perspective. In fact, if anything the findings tended to point in the 
opposite direction. 
That said, there is the potential for social network participation to drive 
overconfidence from an information transmission rather than reception 
perspective. It is one which is closely tied to impression management as 
described in Section 6.2.2. In fact, Burks et al. (2013) find that it is “…the 
process of communicating judgements about one’s relative performance to 
others…” which is the prime driver of individual overconfidence. This is instead 
of Bayesian updating based on signals of one’s ability or information acquisition 
based self-deception. The former is the general basis for how much of the 
foundational overconfidence literature in finance has been developed (De Bondt 
and Thaler, 1995), while the latter links to the social network research noted 
above - providing a potential explanation why no results of note were observed 
in Chapter 5 with respect to increased overconfidence among network 
members.  
Generally speaking, the type of communication central to the Burks et al. 
(2013) findings is filtered in that individuals may pick and choose the information 
about their activities and performance which presents them in the best light. 
This involves the sort of “selective omission” described by Leary and Kowalski 
(1990) with respect to impression management. As such, a link is drawn 
between investor overconfidence and the activities involved in impression 
management. Putting it simply, investor overconfidence is increased through 
the communication of one’s relative performance, not simply by receiving 
indications of it as might be expected.  
What of the case where an objective, unfiltered indication of relative 
investor performance is available, however? That presumably would bring in to 
focus the Bayesian updating process discounted by Burks et al. (2013) as 
having any impact on investor overconfidence. In such a structure, no 
overconfidence-driven influence on performance would thus be expected 
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because the “look how great I am” type of communication mentioned above is 
superfluous. A relatively strong performer would not need to communicate their 
performance to others because it would already be there for all to see. In fact, 
any selective omission employed by an individual by way of impression 
management could easily backfire because of the availability of the unfiltered 
information, resulting in a reduced level of social credibility and status. 
The question is then whether the unfiltered information transmitted by 
socially interactive investors (actively or passively) acts in the same fashion as 
the filtered communication with respect to driving overconfidence. If such 
information transmission reinforces (or even enhances) what an investor 
perceives to be their superior status within the network, then this could indeed 
be the case. This would tie in with the experimental findings of Heath and 
Tversky (1991) that those who perceive themselves to be expert in a subject will 
tend to place greater weight on in their own judgements related to that area, 
resulting in higher levels of overconfidence.  
Generally speaking, in a social network context the degree to which 
one’s communication is disseminated relates to how many network connections 
(friends) an individual has at any given time. One could go a step further and 
introduce the idea of network position and social capital as discussed in the 
previous chapter, but from a status and visibility perspective a friend focus is 
easier for an individual to appreciate and recognise than their network position. 
It speaks to how many others a member knows for sure are in their network and 
who will receive an unfiltered, uninfluenced transmission of information. The 
greater the number of friends, the larger the audience and the higher the 
observability, per Leary and Kowalski (1990), and the greater the 
communication of information which could be used to form judgements to 
motivate overconfidence, as per Burks et al. (2013). 
6.2.5. Hypothesis development 
As noted in Section 6.2.3, one of the questions which needs to be 
addressed is what category or categories of individuals would be most expected 
to employ impression management tactics in an individual trader context. Leary 
and Kowalski (1990) offer some considerations to that end in that impression 
management is said to be motivated by social benefits (approval, friendship, 
etc.), because one seeks enhanced self-esteem from others’ reactions, and/or 
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because they wish to develop a desirable identity. Taking things a step further, 
it is worth considering as well the potential impact of impression management 
activities from the overconfidence perspective outlined in Section 6.2.4. 
Among a collection of socially connected traders, one group which 
stands out as being motivated toward impression management based on these 
considerations is individuals reasonably considered to be seen as, and/or view 
themselves to be, the best market-timers – those who make the best trades, on 
average. Their position at the top of the heap provides them potential social 
benefits (which may include financial rewards) and enhanced self-esteem. It 
may also relate to an identity which they wish to retain or develop. As members 
of this group have reason to want to retain a perception by others as savvy 
traders, they have more to lose from being observed than would likely be the 
case for other groups. Since these sophisticated traders clearly have high 
status, and can use communication to reinforce that, they are also subject to 
potential increased overconfidence. The combination makes them a group 
worthy of examination. 
A second group worth considering on the basis of developing an identity 
is unsophisticated traders - those who have been relatively big losers in the 
market. Such a group would be desirous of becoming good traders, not just 
from the perspective of returns, but also in terms of how they could judge 
themselves and be judged by others. This is particularly true in the context of a 
social network where trading savvy could translate into social status. That then 
speaks to the social benefits motivation above. Further, self-esteem enhancing 
reactions from their peers would serve to help develop the “good trader” identity 
they seek. This group, especially to the extent they are likely inexperienced, is 
also generally one which is expected to exhibit more behavioural influence on 
their trading, as per Barberis and Xiong (2012). That makes it a good candidate 
for observing potential impression management.  
Unfortunately, examination of this unsophisticated group is challenging 
because part of the educational process for such individuals is to adapt trading 
habits which are also the sort one might expect to see exhibited by those 
attempting to manage their public impression (i.e. doing things “good” traders 
do). Further, the unsophisticated group is unlikely to have the same sort of 
impression management influence on overconfidence as would be expected 
amongst sophisticated members since they would struggle to see themselves 
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as being relatively savvy. As such the focus of this chapter will be on the 
sophisticated traders described above. 
Having identified traders most likely to be motivated to manage their 
impression, the question shifts to the manner in which that is attempted with 
regards to their visible trading activity. As mentioned earlier, there are only a 
few ways this can be accomplished. The first is to alter the instruments one is 
trading in a manner which one believes demonstrates a desirable level of 
sophistication. There are two ways this might go. The first is to increase focus 
on the lowest “cost” instruments, which also tend to be the ones with the 
greatest liquidity and lower levels of volatility. The second way a trader might 
think about the instrument question in terms of impression management is to 
seek to move away from “common” instruments as a way to distance 
themselves from the herd. This presents the first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Sophisticated traders change the instruments they trade 
as they are more observed (or judge themselves to be so). 
A second factor in prospective impression management is in the 
disposition phase after a trade has been entered. The excess return of trades is 
heavily influenced by the market-timing strategy, which will be discussed 
momentarily, but the final result may also be influenced by a set of potential 
desires, one of which could be the desire to be proven “right” by showing a 
profit or to otherwise demonstrate trading savvy. This could trigger a change in 
the holding period of winning trades. Those who seek to underline their 
expertise may seek to hold positions longer, counter to the “exit too early” 
element of the disposition effect. Alternatively, it is possible that loss aversion 
could actually increase, resulting in quicker exits. On that basis, the next of this 
chapter’s testable hypotheses may be stated. 
Hypothesis 2: Sophisticated traders will be increasingly influenced to 
change the holding period of their winning trades the more they are observed. 
The counter to cutting winning trades quickly from a disposition effect 
perspective is holding on to losing trades longer. Among sophisticated traders 
the admonition “cut your losses and let your winners run” is well known. As 
such, a member of that group looking to demonstrate their trading savvy is likely 
to want to demonstrate they are not like other traders by avoiding large losses. 
This may have the result of seeing them exit losing trades more quickly than 
otherwise would be the case. To a degree, this could also be something linked 
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in with the idea of being seen as more being more prudent. Again, however, 
observation may actually increase loss aversion, resulting in longer holding 
periods for losing positions. As such, the third hypothesis of this chapter may be 
developed. 
Hypothesis 3: Sophisticated traders will see greater changes in the time 
they remain in losing trades the more they are observed. 
The third area of influence where observability and having an audience is 
likely to have an impact is in leverage use, which is part of the position size pre-
trade decision-making process. On the one hand, it could be theorized that 
increased prudence may be a motivation of increased observability. That would 
lead to lower leverage use. A change in this type of attitude is likely to already 
be expressed in the selection of tradable instrument, though. As such, it is worth 
turning the leverage focus to use it as an indication of increased overconfidence 
based on the ideas developed in Section 6.2.4. On that basis it would be 
expected that a greater audience size, implying a higher level of outgoing 
judgement communication, would result in greater leverage use. That provides 
the basis for the next hypothesis of this chapter. 
Hypothesis 4: Sophisticated traders increase leverage as their 
perceived level of observation increases. 
The final factor available for impression management influence is the 
market-timing strategy employed by the trader. This cannot be directly 
observed, but through analysis of outcomes in the form of realized excess 
returns, changes may be noted. If a trader alters their approach to market timing 
as a function of an impression management desire, it likely means they are 
shifting to a less optimal approach – at least from their own perspective. This 
potentially would be linked to increased overconfidence as per the findings of 
Chapter 4. As such the following hypothesis can be developed: 
Hypothesis 5: Sophisticated traders demonstrate increasingly lower 
excess returns as they are more observed. 
These hypotheses are tested in Section 6.4 below. 
6.3. Data & Methodology 
The data used in the analysis of Section 6.4 below is the same as that 
employed in Chapter 5, as documented in Section 5.3. However, in this chapter 
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only the individual transactions information is utilized. The aggregated monthly 
values are not required. For the purposes of comparability of the results 
between this chapter and the last, the month a member joined the network 
continues to be excluded despite being able to more finely parse things at the 
transaction level by date. This also serves to minimize potential network 
influence issues related to lags between registration when an individual could 
conceivably have access to certain public network information (recalling from 
Chapter 3 that some members opted to allow their profiles to be fully 
accessible) and full membership activation through the linkage with one’s 
brokerage account. 
The focus of the hypothesis testing to follow is the same set of 
“profitable” traders defined at the beginning of Section 5.4 from last chapter. 
That is the group of individuals who comprise the top quartile based on their 
mean trade excess return for the transactions they did prior to entering the 
network (market timing performance). It may be possible to use an alternative 
method to derive a group of sophisticated traders. In this case, however, the 
quality of most value for testing purposes is demonstrated skill in making good 
market calls. The social network from which the data is extracted is one where 
traders can only directly observe each other’s entry and exit points - not the size 
of a position or its actual return. That being the case, it makes most sense to 
analyse individuals who are likely to be seen as and/or perceive themselves to 
be good at getting in and out of the market in a profitable fashion. 
Keeping to the subject of trade excess return, unlike the case in Chapter 
5 where it is only used for classification purposes, in this chapter it also features 
as a specific metric of study (see Section 6.4.4). It can be thought of as 
comparable in this case to the analysis of average deleveraged return from 
Section 4.4.6 of Chapter 4. The only conceptual difference between the two, 
aside from one being a mean, is that the excess return value excludes spread 
whereas the deleveraged return does not. They both serve the same purpose in 
focusing on trader market timing performance. 
Addressing the primary theme of observability for this chapter, once 
again a member’s friend connections are of key consideration in the analysis 
which follows in Section 6.4. While the last chapter mainly incorporated the 
estimated friend counts as the basis for the determination of network position 
measures, in this chapter they are a primary feature and used directly. Refer to 
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Section 5.3.2 for the estimation procedure employed. In this case the social 
capital measures are not utilized, however. Individuals are likely to struggle to 
conceptualize their position in a large social network beyond immediate 
awareness of their friends, and potentially some idea to whom their friends are 
linked as a second level consideration.  
Because the focus is directly on estimated friend counts, attention must 
be paid to extremely connected individuals, as their inclusion could alter the 
outcome of the analysis. In this case, as noted in Chapter 5, there are two 
members with far more friends than any others. Among the 445 network 
members in question, 99% have 119 or fewer friends. One of the two high friend 
count individuals in question has over 1000 friends as of the May 2013 
indication, while the other has more than 500. This makes them strong 
candidates for being network administrators, at least one of whom was known 
by myself to connect with everyone who joined the network during the early 
period of its growth (assuming they were willing, of course). As such, they 
represent both a potential outlier influence on the data as well as being 
individuals for whom observability was viewed in an entirely different context 
than for the majority of members. They are therefore excluded from the 
forthcoming analysis, resulting in a dataset of 443 members and over 488,000 
transactions (analysis of their inclusion is discussed in Section 6.4.5). 
6.4. Analysis 
6.4.1. Does visibility influence trading instrument selection? 
The first hypothesis of this chapter addresses the idea that traders may 
change the instruments they trade when they are subject to observation. This 
can be evaluated in the context of foreign exchange trading by examining the 
currencies and currency pairs being traded. There are two ways to do so. One 
is to examine the mean bid/ask spread of the trades they trade, which provides 
an indication of the liquidity and volatility of the composition of exchange rates 
in which individuals are active. Another is to analyse the actual fraction of trades 
done in specific currencies and/or currency pairs. 
Table 6.1 provides descriptive statistics which start to address the 
question. Panel A of the table compares to Panel B from Table 5.1 from the last 
chapter. Panel B of Table 6.1 focuses on the profitable traders who are the 
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main subject of the analysis herein. The means comparison (unpaired T-test) 
shows that these traders generally shift toward a more conservative approach 
once in the network. They increase their focus on trading in the euro and the US 
dollar, the two most active and liquid currencies. At the same time, they 
decrease the frequency with which they trade more exotic currency pairs – 
those which include no more than one of the so-called majors (USD, EUR, 
GBP, JPY, AUD, CAD, CHF). The combined result sees them trading currency 
pairs with a narrower mean bid/ask spread. 
It may be the case that simply joining the network is enough to trigger an 
observation effect, which could be what the results from Table 6.1 are picking 
up with respect to profitable traders. Leary and Kowalski (1990), though, 
indicate that an observation effect is greater the greater the observation, or at 
least the perception of observation. In a social network setting it is the members 
with the most friends who are expected to be the most observed. As such, it 
should be the case that greater effects are seen amongst those with the most 
friends. To that end, it is possible to test Hypothesis 1 by develop the following 
model which captures variation based on friend connections: 
 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,t =  α +  𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,t +  𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,t +  𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖  
+  𝛽4𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,t  +  𝛽5𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,t  
+  𝛽6𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,t + 𝑢𝑖,t 
(6.1) 
Where 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,t is the return equivalent of the bid/ask spread for position t 
executed by Trader i. 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,t is the log of the leverage used by Trader i in position t. 
𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,t is a dummy for network status of Trader i at the time  
position t is entered (member = 1). 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 is a dummy set to 1 if Trader i is among the top quartile of 
traders based on pre-membership mean excess trade returns. 
𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,t is an interaction term equal to 𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,t x 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 . 
𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,t is 1 + the log of the estimated number of friends connects for 
Trader i in the month when position t is entered. 
𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,t is an interaction term equal to 
𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,t x 𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,t.  
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The regression also clusters on member to account for correlation of 
residuals at the individual trader level. Robust standard errors are derived to 
address heteroscedasticity and non-normality. Leverage is winsorized at 1% 
and 99% to limit the influence of outlier observations on the results.  
The model includes trade bid/ask spread as an indicator of a change in 
the distribution of currency pairs traded by a given member. Trade level 
leverage is included as the other decision point a trader has when entering a 
position beyond that of market timing. At the individual transaction level an 
aggregate control factor such as trade frequency must be excluded because 
each trade is actually a contributory factor toward period trade count. Trade 
duration for any given position is a function of factors outside the trader’s control 
(most specifically, market action). Account balance is similarly not something 
under the immediate control of the trader at the time a position is entered, so it 
has been left out of this model. Month fixed effects are included to account for 
the potential impact of general market conditions on returns, however.  
The primary focus of this model is the two dummies, Membership and 
Profitable, and the interaction terms which incorporate them. MemberProfitable 
captures the variation of the membership effect for profitable members on the 
dependent variable relative to all other members. Adding the estimated number 
of friends a member has to that interaction then indicates the degree to which 
changes in the number of network connections for profitable traders influences 
the dependent variable, again relative to all other members. 
The relative comparison of the two interaction terms is important in this 
analysis from two perspectives. First, to the extent that there might be some 
general observability effect at work from simply being a member, if profitable 
traders are indeed more subject to an audience influence then it would be 
expected to show up in the MemberProfitable coefficient. Second, to the extent 
that having more friends increases observation and thereby increases the 
theorized audience effect, the MemberProfitableFriends coefficient would be 
expected to capture it. 
Table 6.2 provides a correlation analysis of the primary variables 
included in these regressions, and those to follow. As was observed when 
looking at Table 5.8 from last chapter, Excess Return does not have a strong 
correlation to any of the other variables. The strongest correlations are between 
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Spread and EUR or USD and Non-Major. This is to be expected as the more 
liquid currencies have narrower (less negative) spreads. Similarly, the high 
correlation between Membership and Friends is as expected. Aside from that, 
there are no strong correlations elsewhere. 
Table 6.3 presents the results from Equation 6.1.The two takeaways 
from Table 6.3 are that profitable traders tend to operate in somewhat more 
illiquid and volatile currencies. Also the more friends a network member has, the 
more they tend toward lower volatility, higher liquidity currency pairs. In neither 
case are the significance levels high, however. The friends observation may 
indicate a broad audience effect of some kind. The MemberProfitableFriends 
term is insignificant, however. This indicates that profitable traders are no more 
or less impacted than any other members. Membership generally has no 
impact. Leverage is positive and significant in all tests, though that is not 
necessarily surprising. It likely simply reflects a normalizing of per trade risk 
which would result in higher leverage use when trading lower volatility exchange 
rates.89 
To examine the question of instrument selection more narrowly, and 
provide a secondary test of both Hypothesis 1, the model in Equation 6.1 can 
be adapted to examine the currency selection question from two additional 
perspectives. 
 𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑜𝑟𝑈𝑆𝐷𝑖,t =  α +  𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,t + 𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,t
+  𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖  +  𝛽4𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,t  
+  𝛽5𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,t  +  𝛽6𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,t + 𝑢𝑖,t 
(6.2) 
 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑖,t =  α +  𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,t +  𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,t
+  𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖  +  𝛽4𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,t  
+  𝛽5𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,t  +  𝛽6𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,t + 𝑢𝑖,t 
(6.3) 
Where 
𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑜𝑟𝑈𝑆𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating whether position t executed 
by Trader i features a currency pair which includes the euro and/or 
the US dollar. 
                                            
89
 For example, say a trader wants to risk 1% of their capital on a given trade. Given that the 
trader has defined how many “points” they are willing to risk (where they will place their stop 
loss exit order), it is a simple question of calculating position size (and thereby leverage) to 
match the desired 1% risk with the exposure defined by the stop loss. If a market is more 
volatile, it implies the need for a larger distance between the entry point and the stop loss. That 
means a higher nominal risk, which is then accounted for by reducing position size. 
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𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating whether position t executed 
by Trader i features a currency pair which includes no more than 
one of the major currencies (USD, EUR, GBP, JPY, AUD, CHF, or 
CAD). 
Remaining variables as previously defined.  
 
With these two models a closer examination is made of the fraction of 
trades done in certain types of currency pairs. In Equation 6.2 the focus is on 
the proportion of trades done in the two most active currencies, while Equation 
6.3 turns attention on those currency pairs which are among the least actively 
traded. It should be noted that there is overlap between the two groups. One 
can trade a USD or EUR pair which is considered a non-major. An example of 
this would be USD/MXN, which is the US dollar exchange rate against the 
Mexican peso. A trade in this currency pair would count in both categories. 
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 present the regression results, staying with the 
member-clustered OLS method and robust standard errors.90 It is noteworthy 
that in neither case do the profitable traders show any different currency pair 
trade allocation than everyone else (at least in general terms) as indicated by 
the failure of the Profitable dummy to have any significance. On the face of it, 
these two sets of regressions might seem to provide support for the friend effect 
on influencing members toward more conservative currency pair selections 
noted above. The Friends variable coefficient is positive and significant for 
EURorUSD (0.016), suggesting a friend-motivated shift to greater trading in 
those currencies, while it is negative and significant for NonMajor (-0.010), 
indicating a shift away from the more volatile and illiquid currencies. This may 
only be picking up the fact that more people trade in the EUR and USD and 
they may be friending each other on that basis, however. 
In the case of NonMajor there is a contrary indication for the profitable 
group. The MemberProfitableFriends interaction term is positive and significant 
(0.022), suggesting more friends actually encourages the better market timers 
in the network toward the more exotic currency pairs. The significance is not 
strong, however. The bottom line is that based on these findings there is little or 
                                            
90
 I acknowledge there are other methods which could be argued are better for the analysis of 
non-continuous dependent variables (e.g. probit/logit). However, it is unlikely they would 
produce a significantly different result. 
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no support for Hypothesis 1 that more sophisticated traders change traded 
instruments as their level of observation increases. 
6.4.2. Does observation encourage more rapid exits? 
The planning phase of trading cannot be observed after the fact, but it is 
at least possible to get some idea of what happened in the execution phase. 
Specifically, the timing of trade exits may be analysed to see if there is any 
change in pattern. While the size of any given gain or loss is likely heavily 
reliant on trade entry decisions (combined with subsequent market action), 
which are unobservable, it is possible to examine the holding period of positions 
for potential evidence of an audience influence. Hypothesis 2 proposes that 
winning trades would be more quickly or slowly exited, while Hypothesis 3 
makes a similar suggestion about losing trades. To test these hypotheses, two 
models may be utilized: 
 
 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =  α + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,t + 𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,t +  𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖  
+  𝛽4𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,t  +  𝛽5𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,t  
+  𝛽6𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,t + 𝑢𝑖,t 
(6.4) 
 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 =  α + 𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,t + 𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,t
+  𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖  +  𝛽4𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,t  
+  𝛽5𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,t  +  𝛽6𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,t + 𝑢𝑖,t 
(6.5) 
Where 
𝑊𝑖𝑛𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is the log of the duration of position t executed by Trader i if 
that trade is a winner. 
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝐻𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is the log of the duration of position t executed by Trader i if 
that trade is a loser 
Remaining variables as previously defined.  
 
Again, leverage is included in the model to capture the position size 
decision, while currency pair fixed effects are used to account for instrument 
selection decisions. The results of these two sets of member-clustered OLS 
regression can be found in Tables 6.6 and 6.7 respectively. The primary 
takeaway of the findings is that the degree of observation – at least as 
measured by friend connections – does not meaningfully impact on trade 
holding period. It does not matter whether one talks about winning or losing 
trades. Neither of the two tables shows the coefficient of Friends or 
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MemberProfitableFriends as being significant. As such, neither Hypothesis 2 
that sophisticated traders would be increasingly influenced to change their 
winning trade holding lengths as they are more observed nor Hypothesis 3 that 
sophisticated traders would be increasingly influenced to change their losing 
trade holding lengths as they are more observed is supported. 
Nevertheless, there are some worthwhile observations. The first is that 
the profitable group tends to hold both winning and losing trades longer than do 
others. This is perhaps to be expected given that they were selected on the 
basis of mean excess trade return. Longer holding periods tend to mean 
capturing greater volatility. The other observation is that the profitable traders 
do appear to be motivated toward faster exits of winning trades as members of 
the network. This does not show in the MemberProfitable coefficient until adding 
in Friends, and especially the MemberProfitableFriends interaction. The 
coefficient for the latter, while not significant, is positive. The implication there is 
that increased observability may actually counter a tendency to exit winning 
trades more quickly. As such, it is possible that there are conflicting influences 
toward greater loss aversion and an increased desire to appear more savvy by 
fighting against the influences of the disposition effect. 
6.4.3. Does observability drive overconfidence? 
The fourth hypothesis of this chapter speaks to the position size decision 
a trader makes before entering a new position, specifically from the point of 
view of trade volume relative to the size of one’s account - leverage. The 
theorization is that the larger the audience and the dissemination of outgoing 
information, the greater the overconfidence, leading to an increase in leverage 
use. The following model can be applied to test Hypothesis 4: 
 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  α +  𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖  
+  𝛽3𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡  
+  𝛽5𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
(6.6) 
 
It will be observed that Friends is the only random variable included in 
this model. While it would be possible to include spread as reflective of the 
instrument decision being made, a currency pair fixed effect is used instead to 
provide more precision (in theory, multiple currency pairs could have the same 
spread return value at a given point in time). 
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The results of running the member-clustered OLS regressions for this 
model can be found in Table 6.8. The indications are interesting. Firstly, the 
Profitable dummy is negative and significant across the board (about -0.74), 
which suggests that these traders tend to use less leverage on average than do 
others. This is no real surprise given the findings from Chapter 4 that more 
sophisticated traders tend to trade at lower leverage levels (though the 
significance is not overly strong). More directly related to the research question 
at hand, the MemberProfitableFriends interaction term’s coefficient is positive 
with very high significance and an economically meaningful coefficient (0.532). 
This is support of the Hypothesis 4 idea that the greater one’s audience, the 
greater one’s overconfidence. 
Importantly, members of the network under consideration here could not 
observe each other’s level of leverage use – at least not directly.91 That means 
leverage use was not something available for use as the basis of identifying 
others to connect with in the network in the same way as something like 
currencies traded. Additionally, the profitable traders in this case were identified 
on the basis of their market timing ability, not their monthly returns, which would 
have been influenced by leverage.92 As a result, there is little risk of a reverse 
causality issue in these results – that higher friend counts were a function of 
greater leverage use rather than greater leverage use being a function of a 
higher number of friends. 
It is worth noting that in the case of leverage there is no member level 
effect – either generally or with respect to the profitable members. The 
implication is that simply the fact of being observed is not sufficient to influence 
overconfidence. It is specifically the size of a trader’s audience which drives 
them toward greater leverage use. Arguably, this makes the support for 
Hypothesis 4 even stronger. 
6.4.4. Does an audience alter market timing strategy? 
The question of instrument selection and position sizing with regards to 
trade entry have been addressed. So too has the question of whether there is 
                                            
91
 The more ambitious network members might have been able to back out leverage use from 
the net returns they could observe. This would only be reasonably possible in the case of 
traders who never had overlapping positions or multiple trades in a given time period, however. 
That rules out the vast majority of the traders in this study. 
92
 There is less than a 40% overlap between the top quartile of traders in terms of market timing 
and the top quartile in terms of mean monthly return (both on the basis of the pre-membership 
period). 
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an influence on trade disposition. It is now left to consider the final outcome of 
trades as a probable indication of impression management on performance. 
Hypothesis 5 proposes that observation encourages a trader to alter some 
aspect of their decision-making process with respect to market timing. This may 
be something as simple as becoming more hesitant to pull the trigger, or it could 
be as significant as shifting to a different analytic approach altogether. There is 
no way of knowing without direct observation what is really happening. That just 
leaves the analysis of outcomes to ascertain whether there is some change in 
behaviour at work. 
Since the group being examined in this analysis is one which has 
demonstrated strong market timing performance, it makes sense to gauge 
whether they change behaviour by using a metric directly related to that ability. 
That is unleveraged trade excess return. This is a superior measure to simple 
trade return (the mean version of which was used in Chapter 4) because it 
removes other variables unrelated to the entry and exit decision-making 
process from the equation. With that in mind, the following model is proposed to 
test Hypothesis 5: 
 
 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡
=  α +  𝛽1𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,t +  𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,t
+  𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖  +  𝛽4𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,t  
+  𝛽5𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,t  +  𝛽6𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐹𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖,t + 𝑢𝑖,t 
(6.7) 
Where 
𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡 is the exchange rate change captured by position t 
executed by Trader i after accounting for the bid/ask spread. 
Remaining variables as previously defined.  
 
Although the use of excess return in this case, because it only 
incorporates the change in the exchange rate, removes the influence of position 
size on the value of the dependent variable, leverage has still been included in 
the model as a control. Similarly, the use of currency pair fixed effects is 
retained. Both serve to capture aspects of the trade decision-making process 
which go beyond the question of when to buy and sell. 
Table 6.9 outlines the regressions results based on this model, again 
working on an OLS basis with clustering on member and robust standard errors. 
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As would be expected, the coefficient of the Profitable dummy is positive and 
significant across the board. Interestingly, the Membership dummy comes 
through as negative and significant up to the point where the MemberProfitable 
interaction term is introduced, after which the coefficient is no longer significant. 
That MemberProfitable is negative and strongly significant points to the how 
much of an adverse impact the traders in the profitable group experience once 
they become members of the network. Although Friends does not come through 
as significant, the MemberProfitableFriends interaction term is negative and 
significant (-0.00017), with only a small change in the coefficient value for 
MemberProfitable. This indicates that while there is a general membership 
effect on market timing performance, it is exacerbated as one’s audience 
increases. This is evidence in support of Hypothesis 5 in terms of sophisticated 
traders experiencing increasingly lower excess returns the more they are 
observed. It would appear that observation does lead to some kind of change in 
the way these profitable traders plan and/or execute their trades. 
One point of interest in the Table 6.9 results is that the coefficient for 
Leverage is not significant. This would seem to be contradictory to the findings 
of Chapter 4 where leverage is shown to be an influencing factor on average 
deleveraged trade returns, which are closely akin to the excess return values 
being examined here. Recall that the Chapter 4 results were based on monthly 
aggregates, however. My hypothesis is that overconfidence as indicated by 
leverage use is expressed at a higher time frame level than per trade. This fits 
with the findings from Section 6.4.3 in that changes in the size of one’s 
audience are unlikely to happen at the trade-by-trade level, but rather in a 
higher time frame – especially in a high frequency trading environment.  
Further, at the individual transaction level the leverage decision may be a 
function of the nominal risk the position is viewed as taking and how that relates 
to the risk the traders wishes to take relative to their account size. For example, 
if a trader decides to risk 2% of their capital on a position, then the amount of 
leverage applied is considerably different if the nominal risk of the trade is 10 
points as opposed to 20 points. Thus, at the trade level leverage use is a 
function of a higher level decision (percent of capital risked) and the current 
trade operating parameters (where the trader places their stop loss order). If it is 
expected that traders do not change their per trade risk level from transaction to 
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transaction, but only do so in broader spans of time, then overconfidence driven 
changes in leverage use is not necessarily challenged by the Table 6.9 results. 
6.4.5. Robustness checks 
The main decision-point consideration for this chapter not already 
addressed in the sections above or previously in Chapters involves the 
exclusion of the two high-friend members - neither of whom are in the profitable 
group. Including them in the analysis has mixed effects on the results (not 
presented). In the case of the spread analysis show in Table 6.3, the Friends 
coefficient is more negative and the significance is higher in both of the last two 
columns. This does not alter the main conclusion. For the EUR or USD results 
in Table 6.4 and the non-majors results from 6.5, the findings are basically 
unchanged. This also holds for the results for the winning and losing trade 
holding periods shown in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. In the case of the leverage results 
from Table 6.8, including the dropped members causes the Friends coefficient 
from the last two columns to become negative and significant, which in turn 
sees the coefficient for MemberProfitableFriends rise to about 0.68 (already 
highly significant). Finally, in the case of the Table 6.9 results focused on trade 
excess returns, the only influence is a slight drop in the significance of 
MemberProfitableFriends in the last column, but no real change in the 
coefficient of that interaction term or the Friends variable. Thus, where there is 
any impact, including the two high friend count members tends to strengthen 
the findings presented above. 
It is noted in Section 6.3 that the excess return values used can be 
thought of in a similar way as the average deleveraged return value analysed in 
Chapter 4. Aside from the latter being a mean and the former an actual value 
for each transaction, the only difference between the two is that excess return 
has the spread component of the return removed (or more correctly, added 
back in). An alternate set of tests using a deleveraged return value – the 
exchange rate move captured inclusive of the spread – produces virtually 
identical results to those for excess return. 
Because all the analysis in this chapter is done on a transaction basis, 
there is potential value in estimating a member’s friend connections when each 
trade is executed. This is done on the same “earliest possible connection” basis 
as the monthly figures, but can be accomplished in two different ways. One is 
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using only connections between active members (those who have done at least 
one trade in a network-connected account) while the other includes all 
members. It is the active member segment which is applied in Chapter 5 
because non-active members do not transmit any information through the 
network via their trading. For consistency, that same group is used in this 
chapter. While focusing only on active members does make sense when 
considering an audience who is actually participatory, an argument can be 
made that one could be influenced by their total friend count. For that reason, it 
is worth considering trade level friend estimates from both perspectives.  
Secondary analysis based on these two estimation methods produces 
little difference in results, however. In the case of the active-only tests the 
results are almost identical. When including the inactive members (which results 
in a significantly higher mean friend count, as would be expected), the results 
are similar enough not to change the primary conclusions. The one place where 
both sets of analysis do show a difference is in the case of Excess Return 
(Table 6.9). In both cases, the MemberProfitableFriends interaction term loses 
significance, though MemberProfitable is unaffected. This suggests a sensitivity 
to friend counts for that activity metric, but the fact that MemberProfitable 
remains negative and significant continues to suggest an audience effect, just 
one based on existence rather than on size. 
Of additional note, as in the prior chapters, alternative panel regression 
analysis generally provides more significant results than those presented 
herein. The OLS alternative results are presented as representing the more 
conservative approach. 
6.5. Conclusion & Further Discussion 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the question of whether being 
exposed to observation by one’s peers (broadly speaking) influences an 
investor’s behaviour. The primary evidence presented for just such an effect 
comes from Tables 6.8 and 6.9 where a link is made between a higher number 
of friends in a social network (higher observability, larger audience, greater 
judgement influencing communication) and both increased leverage use and 
increasingly impaired market timing performance. In Chapter 4 a connection 
between increased leverage use and a decrease in trade excess returns is 
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developed, suggestive of the idea that not only does increased overconfidence 
hurt returns from the perspective of larger transaction costs, it also results in 
diminished market-timing effectiveness. The findings of this chapter again 
highlight the relationship between overconfidence and the making of worse 
trade decisions – or perhaps the shift toward a different, less effective, trading 
strategy, though that cannot be observed. 
A natural reaction to seeing market timing performance reductions 
related to audience size is to consider the effect of an investor’s followers 
copying their trading strategy. Presumably, this sort of activity would eventually 
degrade that strategy’s performance. Certainly in the case of institutional 
investors this would be a concern, which is a factor in why they seek to mask 
their activity. As is discussed in Chapter 2, in the case of retail forex trading this 
is not a meaningful consideration since retail volumes likely represent less than 
5% of inter-bank market trading, however. The inter-bank market is where 
global exchange rates are set, so the retail market’s impact is small. Going a 
step further, members of the social network in question may have had a few 
hundred friends at most, which would be a tiny fraction of market participants. In 
other words, even if every one of a member’s friends is employing the same 
strategy, it would have no impact on exchange rates, and thus that can be ruled 
out as explaining the drop in trade excess returns. 
 In the case of instrument selection and trade disposition, the results are 
largely unsupportive of the developed hypotheses. That said, there are some 
considerations worth examining. The first is that there could be a general effect 
related to simply joining the network. To the extent that doing so means one’s 
trading activity is visible to others in one fashion or another there could be a 
type of panopticon effect whereby a trader is impacted by the understanding 
that that they could be observed at any given time. As Johnson (2008) observes 
with regards to the type of information gathering happening in this kind of social 
network structure, “Individuals would know that most of what they do can be 
observed and this could influence how they behave.” There is evidence for this 
level of behavioural influence in Table 6.9 where trade excess returns are 
indicated as being negatively influenced by network membership well above 
and beyond any connection to friend count. The same can be said of the length 
of the holding period of winning trades as documented in Table 6.6. An 
interesting potential extension of this research would be to link observability with 
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measures of emotional state at the time of trade entry per the findings of Lo et 
al. (2005) that the latter is important in the context of real-time decision-making. 
Moving down to the level of degrees of observation, there is the question 
of a differentiation in observer effect based on personality types, as suggested 
by Grant and Dajee (2003) and Uziel (2007). Certain types of effects may be 
washed out by having traders of different characters reacting to being observed 
in opposing ways. For example, Table 6.8 shows a strong positive link between 
increased audience size and leverage use, though there is little in the way of 
support for an audience link to risk-seeking behaviour where currency or 
currency pair selection is concerned. It may be in the latter case that even if 
there is relatively little personality type variation within the group of profitable 
traders (111 members), it is enough to keep results from being significant. With 
a richer data set it should be possible to examine these questions at a more 
granular level. 
From a broader perspective, it could be that there is a personality aspect 
to these who join a trading social network which is seen across all members – 
or at least a significantly large portion of them. The findings from Tables 6.3, 
6.4, and 6.5 showing a friend influence on currency and currency pair selection 
seem to point in that direction. This is a self-selection issue with the data used 
in this study. A randomized study or the ability to otherwise compare network 
member traders with a control sample would be useful in addressing this issue. 
It must be noted that since actual friend connection counts are not 
available for most of the sample period, and therefore estimates are used in 
their place, there is the potential for faulty estimates to have influenced the 
results. This is suggested in the robustness analysis from Section 6.4.5. Even if 
the estimates are close enough to reality as to not meaningfully influence the 
findings, there are still ways which the research could potentially be improved. 
The analysis herein assumes that all friend connections are of equal exposure 
and importance value. The reality of the situation, though, is that certain friends 
– or types of friends – may have much more meaning and influence on a 
member’s behaviour than others, or drive a different type of behaviour, as per 
Seta and Seta (1995). The degree of actual observation, and of interaction, is 
also potentially relevant. 
Additionally, there is the question of the directionality of the “friending” 
behaviour underlying the development of network connections. It is perhaps a 
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reasonable assumption that it is lesser skilled traders seeking to connect with 
more skilled ones which drives connectivity. Certainly, expectations would 
support that sort of behaviour as something which could drive increased 
overconfidence, even without taking into account the theories around 
impression management. Unfortunately, the dataset employed herein lacks 
information with regards to which member of a friend pair is the initiating party. 
It would be of research interest to be able to ascertain whether that directionality 
plays a part in any or all of the influences examined in this chapter. 
Potentially of most importance in this discussion is the question of what 
exactly traders would consider socially desirable or acceptable behaviour. What 
is the financial markets equivalent of the Munger and Harris (1989) hand 
washing? Some ideas are put forward here, but a more thorough examination of 
the subject is warranted. Further, it has to be considered that what is deemed 
desirable or acceptable may vary depending on the character of the investor in 
question and their relationship to their audience. 
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Table 6.1 
Descriptive Statistics for Pre-Membership vs. Post-Entry Periods and Social Capital Measures for Social Network Traders 
Sample of 443 retail foreign exchange traders for July 2008 to April 2013, including 488,661 round-turn transactions. Excess Return is the exchange rate move 
captured by a trade after accounting for the bid/ask spread. Leverage ratio of position size to account balance a trade. Duration is the holding period of a trade. 
Spread is the return equivalent of the bid/ask spread (always negative) for a given trade. EUR & USD is an indication of trades which include the euro and/or the US 
dollar in the transacted currency pair. Non-Major is an indication of trades in which the transacted currency pair does features no more than one of the major 
currencies (USD, EUR, GBP, JPY, AUD, CAD, CHF). (* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01) 
Panel A: All Members 
 
Non-Member: 198,356 Observations Member: 290,305 Observations 
  
 
Mean Std. Dev. 25% 75% Mean Std. Dev. 25% 75% Change 
Excess Return 0.0228% 0.6808% -0.0363% 0.1263% -0.0089% 0.6830% -0.0836% 0.1371% -0.03167%*** 
Leverage (N:1) 5.30 17.72 0.40 3.98 3.67 12.87 0.22 2.59 -1.63*** 
Duration (Days) 1.58 12.26 0.01 0.35 1.67 12.01 0.02 0.53 0.087** 
Spread (Bid/Ask return) -0.0151% 0.0096% -0.0185% -0.0077% -0.0144% 0.0094% -0.0176% -0.0077% 0.0008%*** 
EUR & USD 85.40% 
  
  89.27% 
  
  3.87%*** 
Non-Major 8.17% 
  
  6.11% 
  
  -2.06%*** 
 
 
Panel B: Profitable Members Only (111 traders) 
 
Non-Member: 21,790 Observations Member: 43,516 Observations 
  
 
Mean Std. Dev. 25% 75% Mean Std. Dev. 25% 75% Change 
Excess Return 0.1926% 1.2438% 0.0124% 0.3438% 0.0160% 0.9524% -0.1027% 0.2377% -0.1766%*** 
Leverage (N:1) 2.09 7.02 0.18 1.60 1.91 6.10 0.10 1.58 -0.18*** 
Duration (Days) 5.46 22.90 0.06 2.33 2.90 11.64 0.06 1.53 -2.56*** 
Spread (Bid/Ask return) -0.0172% 0.0116% -0.0192% -0.0123% -0.0167% 0.0123% -0.0192% -0.0081% 0.0005%*** 
EUR & USD 84.30% 
  
  85.92% 
  
  1.62%*** 
Non-Major 9.70% 
  
  8.16% 
  
  -1.54%*** 
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Table 6.2 
Correlations of Study Variables 
Sample of 443 retail foreign exchange traders for July 2008 to April 2013, including 488,661 round-turn transactions. Excess Return is the exchange rate move 
captured by a trade after accounting for the bid/ask spread. Leverage is the ratio of position size to account balance a trade. Duration is the holding period of a 
trade. Spread is the return equivalent of the bid/ask spread (always negative) for a given trade. EUR & USD is an indication of trades which include the euro and/or 
the US dollar in the transacted currency pair. Non-Major is an indication of trades in which the transacted currency pair does features no more than one of the major 
currencies (USD, EUR, GBP, JPY, AUD, CAD, CHF). Friends is the log of 1 plus the estimated number of friend connections for the trader in the month during which 
a trade takes place. Membership is a dummy set to 1 for months in which an individual is part of the network. Profitable is a dummy set to 1 for individuals whose 
mean excess trade returns pre-membership were in the top quartile. Excess Return, Leverage, and Duration winsorized at 1% and 99% 
 
Excess Return Leverage Duration Spread EUR or USD Non-Major Friends Membership Profitable 
Excess Return 1.00 
        
          Leverage 0.02 1.00 
       
 
(0.00) 
        Duration -0.08 -0.18 1.00 
      
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
       Spread -0.05 0.08 -0.18 1.00 
     
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
      EUR or USD -0.02 0.04 -0.11 0.58 1.00 
    
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     Non-Major 0.03 0.00 0.06 -0.63 -0.30 1.00 
   
 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
    Friends -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 0.07 0.08 -0.07 1.00 
  
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
   Membership -0.03 -0.13 0.07 0.04 0.06 -0.04 0.44 1.00 
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
  Profitable 0.06 -0.16 0.21 -0.09 -0.03 0.03 -0.11 0.06 1.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Table 6.3 
Implications of Observation on Currency Pair Selection for the Best Market Timers Amongst Members of a Retail Forex Trader 
Social Network, with Month Fixed Effects 
𝑺𝒑𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒅𝒊,𝐭 =  𝛂 +  𝜷𝟏𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝐭 +  𝜷𝟐𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑𝒊,𝐭 +  𝜷𝟑𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊  + 𝜷𝟒𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝐭  +  𝜷𝟓𝑭𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒊,𝐭  
+  𝜷𝟔𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝑭𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒊,𝐭 + 𝒖𝒊,𝐭 
Sample of 443 retail foreign exchange traders for July 2008 to April 2013, including 488,661 round-turn transactions. Leverage is the log of the ratio of position size 
to account balance a trade, winsorized at 1% and 99%. Membership is a dummy set to 1 for months in which an individual is part of the network. Profitable is a 
dummy set to 1 for individuals whose mean excess trade returns pre-membership were in the top quartile. Member-Profitable is an interaction term equal to 
Membership x Profitable. Friends is the log of 1 plus the estimated number of friend connections for the trader in the month during which a trade takes place. 
Member-Profitable-Friends is an interaction terms calculated as Membership x Profitable x Friends. Results are from an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
clustered on member with robust standard errors using month fixed effects, and are expressed in terms of the return of the bid/ask spread (always negative). 
Standard errors indicated below the coefficients. (* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01) 
Test Membership Profitable Member-Profitable Friends Member-Profitable-Friends 
Intercept -0.000142*** -0.000140*** -0.000140*** -0.000140*** -0.000140*** 
 
(0.000017) (0.000016) (0.000016) (0.000016) (0.000016) 
Leverage 0.000005*** 0.000005*** 0.000005*** 0.000005*** 0.000005*** 
 
(0.000002) (0.000002) (0.000002) (0.000002) (0.000002) 
Membership 0.000001 0.000002 0.000001 -0.000005 -0.000006 
 
(0.000008) (0.000008) (0.000008) (0.000009) (0.000009) 
Profitable 
 
-0.000022** -0.000026* -0.000026* -0.000026* 
  
(0.000010) (0.000013) (0.000013) (0.000014) 
Member-Profitable 
  
0.000006 0.000010 0.000014 
   
(0.000014) (0.000014) (0.000016) 
Friends 
   
0.000004* 0.000004* 
    
(0.000002) (0.000002) 
Member-Profitable-Friends 
    
-0.000005 
     
(0.000006) 
Adjusted R
2
 6.40% 7.00% 7.01% 7.37% 7.40% 
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Table 6.4 
Implications of Observation on EUR and USD Trading Frequency for the Best Market Timers Amongst Members of a Retail 
Forex Trader Social Network, with Month Fixed Effects 
𝑬𝑼𝑹𝒐𝒓𝑼𝑺𝑫𝒊,𝐭 =  𝛂 +  𝜷𝟏𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝐭 +  𝜷𝟐𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑𝒊,𝐭 +  𝜷𝟑𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊  +  𝜷𝟒𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝐭  +  𝜷𝟓𝑭𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒊,𝐭  
+  𝜷𝟔𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝑭𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒊,𝐭 + 𝒖𝒊,𝐭 
Sample of 443 retail foreign exchange traders for July 2008 to April 2013, including 488,661 round-turn transactions. Leverage is the log of the ratio of position size 
to account balance a trade, winsorized at 1% and 99%. Membership is a dummy set to 1 for months in which an individual is part of the network. Profitable is a 
dummy set to 1 for individuals whose mean excess trade returns pre-membership were in the top quartile. Member-Profitable is an interaction term equal to 
Membership x Profitable. Friends is the log of 1 plus the estimated number of friend connections for the trader in the month during which a trade takes place. 
Member-Profitable-Friends is an interaction terms calculated as Membership x Profitable x Friends. Results are from an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
clustered on member with robust standard errors using month fixed effects, and are expressed in terms of the fraction of trades featuring the euro and/or US dollar. 
Standard errors indicated below the coefficients. (* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01) 
Test Membership Profitable Member-Profitable Friends Member-Profitable-Friends 
Intercept 0.899*** 0.901*** 0.901*** 0.901*** 0.900*** 
 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Leverage 0.013** 0.012** 0.012** 0.013** 0.013** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Membership 0.009 0.010 0.009 -0.017 -0.019 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026) 
Profitable 
 
-0.019 -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 
  
(0.033) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Member-Profitable 
  
0.008 0.024 0.039 
   
(0.046) (0.046) (0.051) 
Friends 
   
0.016*** 0.017*** 
    
(0.006) (0.006) 
Member-Profitable-Friends 
    
-0.023 
     
(0.020) 
Adjusted R2 6.74% 6.77% 6.77% 7.22% 7.26% 
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Table 6.5 
Implications of Observation on Non-Major Currency Pair Selection for the Best Market Timers Amongst Members of a Retail 
Forex Trader Social Network, with Month Fixed Effects 
𝑵𝒐𝒏𝑴𝒂𝒋𝒐𝒓𝒊,𝐭 =  𝛂 +  𝜷𝟏𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝐭 +  𝜷𝟐𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑𝒊,𝐭 + 𝜷𝟑𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊  + 𝜷𝟒𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝐭  +  𝜷𝟓𝑭𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒊,𝐭  
+  𝜷𝟔𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝑭𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒊,𝐭 + 𝒖𝒊,𝐭 
Sample of 443 retail foreign exchange traders for July 2008 to April 2013, including 488,661 round-turn transactions. Leverage is the log of the ratio of position size 
to account balance a trade, winsorized at 1% and 99%. Membership is a dummy set to 1 for months in which an individual is part of the network. Profitable is a 
dummy set to 1 for individuals whose mean excess trade returns pre-membership were in the top quartile. Member-Profitable is an interaction term equal to 
Membership x Profitable. Friends is the log of 1 plus the estimated number of friend connections for the trader in the month during which a trade takes place. 
Member-Profitable-Friends is an interaction terms calculated as Membership x Profitable x Friends. Results are from an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
clustered on member with robust standard errors using month fixed effects, and are expressed in terms of the fraction of trades in which no more than one of the 
major currencies features (USD, EUR, GBP, JPY, AUD, CAD, CHF). Standard errors indicated below the coefficients. (* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01) 
Test Membership Profitable Member-Profitable Friends Member-Profitable-Friends 
Intercept 0.091* 0.088* 0.088* 0.088** 0.088** 
 
(0.047) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Leverage -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Membership -0.011 -0.012 -0.009 0.006 0.008 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) 
Profitable 
 
0.022 0.035 0.035 0.034 
  
(0.020) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Member-Profitable 
  
-0.019 -0.029 -0.044 
   
(0.031) (0.032) (0.035) 
Friends 
   
-0.010** -0.011** 
    
(0.004) (0.005) 
Member-Profitable-Friends 
    
0.022* 
     
(0.013) 
Adjusted R2 8.43% 8.51% 8.53% 8.81% 8.88% 
 
  
216 
 
Table 6.6 
Implications of Observation on Winning Trade Holding Length for the Best Market Timers Amongst Members of a Retail Forex 
Trader Social Network, with Month and Currency Pair Fixed Effects 
𝑾𝒊𝒏𝑯𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒊,𝒕 =  𝛂 +  𝜷𝟏𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝐭 +  𝜷𝟐𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑𝒊,𝐭 +  𝜷𝟑𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊  +  𝜷𝟒𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝐭  +  𝜷𝟓𝑭𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒊,𝐭  
+  𝜷𝟔𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝑭𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒊,𝐭 + 𝒖𝒊,𝐭 
Sample of 443 retail foreign exchange traders for July 2008 to April 2013, including 312,729 round-turn transactions. Leverage is the log of the ratio of position size 
to account balance a trade, winsorized at 1% and 99%. Membership is a dummy set to 1 for months in which an individual is part of the network. Profitable is a 
dummy set to 1 for individuals whose mean excess trade returns pre-membership were in the top quartile. Member-Profitable is an interaction term equal to 
Membership x Profitable. Friends is the log of 1 plus the estimated number of friend connections for the trader in the month during which a trade takes place. 
Member-Profitable-Friends is an interaction terms calculated as Membership x Profitable x Friends. Results are from an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
clustered on member with robust standard errors using month and currency pair fixed effects, and are expressed in terms of the log of the duration of winning trades 
(winsorized at 1% and 99%). Standard errors indicated below the coefficients. (* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01) 
Test Membership Profitable Member-Profitable Friends Member-Profitable-Friends 
Intercept -1.238** -1.356** -1.375** -1.344** -1.331** 
 
(0.581) (0.546) (0.540) (0.551) (0.552) 
Leverage -0.107*** -0.072** -0.073** -0.077** -0.080** 
 
(0.040) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) 
Membership 0.112 0.082 0.157 0.324* 0.342* 
 
(0.187) (0.172) (0.190) (0.184) (0.186) 
Profitable 
 
1.305*** 1.631*** 1.633*** 1.630*** 
  
(0.215) (0.340) (0.339) (0.339) 
Member-Profitable 
  
-0.518 -0.632* -0.760** 
   
(0.351) (0.349) (0.364) 
Friends 
   
-0.100 -0.110 
    
(0.068) (0.071) 
Member-Profitable-Friends 
    
0.200 
     
(0.137) 
Adjusted R2 11.92% 15.10% 15.22% 15.53% 15.59% 
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Table 6.7 
Implications of Observation on Losing Trade Holding Length for the Best Market Timers Amongst Members of a Retail Forex 
Trader Social Network, with Month and Currency Pair Fixed Effects 
𝑳𝒐𝒔𝒔𝑯𝒐𝒍𝒅𝒊,𝒕 =  𝛂 +  𝜷𝟏𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝐭 +  𝜷𝟐𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑𝒊,𝐭 +  𝜷𝟑𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊  +  𝜷𝟒𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝐭  +  𝜷𝟓𝑭𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒊,𝐭  
+  𝜷𝟔𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝑭𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒊,𝐭 + 𝒖𝒊,𝐭 
Sample of 443 retail foreign exchange traders for July 2008 to April 2013, including 175,685 round-turn transactions. Leverage is the log of the ratio of position size 
to account balance a trade, winsorized at 1% and 99%. Membership is a dummy set to 1 for months in which an individual is part of the network. Profitable is a 
dummy set to 1 for individuals whose mean excess trade returns pre-membership were in the top quartile. Member-Profitable is an interaction term equal to 
Membership x Profitable. Friends is the log of 1 plus the estimated number of friend connections for the trader in the month during which a trade takes place. 
Member-Profitable-Friends is an interaction terms calculated as Membership x Profitable x Friends. Results are from an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
clustered on member with robust standard errors using month and currency pair fixed effects, and are expressed in terms of the log of the duration of losing trades 
(winsorized at 1% and 99%). Standard errors indicated below the coefficients. (* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01) 
Test Membership Profitable Member-Profitable Friends Member-Profitable-Friends 
Intercept -1.567** -1.572** -1.577** -1.609** -1.611** 
 
(0.759) (0.733) (0.729) (0.740) (0.742) 
Leverage -0.307*** -0.287*** -0.286*** -0.293*** -0.295*** 
 
(0.040) (0.043) (0.042) (0.039) (0.039) 
Membership -0.102 -0.138 -0.114 0.114 0.127 
 
(0.214) (0.213) (0.232) (0.222) (0.225) 
Profitable 
 
0.999*** 1.157*** 1.145*** 1.141*** 
  
(0.204) (0.250) (0.250) (0.249) 
Member-Profitable 
  
-0.224 -0.341 -0.459 
   
(0.304) (0.291) (0.305) 
Friends 
   
-0.160 -0.169 
    
(0.115) (0.120) 
Member-Profitable-Friends 
    
0.158 
     
(0.200) 
Adjusted R2 16.96% 18.28% 18.30% 18.96% 18.99% 
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Table 6.8 
Implications of Observation on Leverage Use for the Best Market Timers Amongst Members of a Retail Forex Trader Social 
Network, with Month and Currency Pair Fixed Effects 
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕 =  𝛂 +  𝜷𝟏𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑𝒊,𝒕 +  𝜷𝟐𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊  +  𝜷𝟑𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝒕  + 𝜷𝟒𝑭𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒊,𝒕  
+  𝜷𝟓𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝑭𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒊,𝒕 + 𝒖𝒊,𝒕 
Sample of 443 retail foreign exchange traders for July 2008 to April 2013, including 488,661 round-turn transactions. Membership is a dummy set to 1 for months in 
which an individual is part of the network. Profitable is a dummy set to 1 for individuals whose mean excess trade returns pre-membership were in the top quartile. 
Member-Profitable is an interaction term equal to Membership x Profitable. Friends is the log of 1 plus the estimated number of friend connections for the trader in 
the month during which a trade takes place. Member-Profitable-Friends is an interaction terms calculated as Membership x Profitable x Friends. Results are from an 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression clustered on member with robust standard errors using month and currency pair fixed effects, and are expressed in terms 
of the log of the ratio of position size to account balance for the trade, and winsorized at 1% and 99%. Standard errors indicated below the coefficients.  
(* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01) 
Test Membership Profitable Member-Profitable Friends Member-Profitable-Friends 
Intercept -0.028 0.009 0.011 0.016 0.035 
 
(0.575) (0.581) (0.582) (0.576) (0.576) 
Membership -0.206 -0.183 -0.188 -0.094 -0.048 
 
(0.209) (0.210) (0.224) (0.203) (0.204) 
Profitable 
 
-0.721** -0.745* -0.744* -0.748* 
  
(0.293) (0.419) (0.419) (0.419) 
Member-Profitable 
  
0.037 -0.022 -0.380 
   
(0.455) (0.453) (0.460) 
Friends 
   
-0.060 -0.087 
    
(0.080) (0.080) 
Member-Profitable-Friends 
    
0.532*** 
     
(0.157) 
Adjusted R2 12.77% 14.33% 14.33% 14.51% 15.22% 
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Table 6.9 
Implications of Observation on Trade Excess Returns for the Best Market Timers Amongst Members of a Retail Forex Trader 
Social Network, with Month and Currency Pair Fixed Effects 
𝑬𝒙𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔𝑹𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏𝒊,𝒕
=  𝛂 + 𝜷𝟏𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝐭 + 𝜷𝟐𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝒔𝒉𝒊𝒑𝒊,𝐭 +  𝜷𝟑𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊  +  𝜷𝟒𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊,𝐭  + 𝜷𝟓𝑭𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒊,𝐭  
+  𝜷𝟔𝑴𝒆𝒎𝒃𝒆𝒓𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒇𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝑭𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒔𝒊,𝐭 + 𝒖𝒊,𝐭 
Sample of 443 retail foreign exchange traders for July 2008 to April 2013, including 488,661 round-turn transactions. Leverage is the log of the ratio of position size 
to account balance a trade, winsorized at 1% and 99%. Membership is a dummy set to 1 for months in which an individual is part of the network. Profitable is a 
dummy set to 1 for individuals whose mean excess trade returns pre-membership were in the top quartile. Member-Profitable is an interaction term equal to 
Membership x Profitable. Friends is the log of 1 plus the estimated number of friend connections for the trader in the month during which a trade takes place. 
Member-Profitable-Friends is an interaction terms calculated as Membership x Profitable x Friends. Results are from an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
clustered on member with robust standard errors using month and currency pair fixed effects, and are expressed in terms of the exchange rate move captured by 
trades after accounting for the bid/ask spread, and winsorized at 1% and 99%. Standard errors indicated below the coefficients. (* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01) 
Test Membership Profitable Member-Profitable Friends Member-Profitable-Friends 
Intercept 0.00010 0.00006 0.00003 0.00002 0.00002 
 
(0.00026) (0.00026) (0.00026) (0.00024) (0.00024) 
Leverage 0.00005 0.00007 0.00007 0.00007 0.00007 
 
(0.00008) (0.00008) (0.00008) (0.00008) (0.00008) 
Membership -0.00021** -0.00023** -0.00009 -0.00018 -0.00019 
 
(0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00010) (0.00013) (0.00013) 
Profitable 
 
0.00078*** 0.00144*** 0.00144*** 0.00144*** 
  
(0.00018) (0.00023) (0.00023) (0.00023) 
Member-Profitable 
  
-0.00101*** -0.00096*** -0.00084*** 
   
(0.00028) (0.00029) (0.00031) 
Friends 
   
0.00005 0.00006 
    
(0.00004) (0.00004) 
Member-Profitable-Friends 
    
-0.00017** 
     
(0.00009) 
Adjusted R2 1.04% 1.39% 1.53% 1.55% 1.57% 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7.1. General 
Broadly speaking, this thesis expands the financial literature in four main 
areas. First, it extends the analysis of traders and investors in the high 
frequency environment by employing transactional and performance data from 
retail foreign exchange traders. Second, it expands the research in to the 
foreign exchange arena which has thus far received limited attention despite it 
being the single largest financial market in the world. Third, it extends the work 
being done with respect to social networks in finance, particularly online 
networks, by incorporating a dataset from an online network of retail traders. 
Fourth, it expands the literature with respect to the impact of observation and 
impression management on investor behaviour and performance. Chapter 2 
draws a link between high frequency trading and foreign exchange by 
describing the retail forex market structure, mechanics, and participants. 
Chapter 3 then goes on to describe the dataset used in this thesis which 
connects high frequency individual forex traders with social network 
participation. This is then used in the research chapters to examine questions of 
overconfidence and social influences on traders.  
In Chapter 4 the subject of investor overconfidence is approached from a 
new angle. The use of leverage is proposed as a key indicator of the presence 
of overconfidence in the decision-making process, one which is hypothesized to 
offer more precise information than either the turnover or trade frequency 
metrics previously used in the literature. The analysis of leverage use among 
retail foreign exchanges traders, which are among the most active users of 
leverage in the financial markets, supports the hypothesis in two ways. First, 
increased leverage is demonstrated to be negatively associated with returns in 
the same way turnover is in the extant literature. Second, increased leverage 
use is associated with a diminished quality of trade decision-making in terms of 
the exchange rate moves being captured by the traders studied. These results 
are supported in the evaluation of differences in experience and level of 
sophistication with respect to expectations of their influence on investor 
overconfidence. The findings of Chapters 5 and 6 go on to further underline 
both the influence of leverage on performance and the link it has to the quality 
222 
 
of the trades made by market participants. This expands the financial literature 
in terms of both putting leverage use under specific scrutiny and bringing 
overconfidence analysis in to the realm of high frequency trading where 
different considerations may be at work on behaviour than in traditional 
investment time frames. 
Chapter 5 turns the focus on trader and investor social networks with a 
specific focus on the information transmission they potentially generate and the 
social impact the interactions involving the receipt of that transmission can 
have. The suggestion is made that networks of retail traders in “small” markets 
likely do not involve the transmission of meaningful amounts of private 
fundamental information, but that members may yet benefit from the exchange 
of information of a non-fundamental nature. The evaluation of retail foreign 
exchange traders in an online social network is made to determine whether any 
information benefit is in fact to be gained from participation when considering 
the level and degree of interaction a member has (at least potentially) with 
others and how they were positioned in the network.  
The findings support the idea that at least some amount of useful 
information is transmitted through the network, but that those gains are offset by 
some kind of most likely social influence leading to markedly impaired returns. 
Those demonstrating a large information benefit are network members with the 
poorest pre-registration track record, which suggests the influence of 
endogenous information of an educational nature. More sophisticated members 
appear to experience no information benefit, which supports the hypothesis of a 
lack of meaningful non-public fundamental information transmission between 
members. Further, these sophisticated members appear to suffer a negative 
social effect from network membership resulting in significantly lower monthly 
returns. The existing literature with regards to the potential side effects of 
investor engagement does not offer sufficient explanation for these findings. 
Trader social networks remain the theme on Chapter 6, but with the 
focus shifting from information receipt from others to information transmission. 
Of primary interest is the potential impact on investors of their activity and 
performance being observed by others based on concepts developed broadly in 
the psychology literature. The general hypothesis tested is that an increase in 
the degree to which one is observed, or believes themselves to be observed, 
leads to a stronger motive to shape one’s activity in the markets toward what is 
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expected or to demonstrate savvy. The major findings are meaningful. 
Increased audience size is seen to be associated with greater overconfidence, 
as measured by leverage. At the same time, increased visibility in the form of a 
larger number of friends is linked to reduced excess trade returns. That 
combination of results both supports the hypothesis that audience size 
influences investor behaviour and performance, while also affirming the link 
between overconfidence and impaired market timing performance observed in 
Chapter 4. In the areas of instrument selection and potential disposition effects 
there are no conclusive findings of note, but a closer examination on the basis 
of trader heterogeneity is suggested. Further, there are some broader 
indications which may point to higher level observability effects which are 
introduced by the simple act of being able to be observed, regardless of 
audience size. 
The findings of Chapters 5 and 6 extend the literature in financial social 
networks a number of ways. They include evaluating the actual intentional 
connectivity of individuals with others (as opposed to assuming connections on 
a theoretical basis) as well as in the analysis of the influence of network 
membership both from an information receipt and information sharing 
perspective. It also includes extending the behavioural finance literature in the 
areas of learning, experience and sophistication and their impact on trader and 
investor activity and performance. Additionally, these two chapters further 
develop the literature related to investor overconfidence and trade disposition. 
7.2. Caveats 
The dataset used for the analysis in this thesis provides a relatively 
unique opportunity to analyse the activity and performance of a thus far little-
studied group of market participations. It does come with its share of issues and 
concerns, however. Top of the list is the manner in which it was constructed by 
combining a large number of data providers which did not have a uniform 
protocol for transmission. That created inconsistency in the data collected by 
the social network while at the same time there were acknowledged errors on 
the network side in handling some of that data. Every attempt is made to correct 
for potential data problems, but at a certain point one has to simply rely on the 
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underlying systems and procedures generally being structured properly and 
producing accurate data. 
On a related note, as much as the influence of non-trader initiated 
transactions (copy trades) is intended to be minimized to allow for the focus to 
remain on self-directed behaviour, they may still have had an influence. On an 
indirect basis, the performance of copied trades executed in a trader’s account 
might have influenced that trader’s decision-making where their own trading is 
concerned in terms of availability of marginable funds, the selection of 
exchange rates to trade, and the impact of profitability on risk taking. Any period 
where copied trades were executed in a trader’s account were eliminated from 
consideration with respect to monthly returns, potentially meaning significant 
self-directed returns were excluded from the analysis. This would have 
impacted a relatively small number of traders, however, so the influence is not 
likely meaningful. 
Data quality aside, there are two aspects to the dataset which are 
potentially biasing of the results produced by the analysis here. One is 
survivorship. The other is self-selection. Chapter 3 indicates the presence of 
survivorship in the way the number of active accounts gradually declined 
(Figure 3.2) even as those traders remaining active demonstrated even greater 
outperformance relative to the broader population (Table 3.7). The use of panel 
data regressions clustered on individual traders (and with trader fixed effects in 
places) does tend to minimize the concern about survivorship biasing the 
results. Even where it does not, the expectation would be that the results are 
slightly biased toward the better performers, which suggests that the general 
performance of traders is perhaps slightly worse than that seen here. 
The self-selection issue is somewhat harder to overcome. It introduces a 
question into the social network analysis as to whether the changes in 
behaviour and performance observed are truly reflective of the influence of 
being part of the network or simply reflect the influence of a propensity on the 
part of the traders in question. In particular, the sharing of one’s trading activity 
and returns with the public suggests a certain type of attitude. This is partly 
addressed by being able to control for whether one has opted to connect with 
others in the network, and of course in the analysis of returns and activity 
measures from before joining the network to after become a part. Still, to do a 
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more thorough analysis it would be desirable to have a randomly developed 
trader social network. 
7.3. Implications for Future Research 
The findings presented in this thesis suggest some interesting follow-up 
research questions. Near the top of the list is in the area of leverage use, which 
thus far has received relatively little consideration in the literature, at least at the 
individual market participant level. The focus here is on a relatively uninfluential 
segment of the markets where price discovery is concerned, but leverage is a 
factor in trading in other, much more notable areas, including futures and 
equities. To the extent that a better understanding of what motivates changes in 
the leverage decision can be identified it would facilitate better risk management 
and improved investment/trading performance. The results featured in Chapters 
5 and 6 provide a starting point in terms of offering a set of potential explanatory 
variables, but leave some open questions. One specific topic to consider is a 
possible link between leverage use and the disposition effect. If there is one, it 
has the potential to offer insight into market movements where leverage is 
readily employed. 
Another takeaway from the analysis herein is that market participants 
should be evaluated in a much more segmented fashion than has thus far been 
the case. All three of the research chapters provide indications that traders with 
different levels of experience and/or sophistication show markedly different 
performance. Even more importantly where future research potential is 
concerned, they show variation in the drivers of that performance and of trading 
activity. Clearly, viewing market participants in a more heterogeneous fashion 
offers the opportunity to gain new insights into the way different dynamics in the 
market come together to influence prices and drive returns. 
In the specific area of experience, questions abound as to things like 
source and time frames. The research here uses a fairly simple segmentation 
based on years in the market, but it provides little in the way of nuance. One 
question which immediately comes to mind is whether time is the appropriate 
indication of experience, or whether the volume of trading one has done is a 
better metric. Perhaps some combination of the two? Of course that also ties in 
with the question of education. How are traders learning and are those 
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methods, such as social network participation, effective? The discussion 
regarding some of the foibles of retail forex traders had in Chapter 2 certainly 
questions the quality of whatever education these individuals may be getting.  
Questions related to the influence of one’s account balance are also 
worth considering here. Sophistication indication aside, it is very interesting in 
particular to observe the influence a trader’s capital has on things like how 
much leverage they use. There is the suggestion of a potential risk aversion 
impact at work, begging the question as to whether simply depositing more 
money into a trader’s account would result in them experiencing better (less 
bad) returns. 
Related to the survivorship issue mentioned in the last section, there 
exists the potential in using a dataset such as the one analysed here to 
evaluate the decisions of traders to exit the markets and quit trading. The 
indication from Figure 3.2 is that by the end of the sample period only about half 
as many traders were active in the markets as had been the case at its peak. 
The actual drop-out rate of traders is even worse than 50%, however, as the 
number of active accounts at the end would have included a number of newer 
members. Granted, some of those who become inactive may have simply 
switched to accounts not connected with the social network. Even still, that 
leaves a large fraction of traders who called it quits. The factors which go into 
that decision are well worth researching. For example, does being more or less 
social influence one’s decision to stay in the markets longer? 
From the social perspective, one of the questions which frequently come 
up is the motivation of traders in taking part in a social network such as the one 
studied here. It is a legitimate inquiry which deserves more specific study. 
Educational, commercial, and social drivers were among those noted from a 
scan of user profile data, but a much more systematic approach to answering 
this question is warranted. If nothing else, motivation is a potentially important 
factor influencing the impact network membership has on a given individual. It 
could contribute to how active a member is and the type of interactions they are 
inclined toward, which both factor in to the information exchange aspect of 
network participation. It also likely directly relates to the question of the potential 
audience effects which might influence them. 
Along those lines, a closer examination of member activity and 
interaction is warranted. As has been the case with much of the extant research 
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on social networks in finance, this thesis assumes that connectivity leads to 
information transfer. There is considerable scope to drill down on that matter 
and examine just how much interaction members have with both friends and 
non-friends in the network by looking at things like discussion forum chats and 
instant messaging, as Heimer (2014b) does, perhaps while incorporating 
demographics. Weighting is a whole other consideration. No doubt certain 
friends, or types of friends or members, are more influential than others. Being 
able to establish a sense of how members weight the input they get from their 
network connections, or the degree to which they are being observed by them, 
would make for much more meaningful research into the influence of social 
interaction on trading activity, and by extension returns. 
Related to the question of observation is the performance of those 
traders whose trades are being copied. To what degree does that influence 
one’s trading above and beyond a standard audience effect? The anecdote 
from the beginning of Chapter 6 would suggest a behaviour effect for at least 
some traders in being responsible for other traders’ returns. Other 
considerations would need to be ruled out, however. 
One final area of specific research potential which is only touched upon 
in this thesis is that of copy trade provider selection. The process of selecting 
traders to copy has some commonalities to selecting mutual funds for 
investment, thus similar techniques could be applied in its analysis. At the same 
time, the fact that all trades are done in the followers account, thereby allowing 
them to tamper with active trades, introduces a whole different aspect to things. 
In particular, the question of the disposition effect comes immediately to mind. 
This is supported anecdotally by comments made to me by a manager of the 
social network sourced for the data used here that followers were indeed 
impairing their performance by closing trades out before their time. 
Generally speaking there remains considerable opportunity to extend the 
literature in the areas of high frequency trading, trading in the foreign exchange 
market, and in the areas of social networks. All three subjects remain in their 
relative infancy where the research is concerned 
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7.4. Final Thoughts 
In the realm of active retail trading there is a considerable amount of 
educational information which is passed around from trader to trader. Some of it 
has clear links to the findings of behavioural research such as the 
admonishments “Hold your winners, cut your losers” being related to the 
disposition effect, and “Don’t overtrade” attempting to curtail overconfident 
trading. Much of it, however, stands on shakier ground as it has not been 
subject to rigorous analysis and examination. This thesis is an attempt to at 
least take a step further along the path academically toward understanding the 
factors contributing to trading and investing performance and what motivates 
market participants at the individual level to act as they do. 
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